■ ELEMENTS 

0 F 

MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



ELEMENTS 

o v 

MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 

BY THE 

11 K V. H. II. RIVERS, 1). I). 




n 



EDITED BY THOMAS 0.- SUMMERS, D. D. 



N a s f j lit U e , Q. run.: 
FinU,!>MKi> BY A. H. RED KURD, Agent, 

FOll THE M. K. CHURCH, SO(;TIL 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in th-e year 1871, by 

A. H. BEDFORD, Agent, 
in the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED AT THE SOUTHERN METHODIST PURI.lKIUNfi HOUSE, 
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 
THEORETICAL ETHICS. 



CHAPTER I. 

STATEMENT OP THE SUBJECT. 

PAGE 

Definition of Moral Philosophy — Difference between Moral and 
Mental Philosophy — Subjects embraced in the philosophy of 
duty — Divisions of Moral Philosophy 25 



CHAPTER II. 

MORAL LAW. 

SECTION I. — Wayland's definition : its defects— The difference 
between moral and physical law — Correct definition of moral 
law — -God the establish er — Attributes of moral law 28 

w 



VI CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

SECTION II.— Retribution — Definition— Universality of the 
idea — Coleridge — Cousin — Theory of natural consequences : 
objections to it — Theory that it is always administered for the 
sake of reformation: objections to it — True theory 33 



CHAPTER III. 

MORAL AGENCY. 

SECTION I. — Requisites of moral agency — Intellect : why re- 
quisite — Sensibilities : argument to show they are needed — 
Classification of sensibilities — Appetites : true doctrine of the 
appetites ? 37 

SECTION II. — Propensities, or desires : classification — Desire 
of life : its nature, universality, design, moral character, con- 
nection with Christianity — Desire of knowledge : its nature 
and design — Desire of property — Desire of power — Desire of 
esteem : its universality : the effect of recklessness — Desire of 
society: its design — Desire of imitation: its universality: 
caution to parents — Desire of happiness : importance of this 
principle. 43 

SECTION III. — The affections: difference between affections 
and propensities — Classification — Their general design 48 

SECTION IV. — Conscience: arguments to prove the existence 
of a natural conscience — Objections stated and answered — 
Finney's analysis of conscience — Etymology of the word — 
Functions of conscience — Supremacy of conscience — Error to 
be avoided., t 49 

SECTION V. — Erroneous views of conscience — President Ma- 
han's view — Objections to this view — Theory of the Rev. Hub- 



CONTENTS. Vll 

PAGE 

bard Winslow — Objections to this theory — Concluding reflec- 
tions on the conscience G8 

SECTION VI.— The will : definition of the will— Freedom of the 
will — Arguments to establish its freedom — Opinions of cele- 
brated writers — Importance of the doctrine — Fatalism runs 
into atheism — Quotation from Fichte — Strength of the will — 
Its capacity for good or evil— Cultivation of the will — The 
doctrine of motives.. £ , 74 

SECTION VII.— Light : its sources— The light of nature— The 
light of revelation , 86 



CHAPTER IV. 

MORAL OBLIGATION. 

Definition of moral obligation — Foundation of moral obliga- 
tion — True theory given and established — Conditions of ob- 
ligation — Extent of obligation — Belief— Principles — Habits — 
Intentions « 97 

CHAPTER V 

MORAL CONDUCT. 

SECTION I, — Definition of moral conduct — Theory of morals — 
Mandeville's theory : objections — Wollaston's theory : objec- 
tions to Wollaston's theory — Hume's theory: objections to 
Hume — Selfish theory : arguments against the selfish system — 
Theory of disinterested benevolence : objections — Theory 
of sympathy: objections 117 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

SECTION II. — True theory of morals — Virtue denned — Insepar- 
able from the agent — When it shines most brightly — Hope of 
reward and fear of punishment, characteristics of virtue — 
Arguments to prove the theory true 137 

SECTION III.— Criteria of moral conduct 145 

- CHAPTER VI. 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 

SECTION I. — Moral government — Physical government — Evid- 
ences of physical government — Evidences of moral govern- 
ment — Analysis of moral government — Necessity of moral 
government 148 

SECTION II. — God the moral governor — Arguments to estab- 
lish this 151 

SECTION III.— God's right to rule— By what established— What 
is implied in this right , 153 



CONTENTS. 



PART II. 
PRACTICAL ETHICS. 



CHAPTER I. 

DUTIES TO GOD. 

PAQE 

SECTION I. — Internal duties: To know God — Confidence — Hu- 
mility — Beverence — Godly fear — Dependence — Love — Self- 
consecration , 157 

SECTION II.— Outward duties: Prayer— Prayer defined— What 
it presupposes — Natural views — Scriptural views — Different 
kinds of prayer — Private prayer — Family prayer — Public 
prayer — Posture in prayer — Arguments for and against forms 
of prayer — Efficacy of prayer — Objections answered — Reflec- 
tions 164 

SECTION III.— Sabbath— Original Sabbath— Paley's theory: 
objections to Paley's theory — True theory — Mosaic Sabbath — 
Christian Sabbath — Day changed — Proof that it is obligatory — 
How to be kept 172 



CHAPTER II. 

PERSONAL ETHICS. 

SECTION L— Self-protection— The principle of self-defence- 
Arguments in favor of self-defence — Objection answered — 

Self-injury to be avoided — Maiming — Torture — Suicide 183 

1* 



X CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

SECTION II.— Self-government: Control of the appetites— Sin 
of becoming slaves to the appetites — Control of the passions — 
Anger — Pride and vanity — Envy — Covetousness 187 

SECTION III. — Self-culture— Physical culture: Diet— Exer- 
cise — Dress — Cleanliness — Culture of the mind : Energy — 
Perseverance — System — Moral culture: Pursuit of know- 
ledge — Cherishing the sense of obligation — Obedience to con- 
science — Self-examination — Repentance — Putting principles 
into practice 195 



CHAPTEE III. 

HUMAN ETHICS. 

SECTION I. — Justice: definition — Justice to person forbids 
mutilation — Destruction of life : horrors of the crime of mur- 
der — Duelling: arguments against it 206 

SECTION II. — Justice as it respects character — Definition of 
character — Perfection the standard — What justice requires — 
The guilt of injuring character 210 

SECTION III. — Justice as it respects reputation — Reputation 
defined — Circumstances in which it maybe lowered — Slander : 
its turpitude 214 

SECTION IV. — Justice as it respects property — Definition of 
the right of property — How the right of property is acquired — 
The various ways in which it is violated — Fraud — Theft — Rob- 
bery — Rules that should govern buyer and seller 220 



SECTION V.— Justice as it regards belief— What is meant by 



CONTENTS. xi 

PAGE 

justice in reference to belief — Veracity — Logical truth — Moral 
truth — Paley's theory : objection to Paley's theory 227 

SECTION VI. — Sincerity and fidelity — How sincerity is vio- 
lated — Self-aggrandizement — Self-abasement — Flattery — 
Hypocrisy — Mental reservation — Equivocation — Exaggeration 
and extenuation — False impressions — Ignorant assertions — 
Lying — Promises: when not binding — Contracts.... 234 

SECTION VII.— Oaths : The judicial oath— Official oath— Legal- 
ity of oaths — The philosophy of oaths — Perjury : its turpi- 
tude 241 

SECTION VIII. — Benevolence : positive duties which we owe 
to man — Proofs that we should perform those duties 246 

SECTION IX. — The proper objects of benevolence — The poor — 
Sick — Unfortunate — Afflicted — Ignorant — Depraved 249 

SECTION X. — Benevolence to the injurious — The doctrine of 
forgiveness — What the law requires — Benevolence to those 
who are slandered — Manner of bestowing benevolence 253 



CHAPTER IV. 

POLITICAL ETHICS 

SECTION I. — Necessity of human government — Ownership of 
property — Title of property to be adjudicated — Bible view of 



civil government — Objections to human government — Objec- 
tions answered 257 

SECTION II.— The different forms of government— Advan- 
tages of a republican government — When preferable — The 
rights and obligations of government — Revolution.,. 262 



Xli CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

SECTION III. — The different departments of government: 
legislative, judicial, executive — The constitution that governs 
all — The British and American constitutions compared — The 
duties of the legislator — Of the judge and jury — Of the ex- 
ecutive 272 

SECTION IV. — Crimes and punishments — Difference in crimes — 
Legal crimes — Moral crimes — Capital punishment — Arguments 
in its favor — When it may be inflicted — How to secure the 
administration of justice 279 

SECTION V.— Duties of citizens— Obedience— Voting— Union- 
Intelligence and virtue — Developing resources — Defence — 
Correction of evils 285 

CHAPTER V. 

FAMILY ETHICS. 

SECTION I. — Marriage — To what opposed — Arguments against 
polygamy , 288 

SECTION II. — The design of marriage — Domestic happiness — 
A numerous and happy posterity — Patriotism — Chastity 291 

SECTION III. — The principles that should govern both parties 
in forming the conjugal relation 293 

SECTION IV. — Reciprocal duties of the conjugal relation: 
Love — Sympathy — Help — Chastity — Confidence — Mutual in- 
terest — Affection for common offspring — Mutual responsi- 
bility 295 

SECTION V.— Duties of husbands : Maintenance— Protection- 
Politeness — Tenderness — Care in sickness 298 



CONTENTS. Xlll 

PAGE 

SECTION VI.— Duties of wives: Obedience— Fidelity— Kind- 
ness — Diligence — Providence — Contentment — Patience — 
Keeping at home.... 300 

SECTION VII.— Divorce— May be granted by the state— On 
what grounds 301 

SECTION VIII. — Parental duties : Maintenance — Physical edu- 
cation — Intellectual education — Moral education 304 

SECTION IX. — Parental authority and government — Unity — Im- 
partiality — Uniformity — Efficiency — Reasonableness 312 

SECTION X.— Parental obligations: how violated— By idle- 
ness—Neglect — Flattery — Cruelty — Bad examples 315 

SECTION XI.— Filial duties: Obedience— Affection— Rever- 
ence — Care in sickness — Beauty of filial piety 317 

SECTION XII.— Fraternal duties : Mutual affection— Reference 
of disputes to parents — Submission to the will of parents — 
Mutual respect — Mutual forbearance 322 

SECTION XIII. — Duties of teachers and pupils — Teachers 
should have thorough qualification — Punctuality — Energy — 
Discipline — Care of the morals of pupils — Pupils should ex- 
hibit obedience — Attention — Docility — Courteousness 324 



CHAPTER VI. 

DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 



SECTION I —Abolition of slavery- Results— Different races- 
Negro race, inferiority of — Caucasian race, superiority of 329 



XIV CONTENTS. 

PAGE 



SECTION II. — First duty: To prevent relapse into barbarism — 
Danger of this — Difficulty of preventing — Antagonism 
aroused — The duty does not include social equality — Danger 
of social equality — Indications of Divine Providence — Should 
not fight against God — Races must be kept distinct — Amal- 
gamation... 331 

SECTION III.— Second duty: Education— Results of ignorant 
legislation — Education the only remedy — No mixed schools 335 

SECTION IV.— Third duty: The Christian religion to be in- 
culcated — Present difficulties to be overcome — Sunday- 
schools 338 

SECTION V.— Fourth duty: Justice— No invasion of rights- 
No unlawful combinations — Horrors of a war of races — Dan- 
ger of collisions — Power of public opinion.. 339 

SECTION VI.— Fifth duty : Forbearance— Great need of it— 
A lofty virtue 343 

SECTION VII.— Sixth duty: Liberality— Give employment- 
Master and servant: 1. No unjust exactions; 2. Good wages; 
3. Spiritual welfare — No injury to morals 345 

SECTION VIII.— Duties of servants: Fidelity— No eye-ser- 
vice — Cheerfulness — Politeness — Obedience 349 



CONCLUSION, 



351 



PREFACE. 



Foe, many years, the institutions of learning in 
the South have been without a suitable text-book 
on Moral Philosophy. Indeed, it may be said they 
have never had a suitable one. The errors of Dr. 
Paley, though in many respects he is a fine author, 
are so numerous, and of so grave a character, that 
they are very apt to mislead the young mind, in 
spite of the corrections that may be attempted by 
the teacher. Most of the philosophical writings of 
American authors are exhibitions of fanaticism, 
rather than of sound logic or scriptural truth, 
when they discuss the subject of slavery. 

In view of these facts, the present writer has 
been in the habit of teaching his classes entirely by 
lectures. This course was commenced at the urgent 

(XV) 



XV i PREFACE. 

solicitation of his classes. It has been kept up 
from year to year, because it was believed to be the 
most efficient plan of communicating instruction. 

These lectures were uniformly delivered without 
notes, and altogether without, any manuscript pre- 
paration. The students were required to take co- 
pious notes, and, after retiring to their rooms, to 
write, and preserve abstracts for future reference 
and study. Indeed, the book was prepared by the 
aid of some of these abstracts, furnished by two of 
his old pupils, Mr. J. M. Hubbard and Mr. Thomas 
J. "Williams. The manner in which the work ori- 
ginated will account for some apparent redundancy 
in the style ; which, it is hoped, will be overlooked, 
as the author feels quite sure that his ideas are not 
thereby obscured, but rather presented with fulness 
and force. 

Though, not a word of the lectures was written 
before delivery, they were prepared w T ith great labor 
and much study. Frequently hundreds of pages 
would be read, on one subject, before the discus- 
sion would be attempted in the lecture-room. Id 



PREFACE. XVll 

this way — especially as different authors were ex- 
amined before the class — the author may have been 
brought under some obligations which are not ac- 
knowledged in the body of this work. He has, 
however, scrupulously endeavored to accredit 
each author with what was known to belong to 
him. 

The authors that were consulted during the pre- 
paration of the lectures, were Hamilton, Cousin, 
Jouffroy, Butler, Brown, Wayland, Alexander, Pa- 
ley, Finney, Dwight, Mahan, "Winslow, Hickok, 
the author of the Lowell Lectures, Upham, Thorn- 
well, Bledsoe, Fletcher, Hopkins, and Smith. To 
all these the writer gratefully acknowledges his 
obligation. 

To pretend to any great originality of thought, 
in a work of this kind, would probably be prepos- 
terous: the author makes no such claims. What 
he claims for the book is, 

1st. A plan original, simple, compact, and easily 
comprehended. 



Xviii PREFACE . 

2d. He claims an exhibition of a theory of moral 
obligation freer from objections and more intelli- 
gible than is found in any other work which he has 
been able to examine. The theory is glanced at 
by Dr. Alexander, and partially presented in the 
Lowell Lectures ; but, so far as is known to the 
writer, its full exhibition is found in this work 
alone. 

Should this work be adopted in our seminaries 
of learning, one or two suggestions may not be out 
of place. 

1st. Let the teacher fully master each exercise 
required of a class, so that neither may have need 
of the book. 

2d. Let the class be required to give the ideas in 
their own language. 

3d. "When any proposition is sustained by argu- 
ment, let the class be required to give each argu- 
ment, without help from the teacher. This is a 
most important suggestion. And it is well, at the 
close of the exercise, to have some one give a sum- 



PREFACE. 



xix 



mation of all the arguments which have been pre- 
sented separately by individual members. 

4th. Let nothing be passed over superficially. 
The teacher must not only hear, but he must in- 
struct. He must see that even the dullest member 
of the class has a clear understanding of the subject. 

The writing of the book was undertaken at the 
request of beloved pupils. The writer has felt all 
along a painful sense of incapacity, and yet a high 
sense of responsibility. He would not sow the 
seeds of error in the young mind and heart for all 
the emoluments of earth. He has accompanied 
almost every page of the work with prayer to 
Almighty God for help and direction ; and he now 
sends it forth with an earnest prayer that it may 
be a blessing to his race. 

Wesleyan University, Florence, Ala., 
May 16, 1859. 



ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



During the years that have passed since the issu- 
ing of the first edition of these Elements, the au- 
thor has seen no reason to change his views in 
regard either to the theory or practice of morals. 
In view of great changes in the relations not only 
of individuals, but of races, the chapter on slavery 
has been removed, and one on the duties of the 
superior race to the inferior has been made to take 
its place. With the belief that the principles here 
inculcated afford the only Christian and peaceable 
solution of a question involving the interests of the 
whole country, they are earnestly set forth, and 
modestly, yet boldly, presented for the considera- 
tion of teachers and pupils. 

The publication of this edition has been delayed by 
the loss of the plates. The author was too greatly 
reduced in means to pay for the reproduction of 
stereotype plates, and it has not been possible for 
the Publishing House to bring out the work at an 
earlier day. It is hoped that it will be universally 
adopted in the schools of the South, and 'by all just 
and conservative teachers throughout the country. 

Louisville, Ky. } Dec. 1, 1871. 



TO THE 



REV. JOHN C. KEENER, D. D., 

AND TO THE 

HON. J. S. LITHGOW, 

THE FORMER THE HIGHEST TYPE OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER, 

AND 

THE LATTER OF THE CHRISTIAN LAYMAN, 

BOTH EQUALLY REMARKABLE FOR THEIR EXALTED VIRTUES, 
AND 10 

BOTH OF WHOM THE AUTHOR IS INDEBTED FOR MUCH KINDNESS, 

Sbljts fcorlt h most KspntfitUg iuMnxhi), 

BY THEIR OBLIGED AND TRUE FRIEND, 

R. H. RIVERS, 



PART I. 



THEORETICAL ETHICS 



r 

ELEMENTS 

O F 

MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 



PART I. 
THEORETICAL ETHICS. 



CHAP TEE I. 

STATEMENT OF THE SUBJECT. 

DEFINITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY — DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL A* 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY- — SUBJECTS EMBRACED IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
DUTY DIVISIONS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The term moral in its common acceptation is tlie 
opposite of immoral, and means virtuous or just. 
Its scientific meaning is different. As a scientific 
term, the word moral is applicable to actions that 
are either good or evil, virtuous or vicious ; or still 
more generally it denotes something which has 
reference to man in his relations. Moral philo- 
sophy in its wider acceptation embraces the entire 
science of immaterial objects — mental philosophy, 

2 (25) 



26 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

logic, etc. : in its narrower, it embraces only the 
science of duty. 

Dr. Paley defines it as "the science which teaches 
our duty, and the reasons of it." Dr. "Wayland 
defines it as "the science of moral law." 

Moral philosophy is the systematic arrangement 
and elucidation of the principles in the light of 
which we may learn our duty. The distinctions 
between moral and mental philosophy are as fol- 
lows : 

lr Mental philosophy teaches what man is; it 
enters into a thorough examination of his intellect, 
sensibilities, and will: moral philosophy teaches 
what man ought to be and what he ought to do. 
The latter begins where the former leaves off. For 
example, mental philosophy defines and illustrates 
a desire or affection, and moral philosophy shows 
how far such desire or affection may be gratified. 
When we look upon a beautiful object, pleasing 
emotions are excited, and if any thing valuable is 
connected with the object, a desire of owning it is 
aroused. It is the business of mental philosophy to 
illustrate the perception of the object, the emotion 
of beauty, and the desire of owning ; and here it 
stops: moral philosophy, then, teaches to what 
extent, within what limits, and according to what 
law, the desire may be gratified. 



STATEMENT OF THE SUBJECT- 27 

2. Mental philosophy exhibits to us man in the 
abstract, without reference to his relations : moral 
philosophy exhibits man in his relations : 1. In rela- 
tion to God ; 2. In relation to his fellow-creatures ; 
3. In relation to law; 4. In relation to a future 
state of retribution. 

3. Mental philosophy is subjective; it reveals to 
us the ego — the self: moral philosophy is both sub- 
jective and objective ; it reveals to us not only self, 
but law, duty, etc. 

4. In mental philosophy the subject investigating 
and the object investigated are one ; it is mind 
investigating mind, classifying and illustrating its 
own powers : in moral philosophy, for the most 
part, the subject and object are different ; it is 
mind investigating, classifying, and illustrating duty. 
Hence we conclude that mental philosophy embraces 
mind alone, while moral philosophy embraces mind 
and its relations. 

Moral philosophy is divided into two parts, theo- 
retical and practical. In the theoretical part are 
embraced moral law, moral agency, moral obliga- 
tion, moral conduct, and moral government. In 
the practical part are embraced our duties to God, 
to ourselves, and to our fellow-creatures. 



28 



ELEMENTS 



OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER II. 

MORAL LAW. 
SECTION I. 

WAYLAND'S DEFINITION: ITS DEFECTS — THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
MORAL AND PHYSICAL LAW — CORRECT DEFINITION OF MORAL LAW — 
GOD THE ESTABLISHER ATTRIBUTES OF MORAL LAW. 

Dr. Wayland says that "The term law is a 
form of expression denoting either a mode of 
existence, or an order of sequence;" and that 
" moral law is an order of sequence established 
between the moral quality of an action and its 
result/ ' 

This definition is obscure, and to my mind 
defective. 

1st. It makes no analysis of law — it makes no 
distinction between the rule and its sanctions. 

2d. According to Wayland, the existence of the 
action must be prior to the existence of law, as 
without the action there could be no " order of 



MORAL LAW. 



29 



sequence established between the action and its 
results.' ' Now the reverse of this is believed to 
be true. Moral law exists before moral action, 
and is the rule by which it should be governed. 
As there could be "no transgression without law/' 
so there could be no obedience. The law must 
also exist before the object whose manner of ex- 
istence is determined by law, just as necessarily 
as it must exist before the action it is designed 
to control. So, then, whether we regard law as 
moral or physical, Dr. "Wayland's definition is to 
be rejected. 

Law is a rule of action, or for action, accom- 
panied by sanctions. It may be physical or moral 
And it may be well to present such distinctions 
as may enable the student to distinguish between 
moral and physical law. 

1. Moral law always involves the idea of ought- 
ness : physical law involves no such idea. We do 
not say that the sun ought to shine, or the earth 
to revolve, or the seasons to change; yet all these 
facts exist in accordance with the action of phy- 
sical law. But we do say, God ought to be wor- 
shipped, our neighbor ought to be loved, justice 
ought to be done. These are the requirements of 
moral law. But no such idea of oughtness is 
connected with physical law, whether its action is 



30 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

seen in the falling apple or the revolving world, 
in the mite or mastodon, in man or insect. 

2. Moral law always involves the idea of free- 
dom : physical law involves the idea of necessity. 
No one supposes that the actions of a moral being 
are constrained, as are the actions which of neces- 
sity result from physical causes. The subjects of 
moral law are conscious that they are under a 
"law of liberty:" they may or may not obey its 
requirements; while the subjects of physical law 
are known to be under the law of necessity. 

8. Moral law involves the idea of right and 
wrong : physical law involves no such idea. If a 
stone falls in obedience to physical law, and death 
is the consequence, no one attaches the idea either 
of right or wrong to such operation. The stone 
was not master of its actions ; it was under the 
"law of gravity;" physical law controlled it, and 
no one attaches a moral quality to its necessitated 
actions. But all say that obedience to moral law 
is right, and the transgression of moral law is 
sin. 

4. Moral law involves the idea of intelligence in 
the subject: physical law involves no such idea in 
its subjects. 

5. Moral law involves the ideas of merit and 
demerit ; but no such ideas are connected with 



MORAL LAW. 



31 



physical law. No one thinks of praising or blam- 
ing either the animate or inanimate being for 
rendering a forced obedience to physical law ; but 
all connect merit with obedience to moral law, 
and demerit or blame to transgression of moral 
law. 

In the light of these distinctions, we may 
say, with President Mahan : " Physical law is a 
rule of action, and moral law is a rule for action." 
The existence of law presupposes an establisher; 
hence moral philosophy recognizes the existence of 
an all-wise G-od, as the establisher of moral law. 
The moral law is the offspring of the Eternal 
Reason ; it is the revealing of the unnecessitated 
and infallible will of God. We may know then 
that it possesses the following attributes: 

1. It is perfectly adapted to the nature of the 
beings for whose control it is designed. He that 
adapted light to the eye, food to the stomach, 
and air to the lungs, would not fail to adapt his 
moral law to the beings for whom He designed 
it as a rule of action. 

2. It is impartial. The same conditions and 
relations being given, the same requirements will 
always be made. This law, like its great Estab- 
lisher, is "no respecter of persons." 

3. It is just. We have said that moral law 



32 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



consists of two parts — a rule and its sanctions. 
The sanctions are the rewards and punishments. 
In both these respects the law is just. It re- 
quires no more, no less, than ought to be done ; 
and it always offers the very reward, and threatens 
the very penalty, which justice requires. 

4. Moral law can be obeyed. It is practicable. 
Make it impracticable, and it is no longer a rule 
for action — its character as law is destroyed. Make 
it impracticable, and all ideas of oughtness, of 
right and wrong, merit and demerit, are at once 
destroyed. 

5. Moral law is immutable. It is the law of 
right, and its sacred principles are as immutable 
as their great Author. The circumstances being 
precisely the same, the rule for action must be the 
same. The actions being the same, the retribu- 
tion is always the same. To suppose otherwise 
would be to reflect upon Him who is the "same 
yesterday, to-day, and for ever." 

No analysis of moral law is complete which fails 
to present the correct theory of retribution, and to 
this we propose devoting the next section. 



MORAL LAW. 



33 



SECTION II. 

% 

RETRIBUTION — DEFINITION — UNIVERSALITY OF THE IDEA — COLERIDGE 
— COUSIN — THEORY OF NATURAL CONSEQUENCES : OBJECTIONS TO IT 
— THEORY THAT IT IS ALWAYS ADMINISTERED FOR THE SAKE OF 
REFORMATION: OBJECTIONS TO IT — TRUE THEORY. 

By retribution, is meant that certain actions are 
rewarded, and certain others punished; and that 
the rewards and punishments are determined by 
the moral law. 

No idea of the human reason approaches nearer 
to universality than that of retribution. It is ex- 
hibited in the Elysian Fields and Tartarean regions 
of the ancient Greeks and Romans ; is found in the 
" Spirit-Land" of the American Indians; and even 
Atheists, in peculiar circumstances, have shown 
that they are not strangers to the fearful idea of 
future punishment. 

Coleridge, speaking of the effect which sudden 
calamities produce on guilty men, says, " The 
wretched criminal already interprets the calamities 
into judgments, executions of a sentence passed by 
an invisible Judge ; as if the vast pyre of the last 
judgment were already kindled, in an unknown 
distance, and some flashes of it darting forth at 
intervals, beyond the rest, were flying and lighting 
upon the face of his soul. The calamity may con- 
2* 



84 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sist in loss of fortune, or character, or reputation 5 
but you hear no regrets from him. Remorse extin- 
guishes all regret; and remorse is the implicit 
creed of the guilty." 

Cousin says : " If we raise our thoughts beyond 
this world — if we conceive of God as we ought, not 
only as the author of the physical world, but as the 
father of the moral world, as the very substance of 
good and the moral law — we cannot but conceive 
that God ought to hold ready rewards and punish- 
ments for those who have fulfilled or broken the 
law." 

While the idea of retribution is so nearly uni- 
versal, there are various and conflicting theories 
concerning it. 

I. The theory of natural consequences is, that all 
the punishment deserved for the commission of any 
crime, however flagrant, is simply the unhappiness 
experienced by the culprit at the time of the com- 
mission. Present unhappiness necessarily follow- 
ing present crimes, constitutes the whole of retri- 
bution. 

We object to this theory on the following 
grounds : 

1. Because, according to it, God and man are 
bound to treat all alike, both virtuous and vicious, 
For dissimilar treatment, in view of moral cha- 



MOKAL LAW. 



35 



racier, would be the infliction of punishments upon 
the vicious, other than what follows in natural con- 
sequences. According to this doctrine, any such 
treatment as would add to the punishment of 
natural consequences would be wrong. 

2. It is directly opposed to the universal convic- 
tions of the human race, so far as those convic- 
tions are known. 

3. It is equally opposed to the teachings of the 
Sacred Scriptures. They teach us that a man 
should be judged, and that God will judge him, 
" according to the deeds done in the body." 

4. According to this theory, it would be wrong 
to put man to any inconvenience in order to make 
reparation for any injury inflicted. Such incon- 
venience would be punishment additional to natu- 
ral consequences, and would of course be improper 
if this theory were true. 

II. The second theory of retribution is, that 
punishment is never inflicted except for the sake 
of reformation. 

The objections to this theory are, 

1. According to it, the incorrigible must ever 
escape punishment. A man has only to steep him- 
self in crime, in order to escape punishment : the 
greater the criminal, the more certain the freedom 
from punishment. 



36 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. It destroys the idea of justice in the punish- 
ment. Remember, that according to this, punish- 
ment is not inflicted because the person deserves it, 
but to effect his reformation. 

3. But the greatest objection to the doctrine is, 
that punishment, even when justly inflicted, often 
leaves the criminal morally worse than it found him. 

HI. The last and true theory is, that punishment 
is inflicted as the just desert of crime, and rewards 
are given as the just desert of virtue — that the pun- 
ishment must be commensurate with the obligation 
violated, and the reward must be commensurate 
with the obligation fulfilled. Or, in other words, 
the punishment is determined by the degree of 
crime, and the reward is determined by the degree 
of virtue. 

Retribution commences in this life, and is con- 
tinued for ever. It is experienced in remorse of 
conscience, which sooner or later is proportionate 
to the claim violated; it is experienced in the 
moral indignation aroused against crime in the 
community; and it is to be experienced in 
the fearful penalties of a violated law, inflicted 
by God himself upon the incorrigibly guilty. 
The rewards come from the approbation of con- 
science, the approbation of community, the appro- 
bation of God. 



MORAL AGENCY, 



37 



CHAPTER III. 

MORAL AGENCY. 

section r. 

REQUISITES OP MORAL AGENCY — INTELLECT: WHY REQUISITE SENSI- 
BILITIES : ARGUMENT TO SHOW THEY ARE NEEDED — CLASSIFICATION 
OF SENSIBILITIES — APPETITES : TRUE DOCTRINE OF THE APPETITES. 

Among the many studies that excite the interest 
and improve the mind of man, not the least im- 
portant is man himself. The marvellous structure 
of his body, the wonderful powers of his intellect, 
the great activity of his sensibilities, and more espe- 
cially his peculiar moral organization, show, when 
properly understood, what God intended man to do 
in this world, and the destiny awaiting him in the 
world to come. 

The requisites to moral agency are conceded to 
be, 1. Intellect; 2. Sensibilities; 3. Conscience; 
4. Free Will; 5. Light. All these we find in 
man. 

1. Intellect. By the intellectual faculties we 



38 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

mean those by which we know. It would be a 
very imperfect philosophy that would confound 
the power of knowing with that of feeling. No 
one destitute of the power of attention, of observa- 
tion, of understanding, of perception, of memory, 
and of reasoning, can be capable of exercising 
moral agency. A man must have capacity to per- 
ceive relations, to understand law, to observe dis- 
tinctions, to remember facts, to connect ideas, and 
to draw conclusions, before he can be classed as a 
moral agent. This is a first truth of reason. ITo 
one looks upon a maniac or an idiot as capable of 
exercising moral agency, for the simple reason that 
the intellect is incapable of healthy action. Then 
the intellect, in a sound state, is the first requisite 
to moral agency. 

2. Sensibilities. The feeling of pleasure or pain 
is said to be the chronological condition of our 
idea of worthiness — the idea of worthiness being 
the logical condition of the idea of pleasure or pain . 
That is, the idea of pleasure or pain sustains the 
same relation to the idea of worthiness that the 
idea of body does to space. "We arrive at the idea 
of body through the senses ; then, as an intuition 
of the pure reason, we have the idea of space 
as being necessary to the existence of body. 
Body could not have existed without space; so 



MOKAL AGENCY. 



39 



when pleasure or pain is experienced, the idea of 
worthiness is given as an intuition of the pure 
reason. But for the sensibility, says a great moral- 
ist, there would be no idea of right or wrong, of 
praise or blameworthiness. 

The sensibilities have been classed in the fol- 
lowing order : 1. Appetites ; 2. Propensities ; 8. 
Affections. 

It belongs rather to mental than to moral philo- 
sophy to give an analysis of the sensibilities ; but, 
in view of their intimate connection with morality, 
we propose a brief investigation of them. 

The appetites take their rise in the body ; 
they are only occasional in their action, and are 
common to man with the lower animals. They 
appear to have been given to man for three 
purposes. 1. To continue the race, as without 
them it would not extend beyond one generation ; 

2. They were implanted as a means of enjoyment; 

3. As a means of moral discipline. As given to us 
for these three wise and benevolent purposes, let us 
examine them. 

" Suppose," says Stewart, "that the appetite of 
hunger had been no part of our constitution ; 
reason and experience might have satisfied us of 
the necessity of food to our preservation ; but how 
should we have been able, without an implanted 



40 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

principle, to ascertain, according to the varying 
states of our animal economy, the proper seasons 
for eating, or the quantity of food necessary to 
the body?" We dare say that we should not know 
when to begin to eat, nor when to cease. Besides, 
eating would be the merest drudgery; and that 
which is now attended with real pleasure, and was 
so designed by our Heavenly Father, would be 
unattended by any gratification whatever. It is 
true that we scorn the man wholly surrendered to 
appetite, and hence we believe that the appetites 
were given as a means of moral discipline. 

The appetites may be gratified intemperately, 
and man may give himself up entirely to their 
claims. He then degrades himself. And never 
does he present a more humiliating spectacle than 
when he becomes the slave of his appetites. His 
physical form, so "fearfully and wonderfully made," 
loses its proportions : bloated by dissipation and 
fetid with corruption, it becomes a mass of 
putridity. His intellect becomes almost stultified, 
his conscience polluted, his will itself enthralled, 
and his disordered and ungoverned passions usurp 
control over soul and body. "Who has ever seen 
the debased drunkard, the miserable victim of 
opium, or the degraded libertine, and has not 



MORAL AGENCY. 



41 



been impressed with the depth of the degradation 
to which man can descend ? 

On the other hand, a healthful and vigorous 
body, an elastic and progressive intellect, calm and 
tranquil passions, a pure and serene enjoyment, 
are the heritage of the man whose appetites, 
like so many obedient and well -trained servants, 
minister to his necessities, contribute to his com- 
fort, and obey his behests. 

The appetites are not to be annihilated, as was 
taught by the Ascetics ; nor are they to be inordi- 
nately gratified, according to the doctrine of the 
Epicureans. To annihilate them is a violation of 
nature which brings with it the most fearful con- 
sequences. To give them supremacy is to place 
them in a position that God never intended them 
to occupy. In view of the theory of the appetites 
here presented, we draw a few practical reflections : 

1. That God has graciously designed us for 
happiness. He has shown this in the rich pro- 
fusion of nature's gifts, in the beauties that sparkle 
in the dew-drop, and tnat flash on the brow of 
night as the stars light up the firmament; in the 
gorgeous splendors of the setting sun; in the 
fascinating graces that adorn the bow arching the 
cloud; in the variegated attractions of the land- 



42 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

scape; in the sweetness exhaled from the flower, 
and in the music carolled by the bird. All these, 
and ten thousand times more than these, are given 
by a benevolent Father to promote the happiness 
of his children. And as we are not to close our 
eyes nor stop our ears to these beauties, nor destroy 
the taste that appreciates them, so we are not to 
repress those grateful emotions which should arise 
to our Heavenly Father for giving us appetites as 
ministers to our pleasure. 

2. We are to shun all those scenes which tend 
to vitiate the appetites, and most carefully to avoid 
all those indulgences which may give them undue 
supremacy. 

3. As they were given to develop the strength 
of character, we must, like St. Paul, exercise 
ourselves to "keep the body (appetites) under." 
Remember that self- conquest is the most glorious 
conquest man can make. 

4. If by the force of habit our appetites have 
already gained undue ascendency, let us at once, 
with humble reliance upon Almighty God, seek to 
bring them into a position of subordination to 
reason and religion. 



MORAL AGENCY. 



43 



SECTION II. 

PROPENSITIES, OR DESIRES : CLASSIFICATION — DESIRE OF LIFE : ITS 
NATURE, UNIVERSALITY, DESIGN, MORAL CHARACTER, CONNECTION 

WITH CHRISTIANITY DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE : ITS NATURE AND 

DESIGN DESIRE OF PROPERTY DESIRE OF POWER DESIRE OF 

esteem: its universality: the effect of recklessness — DESIRE 

OF SOCIETY: ITS DESIGN — 'DESIRE OF IMITATION: ITS UNIVER- 
SALITY: CAUTION TO PARENTS DESIRE OF HAPPINESS: IMPORTANCE 

OF THIS PRINCIPLE. 

The propensities are more numerous than the 
appetites, and are of a higher order. They have 
been classified as follows : 1. Desire of life ; 2. 
Desire of knowledge; 3. Desire of property; 4. 
Desire of power; 5. Desire of esteem; 6. Desire 
of society; 7. Desire of imitation; 8. Desire of 
happiness. It belongs rather to mental than to 
moral philosophy to go into an elaborate investi- 
gation of these eight primitive desires. Uni- 
versal consciousness will testify to their existence. 

1. The desire of life is designed to protect us 
from such influences as may lead to its reckless 
exposure ; and to prevent misfortune from leading 
the unhappy sufferer to commit suicide. It affords, 
too, a facility for the implanting of that truth 
which "springs to everlasting life." "Without it 
one of the strongest motives brought to bear in 
the Christian system would be powerless. From 



44 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which we see its intimate connection with the 
purest morality. It is found universally in the 
race, in childhood and in old age, and severe in- 
deed must be the sufferings that can extinguish 
it in the human bosom. 

2. Curiosity, or the desire of learning, is designed 
to excite to that effort which is essential to the 
acquisition of knowledge. "Without it, there would 
be no investigation, and of course no progress. 
Destitute of it, man would ever be a stranger to 
that glow of feeling and really high enjoyment 
arising from the solution of a difficult problem, or 
the discovery of a long-searched-for truth. It is 
a high-born power; and angels themselves are 
said to desire to look into the wonders of the 
Almighty. Under its influence, difficulties of the 
most appalling nature have been surmounted, 
mysteries revealed, obscurities cleared away, alpine 
heights have been scaled, and abysmal depths have 
been explored. 

3. The desire of property is designed to excite to 
industry, economy, and thrift. It was never designed 
to degenerate into avarice, or to be perverted into 
covetousness. Under its influence civilization has 
advanced, laws protecting the right of property have 
been enacted, public enterprises have been accom- 
plished, the resources of a country have been de- 



MORAL AGENCY. 



45 



veloped, and agriculture, commerce, and manu- 
factures have been carried to a perfection which 
they never could have attained without its influ- 
ence. 

4. The desire of power, or of the "ability to 
produce results/ ' is designed to be a stimulus to 
every noble endeavor. Combined with the desire 
of knowledge, it may excite to the greatest efforts 
of which the mind is capable. It may fire the 
imagination of the poet, direct the pencil of the 
artist, point the argument, move the heart, and 
open the lips of the orator, with thoughts and 
words of almost irresistible force. 

5. Desire of esteem is designed to so influence 
our conduct that we may deserve the good opinion 
of others. No sane man is indifferent to this. An 
utter recklessness of the good opinion of mankind 
is a sure indication of a badly organized mind, or 
of deep moral degeneracy. In youth it foreshadows 
a life as dreary and hopeless as the recklessness is 
unnatural and sinful. This desire of the esteem of 
others frequently projects itself into the future, and 
is manifested by a desire to leave a good name as 
the richest heritage to our children. It is readily 
perceived that such a principle is peculiarly adapted 
to the promotion of virtue. 

6. Desire of society. God intended man for 



46 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

society, not for solitude. Children exhibit their 
love of society in their sports and games, and the 
boy that dislikes society is sure to be selfish and 
disagreeable. Most affecting instances are given of 
the action of this principle. " The Count de Lauzun 
was confined for nine years in the castle of Pignerol, 
in a small room where no light penetrated, except 
from a small chink in the roof. In this solitude he 
attached himself to a spider, and continued for some 
time to amuse himself with attempting to tame it, 
with catching flies for its support, and with superin- 
tending the progress of the webs. The jailer dis- 
covered his amusement, and killed the spider. The 
Count used afterward to relate that the pang he felt 
on that occasion could only be compared to that of 
a mother for the loss of her child." The design of 
the principle is to develop a noble philanthropy, 
and to unite mankind in one common brother- 
hood. It collects assemblies, founds states, builds 
cities, establishes churches, unites members of the 
same household, links man to God, man to man, 
and man to the lower animals. 

7. Desire of imitation. This is manifested in 
many of the lower animals, especially in the ape, 
as well as in man. It is seen in the plays of 
children, when they assume the characters of their 
parents, or seek to imitate the guests of the family. 



MORAL AGENCY. 



It gave rise to theatrical exhibitions ; and is found 
in our courts of justice, especially in the love of 
precedent. Its design is to bring man under the 
power of good example, and to warn him against 
setting a bad example before others. How power- 
fully does it appeal to parents not to exhibit those 
examples to their children which through this 
propensity may lead them to ruin ! 

8. Desire of happiness. Possibly no principle 
of our complex nature has been more fruitful of 
controversy than this. "While philosophers of the 
selfish school have made it the only principle of 
our nature that should be consulted, others, who 
believe that all virtue consists in disinterested 
benevolence, have altogether ignored it. Both of 
these are wrong. Our Saviour himself, "for the 
joy that was set before him, endured the cross." 
To this very principle some of the strongest appeals 
in the Bible are made ; from which we learn that 
it was implanted for the promotion of virtue. It 
is not inconsistent with self-denial. On the con- 
trary, present self-denial may be voluntarily sub- 
mitted to as a means to greater future enjoy- 
ment, 



48 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION III. 

the affections: difference between affections and propensi- 
ties — CLASSIFICATION — THEIR GENERAL DESIGN. 

Affections differ from desires in this : affections 
have reference to persons, desires to things. We 
love the man, we desire his prosperity. 

The affections have been classified in the fol- 
lowing order : 1. Parental affection ; 2. Filial 
affection ; 3. Conjugal affection ; 4. Fraternal 
affection ; 5. Social affection, or the love of the 
human race ; 6. Theistical affection, or the love 
of God. 

That these affections are natural to man will 
hardly be denied. The particular design of 
each one of them will be clearly seen when we 
enter upon Practical Ethics. It may be merely 
necessary now to state, that their general design 
is to secure obedience to the laws of the family, 
of society, and of God. "Without them there 
would be no domestic peace, no social benevo- 
lence, no obedience to laws either human or 
Divine, except such as may be exacted by fear. 



MORAL AGENCY. 



49 



SECTION IV. 

CONSCIENCE I ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A NATURAL 
CONSCIENCE — OBJECTIONS STATED AND ANSWERED FINNEY'S ANALY- 
SIS OF CONSCIENCE ETYMOLOGY OF THE WORD FUNCTIONS OF 

CONSCIENCE SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE ERROE TO BE AVOIDED. 

Thus far in our analysis of the requisites of 
moral agency — of man as a moral being — we have 
presented truths universally admitted. Now we 
enter upon the examination of a faculty the very 
existence of which as a natural faculty has been 
denied. That conscience is an original faculty of 
the mind is as clear to us as the existence of any 
other faculty. This position may be established 
by the following considerations : 

1. The universality of moral distinctions. Ac- 
cording to our apprehension, man would be as 
destitute of the idea of duty, of right or wrong, 
without a conscience, as he would be of beauty 
without taste, of color without sight, or of sound 
without ears. A man born blind was asked what 
idea he had of the color red; he answered it 
seemed to him very much like the sound of a 
trumpet. He had no idea of color, because he was 
destitute of the organ through which the mind 
perceived color. So, without a faculty for discrimi- 
nating right and wrong, no discrimination could be 



50 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

made. If, then, moral distinctions are universal — 
and no man will deny their universality — the 
faculty of conscience must be universal, and of 
course it must be original. 

2. Its existence as a separate and original fa- 
culty is clearly proved by the peculiar action of the 
mind in reference to moral subjects. The feelings 
experienced in regard to moral subjects differ not 
merely in degree, but in kind, from any other feel- 
ings of which we are capable. Xo other feelings 
are at all similar to those of remorse. The intel- 
lect cannot feel; hence the conscience cannot be 
a mere function of the intelligence. But the sen- 
sibilities cannot discriminate; hence the conscience 
cannot be a mere function of the sensibility. And 
as it can neither be a function of the intelligence 
nor of the sensibility, it must be an original and 
distinct faculty of the mind. 

3. All languages have words to convey the idea 
which we have of conscience. Why should there 
be such words, unless there were such a reality, 
the idea of which is conveyed by the words ? 
The words, then, prove — as far as words can do so 
— the universality of the idea that conscience is a 
faculty original to our common nature. And as 
words prove the existence of the idea, the idea 
proves the existence of the thing. The existence 



MORAL AGENCY. 



51 



of the faculty is therefore established by universal 
testimony. 

4. The existence of a natural conscience is infal- 
libly attested by universal consciousness. In this 
enlightened period of mental science, no sane mind 
attempts to deny or thinks of calling in question 
the veracity of consciousness. In the light of con- 
sciousness every man will testify that he has some- 
thing within him which convinces of duty, which 
imparts the feeling of obligation and gives an im- 
pulse to its discharge, which approves of his course 
when he has done right, and which punishes him 
when he has done wrong. This inward and uni- 
versal monitor is the conscience. 

5. It is clearly established by the Scriptures. 
"Whenever we have the authority of God's word 
for the statement of a psychological fact, we feel an 
assurance that we are right, which can hardly be 
surpassed by demonstration. When He who made 
man, and gave him a conscience, testifies to its 
existence, he who doubts the testimony must be 
indeed incredulous. "Paul earnestly beholding 
the council, said, Men and brethren, I have lived in 
all good conscience before God until this day." 
Acts xxiii. 1. "And herein do I exercise myself, 
to have always a conscience void of offence toward 
God, and toward men." Acts xxiv. 16. "For 



52 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by 
nature the things contained in the law, these, hav- 
ing not the law, are a law unto themselves : which 
show the work of the law written in their hearts, 
their conscience also bearing witness, and their 
thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing, 
one another.' ' Komans ii. 14, 15. 

From these passages we draw the following con- 
clusions : 1. That man is recognized as possessing 
a distinct faculty which is called conscience. 2. 
That it is regarded as the most important of all the 
faculties of the human soul. We argue that it 
must be original, or God has left the soul destitute 
of its most important faculty. He has left to the 
educator to supply a faculty which is to exercise 
more influence upon man as a moral being than all 
the other faculties ! Is not this a reflection on the 
character of God ? 

6. The existence of conscience as an original 
faculty is argued from the uniformity of moral dis- 
tinctions. On this subject we quote from Dr. 
Alexander's work on Moral Science. " Let an act 
of manifest injustice be performed before their 
eyes, and among a thousand spectators, there will 
be but one opinion and but one feeling. If a 
strong man, for example, violently takes away the 
property of one weaker than himself, and for no 



MORAL AGENCY. 



53 



other reason than because he covets it, all men will 
condemn the act. So if any one who has received 
from another great benefits, not only refuses to 
make grateful returns, but, on the contrary, returns 
evil for good, all men will agree in judging his 
conduct to be wrong. All intuitively discern, that 
for a ruler to punish the innocent and reward the 
guilty, is morally wrong. It is not true in fact that 
there is no agreement among men as to the funda- 
mental principles of morals. Their judgments on 
those points are as uniform as on the axioms of 
mathematics ; as in their agreement that the starry 
firmament is grand and beautiful ; yea, as uniform 
as concerning the greenness of grass or the varied 
colors of the rainbow." "Whether or not the uni- 
formity is as great as our author supposes, in regard 
to the outward act, is not important to our argu- 
ment. "We believe the uniformity to be perfect, so 
far as the intention is concerned. If a Hindoo 
mother voluntarily throws her child into the 
Ganges, or a widow immolates herself on the 
funeral -pile of her husband, or a heathen son 
deprives his suffering and aged father of life, one 
and all of these acts are justified by the intention. 
The intention is to please God, or avert his wrath, 
or relieve the infirm old man of his sufferings. So 
the ancient Spartans justified theft, for the reason 



54 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that the intention was to obey the laws. The con- 
clusion, then, is inevitable, that there must be an 
original principle or faculty, before which all moral 
questions are presented, and by which they are 
decided with so much uniformity. 

As objections have been urged to the theory 
which we have presented and attempted to estab- 
lish, it may be fair to notice them at this point. 
We quote from Paley : 

" The father of Caius Toranius had been pro- 
scribed by the triumvirate. Caius Toranius, com- 
ing over to the interests of that party, discovered 
to the officers, who were in pursuit of his father's 
life, the place where he concealed himself, and gave 
them withal a description by which they might dis- 
tinguish his person when they found him. The 
old man, more anxious for the safety and fortunes 
of his son, than about the little that remained of 
his own life, began immediately to inquire of the 
officers who seized him, whether his son was well ; 
whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of 
his generals. ' That son,' replied one of the officers, 
6 so dear to thy affections, betrayed thee to us ; 
by his information thou art apprehended and diest.' 
With this he struck a poniard to his heart, and the 
unhappy parent fell ; not so much affected by hie 
fate as by the means to which he owed it. 



MORAL AGENCY. 



55 



"Now," says Paley, "the question is, whether if 
this story were related to the wild boy caught in 
the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without ex- 
perience and without instruction, cut off in his 
infancy from all intercourse with his species, and 
consequently under no possible influence of exam- 
ple, authority, education, habit, sympathy — whether, 
I say, such a one would feel upon the narration any 
of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's 
conduct which we feel, or not." 

In reply to this very plausible objection to the 
existence of a natural conscience, we have to pre- 
sent the following considerations : 

1. The case presented as the basis of the argu- 
ment, shows that the whole theory of conscience 
as an original principle of our constitution w T as 
altogether misapprehended by Dr. Paley. No one 
ever contended that the undeveloped, uneducated 
conscience could pronounce at all, much less infal 
libly pronounce, concerning any question of morals 
No one ever contended that the conscience of an 
infant could decide in regard to right and wrong. 
All that we mean by the original and universal 
faculty of conscience is, that., when the mind is 
developed, it has the capacity of making moral dis- 
tinctions, and that it has this capacity universally. 

2. If this case prove any thing, it proves too 



56 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

much ; for if the incapacity of an entirely ignorant 
savage, a wild man of the woods, to determine 
right and wrong, can prove that no such faculty as 
conscience exists, or belongs originally to the 
human constitution, then a like incapacity to 
understand some axiom of mathematics would 
settle the fact that the understanding is not 
original. 

3. But we ask, in the third place, Are great 
truths in moral science to be settled by appeals to 
isolated and anomalous cases, only to be found 
once in a century ? or are these truths to be deter- 
mined by an appeal to humanity in its normal state 
of development ? We should like to see a system 
of mental philosophy based upon the irregular and 
anomalous exhibitions of intellect as found in "the 
wild boy of Hanover,' ' or any such erratic presenta- 
tion of human nature. No objection can be valid, 
until it can be shown that the mass of mankind are 
utterly incapable of making moral distinctions. 
All attempts to ignore the existence of this faculty, 
because of mistaken views of right and wrong, 
which are admitted to exist, are as futile as argu- 
ments to prove that man has no taste, because men 
differ in regard to the beautiful. Nay, more, it 
would be equally as sensible to attempt to prove 
that eyes were not natural and original faculties of 



MORAL AGENCY. 



57 



vision, because men are found to differ about colors. 
For as the existence of erroneous views of beauty 
demonstrate that there is a faculty for perceiving 
the beautiful; or as ideas concerning color, even 
though erroneous, constitute incontestable evidence 
of a faculty of vision ; so imperfect or mistaken 
views of morals demonstrate the existence of the 
faculty of conscience. 

Having established the fact that the Creator has 
not left man destitute of the most important 
requisite to moral agency, we proceed to give the 
functions of conscience. 

" Conscience," says Finney, "is the faculty that 
recognizes the conformity, or the want of con- 
formity, of the heart and life to the moral law, as 
it is revealed in the reason ; and it also awards 
praise to conformity, and blame to disconformity 
to that law. It also affirms that conformity to the 
moral law deserves reward, and that disconformity 
deserves punishment. It also possesses a propelling 
power, by which it urges the conformity of will to 
moral law. It does, in a certain sense, seem to 
possess the power of retribution." 

Conscience is not a simple, but a complex faculty. 
The etymology and composition of the word show 
the complex nature of the faculty. It is both 
intellective and sensitive, combines the rational 
3* 



58 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and emotional, embraces judgment and sentiment, 
In this respect it is analogous to the taste, which 
is both discriminating and emotional. Its functions 
are four. 1. The discriminating; 2. The obli- 
gatory ; 3. The impulsive ; 4. The retributive. 

1. As a discriminating faculty, it distinguishes 
between right and wrong, innocence and guilt, 
merit and demerit. It has, therefore, capacity for 
perceiving moral relations and obligations, and for 
apprehending moral law. This power of judging, 
in the conscience, is essentially different from the 
ordinary function of the intelligence called judg- 
ment. The conscience judges alone in reference 
to duty. It does not judge as to what is, but as to 
what ought to be. The one word ought embraces 
its entire range for discrimination and investigation. 
Xow it is known that the judgment may be very 
acute in distinguishing the expedient, in deter- 
mining the utility of a financial plan or speculation, 
and exceedingly obtuse on all subjects of duty. 
When natural phenomena are to be learned, facts 
and principles discriminated, arranged and classi- 
fied, the judgment is ever ready, and may be 
safely consulted; but when principles are to be 
ascertained for the regulation of the conduct, we 
must consult a higher principle. The conception 
of duty is unlike all other conceptions, and, as a 



MORAL AGENCY. 



59 



good writer remarks, " it corresponds to nothing 
physical, and has no archetype in the universe." 
We refer to this principle to determine character 
as moral or immoral, guilty or innocent. 

2. The second office of the conscience is to 
impart to man the feeling of moral obligation. 
Immediately after duty is perceived, the feeling of 
obligation arises. And this is not felt in reference 
to ourselves only, but also in reference to others. 
We can and do feel that obligations are binding 
upon others, just as certainly as we can feel them 
binding upon ourselves. It is conscience that 
imparts this twofold feeling, for destitute of it we 
would ever be strangers to the feelings of obligation 
to discharge even the plainest duty. To define this 
feeling may be difficult, but every one by reference 
to his own experience will be able to form the 
clearest conception of the feeling which we have 
been attempting to discuss. 

3. After duty has been perceived, and the 
obligation to discharge it felt, then there is an 
impulse to its performance. The conscience gives 
this impulse. It impels us to resist temptation, to 
overcome all obstacles, and to dare to do right. 
For illustration, suppose a man has accidentally 
come into possession of what does not belong to 
him. Say that a merchant, through mistake in 



60 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

changing money, finds that he has received fifty 
dollars more than his due: he at once perceives it 
to be his duty to restore the money to the owner ; 
he also feels under obligation to restore it; then 
comes the impulse of conscience urging him 
forward with an authority which should excite to 
the immediate performance of the honest act. No 
murderer would ever have been stained with his 
brother's 1)1 ood had he listened to the voice of 
conscience addressing him with commanding elo- 
quence, as though it were the voice of a divinity 
saving to him, "Man, do thy brother no harm!" 
"No seducer would ever have polluted the guileless 
and the innocent, had the monitions of conscience, 
the promptings of his better nature, been heeded. 
We dare say that no crime, of whatever grade and 
by whomsoever committed, has ever been com- 
mitted but after a struggle and a conquest as 
fearful as it was disastrous to the soul. 

4. Lastly, we notice the retributive function. 
Conscience rewards us when we have done right, 
and punishes us when we have done wrong. The 
thrill of pleasure which is experienced by the man 
that has conquered temptation, brought his body 
into subjection, resisted a powerful influence to 
evil, can only be compared to that which wells up 
in the bosoms of the pure and incorruptible inhabit- 



MORAL AGENCY. 



61 



ants of heaven. No sudden experience of good 
fortune, no acquisition of fame, or place, or power, 
can afford a tithe of the happiness which arises 
from the testimony of a " conscience void of offertce 
toward God and toward men." 

Let conscience give this testimony and secure 
this reward to the humble votary of virtue : you may 
throw him into the dungeon, clothe him in rags, 
deprive him of food, separate him from friends, 
load him with fetters, and torture him to the utmost 
capacity of physical endurance ; still there will be 
an inward peace as indestructible as his own 
immortal nature, and as pure as perpetual — a peace 
whose price is far above rubies. 

But this retributive function is not confined to 
rewarding virtue ; it puts forth an equal energy in 
punishing vice. The fable of the guilty wretch 
haunted by furies, but poorly expresses the agony 
of remorse. It is a Promethean vulture that lays 
hold upon every sensitive fibre of man's moral 
nature, and produces an agony different in kind 
from the agony of a mother bewailing her first- 
born, and far surpassing it in degree. No sorrow 
is like that sorrow. It deprives of peace, produces 
suspicion, destroys appetite, drives away sleep, 
injures health, wrinkles the brow, places its fearful 
and indelible mark upon the countenance, silvers 



62 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the hair with the frosts of premature old age, aud 
gradually but certainly brings down its victim to a 
dishonored grave. The poison of the rattlesnake, 
the racks of the inquisition, are harmless when 
compared to the fearful enfoldings of that serpent 
which never dies. So terrible are its inflictions, that 
often the guilty and wretched culprit can only 
avoid confession by suicide, and " suicide is con- 
fession." 

This punishment may not always follow imme- 
diately after the crime has been committed. Long 
years may intervene before conscience wakes up to 
perform its fearful office. But then, as though 
months or years of inactivity had served to 
increase its force, with one terrific stroke it sinks 
the agonized sufferer to the depths of despair. Let 
not then the hardened culprit hope to escape the 
agonies of remorse. Those agonies may be delayed 
by dissipation and crime, but, like the long-pent-up 
fires of a volcano, they will break forth in such 
throes as must terrify, convulse, and overwhelm 
the soul. 

Such is an analysis of the functions of conscience, 
as it is presented to the mind of the author. 
Whether or not it be considered true, either in 
whole or in part, few can deny that the mind has 
such functions as are here ascribed to conscience. 



MORAL AGENCY. 



63 



This being admitted, we ask no more. We 
cannot contend about words. That we make 
moral distinctions, that we feel moral obligation, 
that we have impulses to duty, and that we enjoy 
pleasure in doing good, and suffer pain for doing 
wrong, are facts attested by universal conscious- 
ness. These are absolutely essential to moral 
agency, and whether they are functions of con- 
science, or of some other power, is immaterial. 
Hence, we proceed to examine the supremacy of 
conscience. ^ 

By the supremacy of conscience, we mean its 
authority among the other motive -powers. We 
do not intend to place conscience above law; on 
the contrary, it must be amenable to law. 

Bishop Butler is*said to have been the first to 
recognize the supremacy of conscience among the 
affections and other principles of man's nature. In 
reference to this, he uses the following language : 
" That principle by which we survey, and either 
approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and 
actions, is not only to be considered as what in its 
turn is to have some influence — which may be said 
of every passion, of the basest appetites — but like- 
wise as being superior; as from its very nature 
manifestly claiming superiority over all others, 
insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this 



64 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

faculty of conscience, without taking in judgment, 
direction, and superintendency. This is a con- 
stituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty 
itself; and to preside and govern, from the very 
economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. 
Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it 
has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern 
the world." 

Again he says : " This faculty was placed within 
us to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate 
all under principles, passions, and motives of 
action. This is its right and office ; thus sacred 
is its authority. And how often soever men violate 
and rebellious] y refuse to submit to it, for supposed 
interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for 
the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise 
gratify, this makes no alteration as to the natural 
right and office of conscience.' 7 

On the same subject Dr. Chalmers uses the fol- 
lowing language: "In every human heart there is 
a faculty, not, it may be, having the actual power, 
but having the just and rightful pretension, to sit 
as judge and master of the whole human conduct. 
Conscience is the rightful sovereign in man, and if 
any other, in the character of a ruling passion, be 
the actual sovereign, it is a usurper. In the former 
case the mind is felt to be in its proper and well- 



MORAL AGENCY. 



65 



conditioned state ; in the latter case it is felt to be 
in a state of anarchy. To it belongs the mastery — 
although the mastery is often wrongfully taken 
from it. It is the sovereign de jure, although it 
may not be de facto/ 9 

What we mean, then, by the supremacy of con- 
science, as stated above, is that when appetite, 
desire, or affection comes in conflict with con- 
science — when interest or gratification opposes 
duty — the latter should rule. The following con- 
siderations may serve to establish this point, if, 
indeed, it be not a first truth of reason, as I am 
inclined to think it is. 

1. If God intended man for virtue, he designed 
that faculty to be authoritative which would be the 
most certain to lead to virtue. That he did form 
man for virtue, no one who has any just idea of 
his character can doubt. That conscience, more 
than any other principle of our nature, promotes 
virtue, is a truth equally clear. Hence the conclu- 
sion is absolutely infallible, that conscience should 
be supreme, that it should have might as it has 
right, and rule the world. 

2. Its tme design is that of a regulator. Deprive 
it of that characteristic, and it is useless. It is to 
the moral mechanism what the regulator is to the 
watch ; and if it be not allowed to act in that capa- 



66 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

city, the very design for which it was given will be 
subverted. Or, to change the figure, its position is 
that of a civil governor among his subjects : if per- 
chance the lawful ruler be dethroned, and his place 
occupied by another, he still retains the insignia of 
royalty, and with a sublime dignity asserts his 
claims to the throne. If such be the position of 
conscience among the other faculties of the soul, 
we must admit its supremacy, or charge G-od with 
folly — with having given us a faculty for no 
purpose. 

3. The supremacy of conscience is manifest, 
when the nature of its rule is compared with that 
of any other faculty. Place man under the domi- 
nion of appetite, and he is little, if any, better than 
the brute. Let passion have the sway — ambition 
with power for its object, avarice with wealth for 
its object, the love of esteem with fame for its 
object — and man would hardly retain a vestige of 
his pristine dignity. The passions contend with 
tiger -like ferocity, and appetite blindly urges to 
gratification. Unhallowed lust, fierce rage, malig- 
nant envy, scornful pride, heated jealousy, and 
" unruled" ambition produce confusion in the hu- 
man bosom, wild and fearful as that which reigns 
in Pandemonium. If, then, God intended order 
and not confusion, rule and not anarchy, he de- 



MORAL AGENCY. 



67 



signed the supremacy of conscience. Another fact 
in this connection strengthens the position taken. 
Any one even of the benevolent affections may 
become of monstrous growth. Man may love wife 
or child or friend to idolatry. But who ever heard 
or believed that man could become too conscien- 
tious ? 

4. The retributions of conscience show that it 
should be supreme. "When the passions are obeyed 
or the appetites gratified to satiety, then they inflict 
their punishment. For obedience rather than for 
disobedience are their penalties inflicted. £Tot so 
with conscience : its rewards come from obedience, 
and its punishments from disobedience. These re- 
wards afford the highest enjoyment, these punish- 
ments the deepest suffering. The very arming of 
conscience with this fearful power of retribution, 
is the clearest possible proof that the Creator de- 
signed its supremacy. "Why give this power of 
rewarding or punishing, unless to exact obedience ? 
These retributions, like lictors' rods, are the insignia 
of authority, the infallible evidence of supremacy. 

5. But lastly, we appeal to every man's con- 
sciousness. Every one feels and knows intuitively 
that conscience ought to rule ; and by no amount 
of argument could you convince any man to the 
contrary. Every man is conscious that the voice 



68 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of conscience is heard only in command. The 
appetites may persuade, the passions may fas- 
cinate, like so many seductive sirens, but conscience 
commands. 

Having stated, as we think, the true theory in 
regard to the supremacy of conscience, we desire to 
guard the student against error. Let no one place 
conscience above God, or above his law. Let no 
one fall into the error that there is a "higher law" 
in his moral nature which is above God's revealed 
law. Conscience is supreme in its sphere. In any 
conflict with any other principle of our nature, con- 
science should be admitted as the higher principle, 
and should be obeyed. In this, and in this alone, 
is the rightful supremacy of conscience. 

SECTION V. 

ERRONEOUS VIEWS OF CONSCIENCE — PRESIDENT MAHAN'S VIEW — OB- 
JECTIONS TO THIS VIEW — THEORY OF THE REV. HUBBARD WINSLOW 

—OBJECTIONS TO THIS THEORY CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE 

CONSCIENCE. 

" Conscience," says Mahan, "is the voice of God 
within us." (Intellectual Philosophy, page 260.) 
It is with great diffidence that we oppose the view 
of so profound and accurate a thinker on metaphy- 
sical subjects as we acknowledge President Mahan 
to be — especially as we are indebted to him for 



MORAL AGENCY. 



69 



many valuable thoughts — yet the cause of truth 
demands it in this case. 

L If conscience were the voice of God, it could 
not be polluted, nor perverted, nor hardened. How 
would it do to speak of the voice of God as "seared 
with a hot iron/' as " purged from dead works," as 
"defiled," and as "guilty?" Yet in this very way 
is conscience spoken of in the Scriptures. 

2. This declaration comes in contact with what 
he had just stated — namely, that "conscience is a 
function of the reason." Can the voice of God 
be a function of the human reason? To propose 
the question is to show the absurdity of that doc- 
trine which we are opposing. 

3. If conscience were the voice of God within us, 
it would be a perfect guide in all circumstances and 
at all times. The light of revelation would not 
have been needed, nor would any necessity for the 
culture of conscience have existed. 

The Rev. Hubbard Winslow, in his very excel- 
lent work on Moral Philosophy, has expressed some 
views of conscience which we judge to be erro- 
neous ; although he is supported in them by no less 
authority than Dr. Alexander. He says that "con- 
science is man's susceptibility to moral distinction ;" 
and he opposes the idea that conscience possesses 
any discriminating function. According to Mr. 



70 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Wmslow, conscience is the faculty by which we 
feel right and wrong. We regard this view as erro- 
neous, for the following reasons : 

1. Because it is not the province of the mere 
intellect to investigate the subject of morals. The 
pure intellect can form no conception of duty. 
Men may have the most accurate judgment in 
reference to natural subjects, to mathematics, to 
finances, etc., and be utterly destitute of the ideas 
of right and wrong. In cases of congenital moral 
derangement, this is admitted to be the case. 
There are constitutional thieves, to whom you can- 
not show the criminality of theft. We presume 
this fact will not be denied. To such persons you 
cannot impart the idea of duty, though they receive 
ideas upon other subjects with readiness and accu- 
racy. Now, the argument is that, if the derange- 
ment or deprivation of the moral faculty effaces not 
only the feeling but the idea of right and wrong, 
the faculty must have a function for perceiving as 
well as feeling moral distinctions. 

2. But we are still more thoroughly convinced 
of the erroneousness of this view by the fact that, 
in proportion as man loses the power of feeling 
moral distinctions, he at the same time loses the 
power of judging or discriminating. As is the one, 
so is the other, which shows that they are functions 



MORAL AGENCY. 



71 



of the same faculty. One of the greatest writers 
and most astute logicians that England ever pro- 
duced, had so abused his conscience that he could 
neither perceive nor feel that adultery is wrong, 
and so taught in his writings. 

3. But this view, which Mr. Winslow elaborates 
through twenty pages of his "Elements," is in 
direct opposition to another view expressed by him. 
He says : " Conscience includes the rational power 
to discern, with the susceptibility to feel our moral 
obligations." Again, he speaks of "its enlightened 
decisions." And again, " Conscience includes both 
the power of perception and a susceptibility to a 
peculiar feeling." In one place he says it does not 
include the power of perception, and in another 
place of the same work he makes it include the 
power of perception. As two contradictory propo- 
sitions cannot both be true, we must judge between 
them, and accept that which accords with our no- 
tions of truth. 

Conscience has been supposed by many to be a 
perfect guide ; and consequently, when they act in 
accordance with the dictates of conscience, they can- 
not do wrong. 

The truth is, whether conscience guides aright or 
not depends upon the light and culture it has re- 



72 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ceived. If light has been offered and refused, or 
if the conscience has been blinded or rendered 
insensible by a course of sin, man is responsible 
for its defect, and is just as guilty as though he 
had sinned against it. 

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 

L The existence of conscience affords the highest 
proof of the existence and character of God that 
can possibly be presented. It not only shows de- 
sign, but virtuous design, and hence it not only 
manifests the existence of the Divine Being, but 
his virtuous character. "It is the strongest argu- 
ment which nature furnishes for the moral per- 
fections of the Deity ; and even with all minds, 
or certainly with most minds, it is the most effective 
argument for his existence. The inference is 
neither a distant nor an obscure one, from the 
existence and character of the design, to the exist- 
ence and character of the designer.' ' 

2. As the existence of intellect shows that man 
was designed for knowledge, so the existence of 
conscience proves that he was designed for virtue. 
And as he instinctively feels that conscience is the 
highest faculty of his nature, so he ought to feel 
that he was designed more for virtue than for any 



MORAL AGENCY. 



73 



thing else. The softest whispers of conscience are 
more imperative, and come armed with higher 
authority, than the loudest calls of passion. 

3. Virtue for its own sake should be chosen as 
the highest end of man's existence. Just in pro- 
portion as man departs from virtue is the design 
of his creation perverted, and, instead of accom- 
plishing his destiny, his life is a failure. 

4. Our theory of conscience being admitted to be 
true, man is seen to be invested with a power in- 
volving elements of the most fearful character — 
elements by which not only the turpitude of sin is 
exhibited, but by which its penalties are most ter- 
ribly visited. Hence man's highest interests are 
indissolubly connected with his highest duty. 

5. As conscience teaches more of the Divine 
character than any external object, it likewise 
teaches more of man as related to God's law. 

It behooves us, then, to look deep into our own 
natures, and seek a clear and accurate apprehen- 
sion of every function of conscience. It behooves 
us also to pursue that course which will the most 
perfectly develop this important faculty. 
4 



74 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION VI. 

THE WILL : DEFINITION OF THE WILL — FREEDOM OF THE WILL — ARGU- 
MENTS TO ESTABLISH ITS FREEDOM OPINIONS OF CELEBRATED 

WRITERS IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE FATALISM RUNS INTO 

ATHEISM QUOTATION FROM FICHTE STRENGTH OF THE WILL ITS 

CAPACITY FOR GOOD OR EVIL — CULTIVATION OF THE WILL THE 

DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES. 

In the presentation of the requisites of moral 
agency, the will comes next in order. 

By the will is meant the power of choice, which 
always involves an alternative. Moral agency could 
not exist in the absence of power of choice. Man 
must be free, or he is incapable of moral, agency. 
His freedom is found in the will, and can be found 
in no other faculty. All his acts of both mind 
and body which are involuntary are admitted to 
be necessitated, while all that are voluntary are of 
course produced, controlled, or necessitated by the 
will. Hence the great importance of establishing 

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

1. All the promises of the Bible are made upon 
the supposition that man is free to accept or to 
reject them. It would be absurd to offer promises 
to reward a necessitated action. As promises are 
offered as incentives to action, they necessarily 



MORAL AGENCY. 



75 



presuppose that the action for the performance of 
which the reward is promised is a perfectly volun- 
tary one. 

2. All the threatenings of the Bible prove with 
still more force the freedom of the will. The ab- 
surdity of a holy and just God threatening to 
punish an agent for an act of which he was not 
the master, is too obvious to admit of denial or 
to require proof. 

3. All our feelings of remorse incontestably 
prove that the act for which the remorse is felt 
was a free act — that the course exactly opposite 
might have been chosen. 

4. All our feelings of self-approbation prove that 
man is free. ~No man could stultify his conscience 
so far as to commend himself for an unavoidable 
act. 

5. All human laws go upon the supposition that 
man's power of choice is not necessitated. If laws 
are rules of action accompanied by sanctions, they 
can only be prescribed for those who are free to 
obey or to disobey them. 

6. The moral law prescribed by God for the gov- 
ernment of man proves that the acts of the will 
are not necessitated. 

7. All distinctions in moral actions— such as 
virtue and vice, merit and demerit — would be ab- 



76 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

surd, except upon the principle of the freedom of 
the will. A forced action, whether performed by 
man or a machine, is intuitively perceived to be 
destitute of a moral character. 

8. Every man is conscious of his freedom. This 
argument alone is sufficient to answer all the so- 
phistry of the fatalist. No argument against the 
testimony of consciousness can be of any avail. 
Its decisions are imperative, and universally ac- 
knowledged. 

As this subject is one of vital importance to the 
philosopher, and has created much controversy, 
we offer the following opinions of distinguished 
writers. 

Sir William Hamilton says : " Practically, the fact 
that we are free is given in the consciousness of an 
uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness 
of our moral accountability. Practically, our con- 
sciousness of the moral law, which without a moral 
liberty in man would be a mendacious imperative, 
gives a decided preponderance to the doctrine of 
freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in 
act, if we are accountable for our actions." (Hamil- 
ton's Philosophy of the Conditioned, pp. 510-512.) 

Speaking of the will, Cousin says: "Analysis 
discovers in this single element two terms still, a 
special act of willing, and the power of willing, 



MORAL AGENCY. 



77 



which is its cause ; and this cause, in order to pro- 
duce its effect, has no need of another theatre, of 
another instrument than itself. It produces it 
directly, without intermediation and without con- 
dition, continues it, consummates it, or suspends 
it, and modifies it, creates it entirely or destroys it 
entirely ; and at the moment even when it exercises 
itself by such a special act, we have the conscious- 
ness that it could exercise itself by a special act 
entirely contrary, without being thereby exhausted; 
so that after having changed its act ten times, a 
hundred times, the faculty would remain integrally 
the same, inexhaustible and identical with itself, in 
the perpetual variety of its applications, being 
always able to do what it does not do, and not to do 
tohat it does. Here (that is, in the will) in all its 
plenitude is the character of liberty/ ' (History of 
Modern Philosophy, pp. 407, 408.) 

"By free will," says Prof. Finney, "is intended 
the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in 
compliance with moral obligation in every instance. 
Free will implies the power of originating and 
deciding our own choices, and of exercising our 
own sovereignty in every instance of choice upon 
moral questions ; of deciding or choosing in con- 
formity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral 
obligation. That man cannot be under moral obli- 



78 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 

gation to perform an impossibility, is a first truth 
of reason. But man's causality, his whole power 
of causality to perform or do any thing, lies in his 
will. If he cannot will, he can do nothing. His 
whole liberty or freedom must consist in his power 
to will. His outward acts and mental states are 
connected w^ith his will, by a law of necessity. If 
I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless 
there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary mo- 
tion, or unless some resistance be opposed that 
overcomes the power of my volitions. The se- 
quences of choice or volition are always under the 
law of necessity, and unless the will is free, man 
has no freedom ; and if he has no freedom, he is 
not a moral agent.' ' (Systematic Theology, pp. 27, 
28.) Again he says: " Liberty is an attribute of 
the phenomena of the will. I am as conscious of 
being free in willing, as of not being free in my 
feelings." Page 32. 

Dr. Alexander, the great Princeton divine, and 
one of the greatest lights of the Presbyterian 
Church, says : " In answer to all arguments brought 
to prove that man is not a free moral agent, we 
appeal to the consciousness of every rational being. 
No arguments, however plausible, are of any force 
against intuitive principles. "Whether we can or 
cannot answer arguments against liberty, we know 



MORAL AGENCY. 



79 



that we are free." Again he says : "We lay it 
down as a first principle, from which we can no 
more depart than from the consciousness of exist- 
ence, that man is free, and therefore stand ready to 
embrace whatever is fairly included in the idea of 
freedom." (Moral Science, p. 97.) 

Hickok utters the following sentiment : " I feel 
that my act of will was not bound, in its given 
conditions, without an alternative. I know that I 
could have done differently if I had pleased ; and I 
know, moreover, that if I was pleased to do wrong, 
that pleasing to do so was not inevitable." (Science 
of Mind, p. 272.) 

I have been thus careful in collecting these testi- 
monies concerning man's free agency, because of 
the vast importance of the doctrine in the science 
of morals. Fatalism runs into Atheism, and is 
utterly destructive of moral accountability. 

We will listen to one of the most accomplished 
of this school — Fichte. He says: " I myself, with 
all that I call mine, am but a link in this chain of 
rigid natural necessity. . . . The time at which 
my existence commenced, and the attributes be- 
longing to me, were determined by this universal 
power of Nature, of which I form a part ; and all 
the forms under which these, my inborn attributes, 
have since manifested themselves, have been deter- 



80 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

mined by the self-same power. It was impossible 
that instead of me another should have arisen, it is 
impossible that at any moment of my existence I 
should be other than what I am. ... I am, 
and I think, both absolutely and necessarily. . . . 
Give to Nature a single definition of a person, let 
it be ever so apparently trivial, the course of a 
muscle, the turn of a hair, and she would be able, 
had she a universal consciousness, to declare what 
would be his whole course of thought during his 
whole course of being. Most certainly I cannot, 
by all my repentance, by all my resolutions, pro- 
duce the smallest alteration in the appointed course 
of things. I stand under the inexorable power of 
rigid necessity : should she have destined me to 
become a fool and a profligate, a fool and a profli- 
gate without doubt I shall become. Should she 
have destined me to be wise and good, wise and 
good I shall doubtless be. There is neither merit 
nor blame to be attached to her or to me. She 
stands under her own laws, I under hers." 

Here is no ambiguity, no concealment. The doc- 
trine, in all its horrid deformity, is clearly, fully 
stated. Man is like a piece of inert matter carried 
along by a strong current, and he must quietly sub- 
mit to be borne along at its mercy. This system 
dethrones Deity, degrades humanity, destroys 



M 0 U A L A (J E In C Y . 



81 



moral law, annihilates human responsibility, and 
swallows up, in one dread vortex, all our hopes and 
fears, our wills and consciences, in fact all that is 
uoble in action or virtuous in resolve. On the 
other hand, the theory of free-will being true, God 
is recognized, his moral government is a great 
truth, human responsibility a fearful reality, and 
man has it in his power to work out a noble 
destiny. 

STRENGTH OF THE WILL. 

The will has no power to control our perceptions 
or to determine our cognitions. They must be as 
the objects perceived or known. No act of the will 
can make us perceive a horse to be a tree, or the 
opposite. Nor can the will, by any force it is capa- 
ble of exerting, make the body warm when it is 
cold, or, by the mere act of willing, satisfy the 
cravings of hunger, etc., yet the will possesses 
great strength, which may be illustrated as fol- 
lows : 

1. The will of God is the greatest causative 
power in the universe ; probably the will of man is 
next. Its effects are seen in the formation of gov- 
ernments, and the revolutions of empires. 

2. A strong will enables man to endure the 
greatest sufferings without complaint. As in the 

4* 



82 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

case of Mucins Scaevola, wlio stood with unmoved 
countenance while his right hand was consumed in 
the flames. The racks of the Inquisition have not 
been able to move the man of strong will from his 
governing purpose. 

3. It enables its possessor to triumph over pas- 
sion, and subdue appetite, and, upon occasions, rise 
superior to the force of inveterate habit. 

4. Strength of will is essential to the accomplish- 
ment of great enterprises. It enabled Hannibal to 
pass the Alps, Columbus to discover America, 
Washington to triumph in the Revolution, Bona- 
parte to bring Europe to his throne, and imparted 
to Andrew Jackson the force which characterized 
him as a hero and a statesman. 

A strong will, when directed to the performance 
of right, is capable of effecting the most beneficial 
results ; but, when directed to evil, it may become 
the most fearful instrument of ruin. It may nerve 
the arm of the assassin, as well as invigorate the 
heart of the benefactor ; it may give success to the 
traitor, as well as victory to the patriot. Hence the 
necessity of the 

CULTIVATION OF THE WILL. 

The will is to be cultivated : 1. By shunning all 
those influences which may enthrall it or give it a 



MO HAL AGENCY. 



83 



morally wrong direction; such as, 1. Party or sec- 
tarian prejudices; 2. Sudden but violent gusts of 
passion ; 3. Long-continued self-indulgence, or any 
vicious habit whatever. Persons have become so 
depraved by habit, that when they " would do good, 
evil was present with them." 

2. The will is to be cultivated by always giving 
the assistance of reason and enlightened conscience. 
The will should be rational, not arbitrary. God's 
will is never arbitrary — it is always a rational will : 
so should man's be. There should be no act of the 
will merely for the sake of willing, but always for a 
sufficient reason. So, also, the will should be cul- 
tivated in connection with conscience. We should 
will nothing which conscience disapproves. 

3. But lastly, the will is to be cultivated by sub- 
mitting it to the will of God. Let the will of man 
concur with the will of God, and its acts will cer- 
tainly be right. 

THE DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES. 

Sir William Hamilton says, "A determination by 
motives cannot to our understanding escape from 
necessitation." And yet he maintained the free- 
dom of the will, and a determination by motives. 

On this subject Dr. Alexander is chargeable with 
a strange contradiction. On page 92 of his Moral 



84 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Science, he makes the broad declaration, " No in- 
voluntary action can be of amoral nature." This 
theory he attempts to prove, and we think with 
success. On page 140 of the same work, he says, 
" It is clear, then, that men are more accountable 
for their motives than for any thing else." If both 
these statements are true, and we do not doubt 
their truth, man must be master of his motives, 
or, in other words, they must be voluntary, or they 
can have no moral character. On page 120, he 
says: "If there is one point above all others on 
which responsibility rests, it is on the motives 
from which proceeds volition, and by which it is 
governed." According to our understanding, he 
first declares man irresponsible, except for volun- 
tary actions ; second, he is responsible for his 
motives ; third, his motives are not voluntary ; 
hence he is responsible for what he cannot avoid — 
for what is involuntary. 

Men almost instinctively and universally refuse 
to hold a man responsible for any thing unavoid- 
able, and, with equal instinctiveness and univers- 
ality, agree to hold him responsible for his motives. 
This very fact establishes the universal belief of 
the voluntariness of motives. Impugn a man's 
motives, and he at once becomes highly offended. 
jSTo offence could arise if there were not a universal 



MORAL AGENCY. 



85 



consciousness that will governs the motive, and 
not motive the will. Man, by his intelligence, his 
reason, and his conscience, examines the various 
motives that may present themselves for his choice, 
and by his will he chooses them. 

The truth is, that instead of motives governing 
the will, the will always determines the motives, 
and is itself free. 

1. If the motives were involuntary, man would 
no more be responsible for his motives than for 
any act committed while the body was convulsed 
with spasms. 

2. If the motives were the governors of the will, 
and man of course could not choose his motives, 
the law should not ask the "quo animo" — the mo- 
tive that prompted the act. 

3. If the motives were not voluntary, man could 
feel no condemnation for acting from them — they 
being entirely beyond his control. 

4. If the motives were not voluntary, the will 
would be necessitated, controlled, and we should 
look for freedom in some other attribute, or man 
would lose his character as a free agent. It has 
been shown that all the acts of both mind and 
body are necessitated except the acts of the will ; 
if, then, this be necessitated, man has no freedom. 
The acts that are not voluntary are admitted to be 



86 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

controlled by physical or other laws ; and all the 
acts of mind or body that are voluntary are of 
course necessitated by the will. If the will then be 
necessitated, man becomes a machine, human re- 
sponsibility a fiction, and the whole system of 
morals a fable. 

We come then to the conclusion that the will 
chooses the motives, the motives determine the 
character of the action, and hence the propriety 
of holding man responsible for his motives. 

SECTION VII. 

LIGHT: ITS SOURCES THE LIGHT OF NATURE — THE LIGHT OF REVE- 
LATION. 

It has been stated that in order to render man 
accountable, he must not only have intellect, sen- 
sibilities, conscience, and free-will, but that, in addi- 
tion to all these, there must be light. In this section 
we propose to give the sources of this light, and 
the manner of teaching morality to man. 

THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 

The light of nature teaches that ignorance is 
universally the penalty of idleness : hence is readily 
inferred a most important duty in reference to the 
intellect. It also teaches us that loss of health, 



MORAL AGENCY. 



87 



and either a lingering or sudden death, are the 
penalties of inordinate indulgence of the appetites. 
Hence from the light of nature we infer the duties 
of temperance and chastity, and the vices of intem- 
perance and debauchery. Or take the affections. 
The indulgence of resentment in any of its forms, 
and especially of revenge, is attended with the 
most painful consequences : aggression must follow 
aggression, until, if not arrested, the annihilation 
of society would be the fearful consequence. On 
the other hand, the gratification of the benevolent 
affections, such as parental love, or the love of the 
human race, is attended with the highest gratifica- 
tion, and with the very best results. Hence is 
inferred the duty of benevolence, and the sin of 
revenge. 

So, by the light of nature we may judge of the 
propriety of an action from the results of such an 
action. It is our only means of judging. As re- 
velation is absent, and no duty declared or sin 
forbidden, it must only be by the " light of expe- 
rience' 9 that our feet can be guided. Upon the 
same principle, by looking at the consequences of 
falsehood, we may learn the duty of veracity. By 
seeing the consequences of fraud, we may learn the 
duty of honesty. Hence the old adage, " Honesty 
is the best policy." 



88 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

.Now let it be distinctly understood what relation 
the intellect and moral sense bear to this light, 
"Without light the powers of both would be dor- 
mant and undeveloped. Neither intellect nor con- 
science is a light — they are the receptacles of light. 
As no natural truth could be perceived without 
light, so no moral truth could be perceived with- 
out light. The clearness of the light determines 
the accuracy with which truth or duty may be 
apprehended. As a man in a starless night, with- 
out one ray of light, would be unable to see his 
path, so without either the light of nature or of 
revelation he could have no idea of the path of 
duty. As in the dim twilight the path may be 
obscurely discerned, so in the dim light of nature 
he may faintly discover the path of duty. 

Again, as the medium through which light passes 
greatly changes its character, and gives either the 
red, blue, or yellow ray the ascendency, imparting 
to objects the red, blue, or yellow tinge, so the 
moral medium, whether it be prejudice, supersti- 
tion, tradition, or any form of error, gives its par- 
ticular hue to the moral objects discerned. And 
as in the former instance the fault would not be 
in the light, nor in the eye, but in the medium, 
so, in the latter, the fault may not be in the 
light, nor in the conscience, but in the medium by 



MORAL AGENCY. 



8!) 



which it has been perverted. We believe the 
light of nature is a great source of knowledge, 
and that it is rather imperfect in degree than in 
kind. 

1. It teaches us duties, a knowledge of which 
could not be obtained without it. 

2. It presents motives to virtue. 1st. Motives 
derived from the natural consequences of crime 
or virtue, such as loss of health, destruction of life, 
etc. ; or the peace of society, the happiness of the 
race, etc. 2d. Motives derived from the moral 
consequences, such as shame, guilt, remorse, or the 
opposites of them, self-approbation, peace of con- 
science, and the like. 

That this system is defective is proved, 1st. By 
reference to the fact that under its influence the 
course of man has been one of moral deterioration. 
The heathen always regarded their first age as the 
golden, their second as the silver, their third as 
brazen, and their fourth as iron. 2d. The religious 
and moral systems of the heathen were based upon 
natural religion. Those systems were essentially 
defective, and necessarily so from the very defect- 
ive light with which they were favored. Those 
defective systems, moreover, existed at a time when 
the mind had arrived at a very high state of im- 
provement ; when the arts and sciences had made 



90 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

astonishing progress, and when civilization had 
been cultivated by a people learned in all the wis- 
dom of this world's philosophy. Still these very 
people were bound down to those systems of false 
philosophy and false religion. The causes of these 
defects are inherent in the system of natural reli- 
gion, and are obvious to any who may give to the 
subject a little reflection. 

1. The light of nature teaches only by experi- 
ence. Experience is a slow teacher : the know- 
ledge gained by experience is not only dearly 
bought, but slowly bought. As we must learn the 
nature of an action by the consequences of the 
action, of course we must not only await the per- 
formance, but must actually await the results of 
the action before we can determine its moral char- 
acter. Sometimes these results may follow imme- 
diately, at other times they do not follow until 
long years after the performance of the action. 

2. However clear may be the inferences, yet in- 
ferences only they are. They are not the indubit- 
able utterances of truth in words. They are not 
the unmistakable language of a great lawgiver. 
Hence much of the nature of fact remains in ob- 
scurity, and must for ever remain uncertain, until 
the uncertainty is removed by the light of revela- 
tion. 



MORAL AGENCY. 



91 



LIGHT OF REVELATION. 

The revealed facts of Christianity are not very 
numerous, but they are very important, and in 
their light our duties may be distinctly seen. They 
are, 1. The existence and perfections of God. 2. 
The creation of man. From these clearly revealed 
facts we may learn the duties we owe to God. 
3. The original purity of our race. 4. The fall of 
man, involving human depravity, in all its fearful 
extent and depth. 5. The great- remedial dispen- 
sation. From these last three great facts may be 
learned the duty, and from them also may be 
derived incentives to the attainment of moral 
purity. 6. The great fact of retribution in a future 
state. 7. The fact of the resurrection of the body. 
From these last may be deduced those awful 
motives which arouse man under a sense of his 
immortality, and excite his hopes and fears in 
reference to present duties as connected with the 
eternal future. Christianity not only reveals these 
great facts, but lays down many precepts, and 
hence it may be necessary to state certain leading 
principles which should guide us in learning our 
duty from the light of revelation. There are three 
supposable methods of revealing duty : 



92 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. A specific revelation in reference to every 
relation into which man could enter, and of every 
duty connected with that relation. According to 
this, every change of circumstance would be noted, 
and every possible phase of relation during the 
entire course of man's existence distinctly marked. 
The objection to this method would be that the 
revelation would be so voluminous as to render it 
impossible for any one to subject it to a thorough 
examination. 

2. The statement of mere general principles, in 
the light of which duties may be learned; but 
these general principles to be illustrated by no 
specific duties or special examples. According to 
this, all is to be general — nothing special. And 
even the most general principle is to be left without 
illustration. The objection to this is its vague- 
ness, and the consequent difficulty of arriving, 
with any degree of certainty, at a knowledge of our 
duties. 

3. The third method embraces the good and 
discards the objectionable features of both the 
others. According to this, general principles are 
clearly stated, and they are illustrated by specific 
examples, so that in no supposable case in which 
man can be placed can he fail to learn his duty, 



MORAL AGENCY. 



93 



if he make the proper effort. This seems to be the 
method adopted by God in the revelation which he 
has given to us. 

In learning our duty from the Bible, certain 
things are to be excluded as not obligatory 
upon us. 

1. Every thing that is merely historical; for the 
mere fact that any thing has been done, and has 
been recorded in God's book, by no means places 
us under obligation to perform it. 

2. All those duties which were required of 
particular men in particular circumstances are 
excluded. Such commands as were only intended 
for individuals, or even nations in particular 
circumstances, would not be binding upon us. 

3. All those laws which are merely ceremonial, 
and which were simply intended to separate one 
nation from all others, or which had reference to 
types of a new dispensation, are to be ex- 
cluded. 

4. All that is not enjoined upon man as man, 
is excluded upon this principle. 

6. Any command which, taken literally, is found 
to be directly antagonistic to the great principles 
of Christianity, and to other positive specific duties 
of the Christian system, is to be regarded as not 
binding; for duties can never clash, nor can a 



94 



ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



specific duty come in contact with a correct general 
principle. 

In learning our duty from the Bible, certain 
things are to be included. 

1. All that is required of man as man, in 
distinction from what has been required either of 
individuals or of nations. 

2. All those specific duties which do not come 
in conflict with other commands, or with the great 
principles contained in revelation. 

If, then, we are reading the Old Testament, we 
should inquire, To whom were these commands 
given ? In what circumstances ? For what object ? 
Is the command renewed in the New Testament ? 
If we are endeavoring to find out our duty from 
the New Testament, the way is plain. Most of its 
requirements are made of man as man, and not 
of man in any peculiar circumstances, such as 
surrounded the Jewish nation, so that here the 
inquiry should be : Is a duty required ? Am I 
included among those of whom the duty is 
required ? "Would the practice (though not precisely 
forbidden) come in conflict with the duties that 
are known to be binding? 

How bright is the light thrown on our path by 
this candle of the Lord ! Men may differ in regard 
to abstruse points of theology, but in regard to 



4 

MORAL AGENCY. 95 

duty there should be no controversy. Before this 
light the clouds of bigotry and error should disap- 
pear like mists before the rising sun. Before this 
all lesser lights grow dim, as stars fade at early 
morn. In this presence heathen oracles are dumb, 
and heathen philosophy gives up its crown. It 
breaks in upon slumbering and benighted man in 
characters of flame, startling him from his slumbers, 
enlightening his darkness, and even dazzling his 
vision by its divine radiance. Man needed the 
light shining in truthful narrative, flashing in 
earnest precepts, glittering in song and promise, 
ascending in auroral splendors amid grand and 
eternal truths, spanning with beautiful efful- 
gence the valley of death, and opening before his 
vision the portals of immortality. For this light 
man labored, looked, and prayed. At length it 
came. It reaffirmed the moral law which was 
given to us in natural religion, in its whole extent, 
and sanctioned the severity of its demands. Its 
precepts have regard not so much to outward acts 
as to the disposition of mind from which such acts 
proceed, and to the secret purposes of the heart. 
By it we perceive that the great design of creation 
is a moral one ; that all physical arrangements and 
events, as we are accustomed to call them, are 
chiefly intended to promote the growth of the 



96 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

religious element in man, and to introduce the 
reign of justice, purity, and love, of truth and 
righteousness, upon the earth. By this light God 
is displayed in nature before the mind of man, 
creating the universe, fixing its laws, harmonizing 
its movements. He becomes the God of providence, 
marshalling the clouds, sending the showers, cloth- 
ing the earth with verdure, painting the lily, and 
noticing the falling sparrow. By it the Redeemer's 
footprints are seen, and under its potent influence 
life and immortality become a divine reality. It is 
a power — a sublime moral power — for no other 
power has ever dismantled the grave, lighted up its 
gloom, and made its dreary slumbers hopeful. 
Again and again has man presumptuously turned 
away from the light of Christianity ; but the earnest 
prayer of the author is that all who read this 
volume may ever be guided by the light of religion, 
and may ever be influenced by the words of the 
"Great Teacher:' 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



97 



CHAPTER IV. 

MORAL OBLIGATION. 



DEFINITION OF MORAL OBLIGATION — FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLI- 
GATION — TRUE THEORY GIVEN AND ESTABLISHED — CONDITIONS 

OF OBLIGATION — EXTENT OF OBLIGATION — BELIEF PRINCIPLES — — 

HABITS — -INTENTIONS. 

Moral obligation is that which binds moral 
beings to the observance of moral law. When pros- 
pectively considered, it bears the same relation to 
law that virtue does when retrospectively considered. 
Obligation has the same relation to law, in refer- 
ence to future action, that virtue has in reference 
to past action. Obligation requires the observance 
of moral law: virtue has met the requirement. 
Every being endowed with a moral nature feels the 
force of moral obligation with a power and vivid- 
ness which give a clearer idea of the meaning of 

the term than can be conveyed by any definition. 
5 



98 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

In the definition given above, we believe, however, 
all authors concur. 

In reference to the ground of moral obligation, 
authors have presented theories at once unsatis- 
factory, numerous, contradictory, and false. One 
has made utility; another, right; another, self- 
interest; a fourth, sympathy; a fifth, fitness; a 
sixth, moral order; a seventh, the will of God. 
Kemember that all these answers have been given 
to the celebrated question propounded by Dr. Paley, 
""Why am I obliged to keep my word?" and hence 
have each been assumed as the only foundation 
of moral obligation. 

To our mind, all these theories have a tendency 
to mystify one of the plainest subjects in morals. 
This question is supposed to be asked by one who 
is satisfied that an obligation is upon him to keep 
his word ; but, not satisfied with a knowledge of 
the existence of the obligation, he carries his 
inquiries still farther, even to the foundation on 
which the acknowledged obligation rests. Now, 
we venture the assertion that no mere seeker after 
truth, no earnest inquirer after the path of duty, 
ever did ask or ever will ask such a question as the 
one propounded by Dr. Paley, and discussed with 
so much zeal and learning by others. Neither 
reason nor conscience, unbiased by a pseudo-philo- 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



99 



sophy, ever made such an inquiry as, Why is it a 
duty to do my duty ? or, Why am I obliged to meet 
an acknowledged obligation? The question is 
based upon the supposition that a man, with the 
acknowledged obligation to tell the truth, with the 
deep feeling that he ought to tell the truth, is still 
seeking for a higher, a stronger reason for telling 
the truth. A man's disposition to lie must be 
extreme, when the felt obligation to tell the truth 
is not a sufficient reason for telling it. Suppose 
you convince a man that it is his duty to perform 
a certain act, to make reparation for some injury 
done : he acknowledges that he ought to do what 
is required, he feels it, he knows it; but now he 
says, Just show why I ought to do what you have 
convinced me I ought to do, and without hesitation 
I will do it. You would at once doubt either his 
sanity or his sincerity. You would say, Does the 
man wish me to show him that it is his duty to do 
his duty ? Is he really in earnest in asking me to 
give him a reason for doing what he admits to be 
his duty ? 

That we have not misrepresented the question is 
evident from the following authorities : 

President Mahan says : " The question as to the 
foundation of obligation resolves itself simply and 
exclusively into this one — namely, What are the 



100 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

reasons in view of which such affirmations are 
made ? What are the reasons for which the intelli- 
gence affirms that the will ought to put forth 
certain intentions or choices, and ought not to put 
forth others ? This one question being correctly 
answered, we have discovered the real and only 
foundation of moral obligation. No one, we pre- 
sume, will deny that this is a distinct and correct 
statement of the question.' ' 

" The foundation of moral obligation/ ' says Pre- 
sident Finney, "is the reason or consideration that 
imposes obligation on a moral agent to obey moral 
law." 

Dr. Paley thus presents the subject : " "Why am I 
obliged to keep my word? Because it is right, 
says one ; because it is agreeable to the fitness of 
things, says another; because it is conformable to 
reason, says a third," etc. 

Now we hold that all theories in regard to the 
foundation of moral obligation are based upon the 
false assumption that a higher reason for the per- 
formance of obligation can be given, or is required 
to be given, than the existence of obligation ; while 
the truth is, obligation is original, self-sustaining, 
and ultimate, and is not only the highest, but the 
most authoritative reason that can be given for the 
performance of any act. Satisfy any sane mind 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



101 



that obligation exists to pursue a certain course of 
conduct, and no other reason is wanted, for none of 
equal authority can be given. 

Dr. Paley himself has shown that no answer can 
be given to the question, " "What is the foundation 
of moral obligation?'' which will prevent it from 
being instantly repeated. For instance, Dr. Paley 
makes all obligation rest on the ground that virtue 
promotes our eternal happiness. The inquiry im- 
mediately arises, Why am I obliged to promote my 
eternal happiness ? Or take Finney's theory, which 
is, that the highest well-being of God and the uni- 
verse is the only foundation of moral obligation. 
Again the question immediately recurs, Why am I 
bound to promote the well-being of God and the 
universe? And so with every other theory that 
has been presented. This is not the line pursued 
by the intellect. It does not move in a circle. It 
must have an ultimate on which to repose; and 
what can afford to the mind such support as the 
idea of obligation ? Resting on this foundation, it 
asks no firmer stay. Instead of for ever moving in 
a circle, seeking satisfaction and finding none, it 
rests with an unwavering confidence on moral obli- 
gation, as one of those grand first truths vouch- 
safed to us by the Almighty. 

The following considerations will probably con- 



102 ELEMENTS 0E MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

vince most impartial minds that the position here 
taken is true. 

1. If obligation be not ultimate, then conscience 
is not the highest faculty of man's nature. The 
admitted supremacy of conscience is not true, if 
obligation itself be not supreme. If there can be 
any higher reason for the performance of a work 
than the claims of moral obligation, which lays 
hold of the conscience, then is the oft-quoted saying 
of Bishop Butler false: "If conscience had might 
as it has right, it would absolutely rule the world." 

2. If obligation be not ultimate, and there is 
something behind it of a more binding character, 
then is our whole moral nature a lie, its authori- 
tative imperatives are mendacious, the remorse 
which it inflicts is a fiction, and the feelings of self- 
approbation for the performance of virtue are unreal. 
For we dare assert, that all its commands are only 
in view of obligation ; that remorse follows the vio- 
lation, and peace of conscience the observance of 
obligation ; and that no consideration is ever 
extended beyond obligation, either in its com- 
mands, its impulses, its rewards, or its penalties. 

3. If obligation be not ultimate, then can the 
human mind find nothing ultimate. For it can be 
demonstrated that no answer can be given to the 
question. "What is the foundation of moral obliga- 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



tion ? which will prevent the recurrence of the 
question. Take the answers that have been given 
to the question as proposed by Paley, " Why am I 
obliged to keep my word ?" "Because it is right," 
says one. The question immediately recurs, "Why 
am I obliged to do w T hat is right?" " Because it 
promotes the public good," says another. Again 
the question comes up, "Why am I obliged to pro- 
mote the public good ?" And thus may the ques- 
tion be repeated for ever, and the mind never find 
a resting-place — an ultimate. Now we hold that 
the mind does not thus move in a circle, and that 
this very unnatural movement is proof positive of 
the absurdity of the question, and of the folly of 
seeking an answer. 

4. If obligation be not ultimate, then obligation 
is not binding per se. For the very question pre- 
supposes a reason of greater moment than the sense 
of duty — a reason which, lying behind obligation 
and supporting it, may impart to it a force which 
does not inherently belong to it. If obligation is 
binding per se, why require one to give a reason for 
performing a duty other than is found in duty 
itself? 

5. Universal consciousness proclaims the supreme 
and ultimate nature of moral obligation. Here, 
and here alone, the mind rests satisfied, and feels 



104 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that no more commanding reason can be given for 
the performance of an act, than that we are under 
obligation to perform it. It acknowledges that the 
great culminating idea of our humanity is moral 
obligation. 

"We hold, then, that in regard to any specific act, 
it is reasonable to inquire whether an obligation 
exists to perform it ; but this being ascertained, to 
attempt to inquire into the foundation of the obli- 
gation, is to enter upon a series of questions at 
once interminable, absurd, and unnecessary, pro- 
ducing confusion of thought, and involving the 
mind in a mist of metaphysical nonsense. We hold 
it to be just as absurd to ask why we ought to do 
what we ought to do, as to ask why things equal to 
the same thing are equal to each other, or to ask 
why two and two make four. And we believe that 
the many writers who have mystified themselves 
and their readers, by seeking for a ground of obli- 
gation, have inadvertently admitted the supreme 
and ultimate nature of this principle. 

For example, take the answers that have been 
given to the question. One says utility ; another, 
self-interest, etc. Now what do these answers 
mean, except that an obligation exists to be useful, 
to promote self-interest, or to do the will of God ? 
If they do not mean this, they are utterly destitute 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



105 



of meaning; and if they do mean this, they estab- 
lish the truth of our theory. 

Every science has its first truths, upon which the 
whole fabric is reared. The axioms of mathematics 
are intuitively perceived, and from them the student 
goes forward to the solution of the most difficult 
problems. It is so in natural philosophy; it is 
equally so in morals. Among these, moral obliga- 
tion, intuitively perceived by all moral beings, and 
rested upon as eternal and immutable, lies at the 
foundation of the sublime science of morals. 

With a little care, we may be able to account for 
the manner in which philosophers have been led 
into this fundamental error. They misapprehended 
the evidences by which the existence of obligation 
is established, for the foundation of obligation; 
whereas, they are two entirely different subjects; 
as may be seen by the following illustration: "I 
believe in the existence of God." Now the founda- 
tion of that belief is one thing, and the proof that 
I do believe it is another. So in regard to every 
thing else : the foundation of its existence, and the 
proofs of its existence, are two things essentially 
different. But in reference to moral obligation, we 
find that whatever can be taken as proof of its 
existence has been assumed as its foundation. It 
may be the foundation upon which rests the belief 
5* 



106 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in the existence of obligation, and not that upon 
which is based the obligation itself. 

The question really answered by all these theo- 
rists is not, Why am I obliged ? but, What am I 
obliged to do ? And this is the inquiry proposed 
by every honest seeker after truth and duty. One 
says, You are obliged to do whatever the will of 
God requires ; and another, whatever will promote 
the public good, etc. Now who does not see that 
these answers are legitimate, and that they may 
both be correct? The will of God is, to the mind 
of the writer, always sufficient evidence of what 
man, in all his relations, is under obligation to do. 
When duty is revealed in the Bible, the evidence is 
complete, and the mind is satisfied. But when no 
explicit declaration of the will of God teaches the 
existence of the obligation, it may be learned by 
the tendency of the act, or by the relations of the 
actors. By whatever evidence the existence of obli- 
gation may be made manifest to the mind, when 
the fact is known, all inquiries in reference to it 
cease, and the mind reposes upon it, with the assur- 
ance which God's own eternal and immutable truths 
always impart. 

The conditions of moral obligation are intelli- 
gence, free-will, sensibilities, conscience, and a suf- 
ficiency of light to develop these powers. So soon 



MOKAL 0 13 L I U A T 1 0 N . 



107 



as these conditions exist, obligation exists; had 
they existed from eternity, moral obligation would 
also have existed. Let such conditions meet in 
any being, and obligation becomes supreme, and 
he feels that God himself cannot change it ; for 
this is only feeling and saying that it is impossible 
for God to act contrary to his own nature, or that 
it " is impossible for God to lie." As these are 
universally admitted to be the conditions of moral 
obligation, and as we do not hope to add any 
thing new, we pass to the investigation of its ex- 
tent. 

As a general principle, we assume that obliga- 
tion extends to all intelligent acts of the will. 
According to this principle, it does not extend to 
any instinct, nor to any involuntary affection or 
desire, nor to any involuntary act of intellect, nor 
to any involuntary muscular act. In the light of 
the same principle, we maintain the following 
points : 

I. Moral obligation extends to the belief. 

1. Our first argument to establish this position 
is derived from analogy. Man is held responsible 
to physical law, and why not to moral ? Let a man 
determine to take corrosive sublimate under the 
sincere belief that it is innocent, and death will be 
the consequence in spite of his belief ; he may sin- 



108 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cerely believe that indulgence in alcoholic liquors 
will do him no harm, but the signals of distress 
which violated nature will hang out will convince 
others, if not himself, that he is responsible to phy- 
sical law. 

2. The influence of belief upon the heart is con- 
clusive evidence that obligation extends to the 
beliefl The tendency of error, however sincerely 
believed, is to corrupt the heart and degrade the 
conscience. The tendency of truth is to purify and 
exalt the moral sensibilities. This shows that man 
is fearfully accountable for his belief. 

3. The intimate connection between belief and 
conduct proves the same truth. A man who be- 
lieved polygamy right, would not be very apt to 
regard with proper rigor the law of marriage. If, 
then, he be not responsible for his belief, in all law 
and right he should not be held responsible for his 
conduct, the result of that belief. 

4. The trial by jury, in which the juror is sworn 
to decide according to evidence, would be a mock- 
ery on any other supposition than that man is 
under obligation to believe according to the evi- 
dence. 

5. If sincerity can give to error the character of 
truth, it must of course give to vice the character 
of virtue. Hence, to deny that obligation extends 



MOilAL OBLIGATION. 



109 



to the belief, is to deny that truth and error, virtue 
and vice, possess distinctive qualities. 

Other arguments might be added, but these are 
deemed sufficient. It may, however, be proper to 
explain how it is that obligation extends to the belief. 
In belief there are three things : a thing believed, a 
believing mind, and evidences on which the beliet 
is founded. Evidence, to have its proper influence, 
must be examined, weighed, and understood. This 
requires attention, perseverance, and the earnest 
direction of the mind to its investigation. We 
may or we may not examine the evidence. We 
are perfectly free to examine, or refuse to examine, 
or to examine under the influence of partiality or 
prejudice. The will is uncontrolled j hence the 
responsibility. 

II. Man is responsible for his principles ; that 
is, he is under obligation to have right principles. 

Principles sustain the same relation to the moral 
nature that belief sustains to the intellectual. They 
are the tempers or dispositions which issue in 
actions. It is the avarice that causes the miser to 
hoard his coin, unmindful of the calls of pity or the 
duties of benevolence, that we regard as base. It 
is the malice that nerves the arm of the assassin 
that we condemn. And no man can regard the 
sleeping robber or murderer in the same light in 



110 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which he views the unconscious infant. If the 
actions proceeding from corrupt principles are 
worthy of condemnation, much more worthy are 
the principles from which the actions spring. "Why 
condemn the stream for its pollutions, if you do 
not condemn the source? Corrupt a man's prin- 
ciples, and his conduct will become corrupt. 

1. Man is more detested for bad principles than 
for instances of bad conduct. 

2. Men will overlook slight departures from rec- 
titude if the principles are believed to be sound. 

3. If we are satisfied of the correctness of a man's 
principles, we are always sure that his conduct will 
be just and proper. 

4. All teachers of morals urge the importance of 
cultivating correct principles as the basis of good 
character. Now, if obligation does not extend to 
the principles, you are deprived of one of the 
strongest incentives to their cultivation. 

5. All the vicious that seek the ruin of the in- 
nocent, try first to vitiate their principles. When 
they have poisoned their principles, they make 
them an easy prey. No seducer seeks to gain his 
unholy ends but by corrupting the principles of 
his weak and unfortunate victim. 

6. The Great Teacher makes the principles the 
sources of all evil, or of all good. The very 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



Ill 



essence of his religion consists in purifying the 
heart and correcting the moral principles. His 
blessings are poured upon the meek, charitable, 
forgiving, patient, and pure. He was the embodi- 
ment of all holy principles ; and he exalts before 
our gaze, and offers to our imitation, such prin- 
ciples as adorned his godlike character. 

HI. Moral obligation extends in the next place 
to the habits. 

By habit is meant the increased inclination and 
facility acquired in the performance of an act by 
frequent repetition. Hence it is the product of 
custom, and of course always involves custom. It 
is thus portrayed by Dr. Chalmers : 

" If ever for once we have described the process 
of thought and feeling which leads through the 
imagination or the senses from the first presenta- 
tion of a tempting object to a guilty indulgence, 
this of itself establishes a probability that, on the 
recurrence of that object, we shall pass onwards 
by the same steps to the same consummation. 
And it is a probability ever strengthening with 
every repetition of the process, till, at length, it 
advances towards the moral certainty of a helpless 
surrender to the tyranny of those evil passions 
which we cannot resist, just because the will itself 
is in thraldom, and we choose not to resist. It is 



112 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

thus that we might trace the progress of intemper- 
ance and licentiousness, and even of dishonesty, to 
whose respective solicitations we have yielded at 
the first — till by continuing to yield we become 
the passive, the prostrate subjects of a force that is 
uncontrollable only because we have seldom or 
never in good earnest tried to control it. It is 
not that we are struck of a sudden with moral 
impotency; but we are gradually benumbed into 
it. The power of temptation has not made instant 
seizure upon the faculties or taken them by storm. 
It proceeds by an influence that is gently and im- 
perceptibly progressive." 

The insidious nature of habit is often observed 
in the downward course of the inebriate. At first 
a network of gossamer entangles him ; he could 
break every thread, and scarcely realize that he had 
made an effort. You tell him of his danger, and 
he laughs at your foolish fears. But pursue him 
for a few years, or even months — the gossamer 
threads become adamantine chains, and the strength 
of a giant would be required to break them. He 
yields himself a willing victim to the inveteracy of 
habit, and can only utter useless wails over his pros- 
trate condition. As the cords that bind him have 
grown stronger, the power to break them has be- 
come less, until with the helplessness of infancy 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 113 

he vainly seeks to accomplish what Titanic force 
would hardly effect. Thus have we traced the 
operation of habits; from which we infer that obli- 
gation extends to them. 

1. Because they are voluntarily contracted. 
Habits do not force themselves upon men ; on 
the contrary, man chooses any habit of which he 
may become the victim. 

2. In their early history they could be easily 
overcome, and one victory would give the victor 
such power as by the force of the same law would 
make every successive victory more easy. 

3. Even the most inveterate habits have been 
conquered by a strong will, assisted by reason and 
conscience. 

4. Because good habits may be as readily con- 
tracted as vicious ones ; and if we do not hold man 
responsible for the bad, we cannot praise him for 
the good. 

5. Because if we allow habits to change the moral 
character of actions, we at once break down the 
distinction between virtue and vice. Suppose we 
allow habit to be pleaded in extenuation of a crime, 
merely to lessen the guilt : if habit can be pleaded 
to justify swearing, lying, or drinking, it should fol- 
low, of course, that the habitual murderer or the 
common highwayman is less guilty in propor- 



114 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion to the number of robberies or murders com- 
mitted. 

What a fearful element of our nature is here pre- 
sented ! The more frequently we perform a virtuous 
action, the more capable of virtue we become ; and 
the more frequently we engage in vice, the more 
capable we become of progress in vice. Progress 
in vice — of what fearful import are these words ! 
Down, down, and yet ever descending in all the 
depths of vice, and still lower depths opening to 
receive the victim. 

The first oath the boy swore trembled on his lips ; 
the first lie almost palsied his tongue*; the first de- 
parture from virtue stung his heart with a scorpion 
lash ; but, alas ! his lips fear not now to utter horrid 
oaths, his oily tongue falters not at the utterance of 
falsehood, and his base passions find remorseless 
gratification in dens of infamy. 

Youthful reader, remember a dear lover of youth 
warns you against the formation of vicious habits. 
Remember the fearful doctrine, we are responsible 
for our habits. 

IV. Moral obligation extends to the intentions. 

Originally, it is probable, obligation extends di- 
rectly to the intention only, when reference is made 
to any special act. That this is true may be in- 
ferred from the following facts and arguments : 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 



115 



1. When any specific wrong act is charged upon 
children, they universally excuse themselves by say- 
ing they did not intend it ; and the excuse so uni- 
versally given is received, provided the injured 
party is certain that no evil intention existed. 

2. All jurisprudence, by inquiring into the inten- 
tion, and by settling the act and its penalty by the 
intention, shows that originally and directly moral 
obligation extends only to the intention. 

3. The same fact is established by reference to 
the different class of feelings which arise towards 
the person who has intentionally done us an injury 
or a favor, and towards one who, without intention, 
may have injured us, or conferred upon us a favor. 

4. The Great Teacher removes all doubt, in re- 
gard to specific acts, when he teaches us that he 
who intends a crime is guilty whether he commit 
the overt act or not. 

5. As the intention decides the moral quality of 
the act, it must follow that moral obligation extends 
directly to that and that alone. 

6. God has agreed to take a willing mind as 
obedience to the whole law. If the intention is 
right, it is accepted by him as obedience. And if 
right intention is absent, no outward act of devotion, 
of self-denial, or of any service whatever is accepted 
by him as obedience. Hence all obedience exists 



116 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in the intention ; so that if one has intended to do 
right, his intention is set down to his credit, and he 
is rewarded accordingly. 

The muscles of the body by which the outward 
act is performed, the attention and pursuits of the 
intellect, and the states of the sensibility, are under 
the control directly or indirectly of the will, and 
hence moral obligation extends to the belief, to the 
principles, and to the outward conduct or habits, as 
was shown in the preceding part of the chapter. It 
is through the intention that moral obligation may 
be said to extend to any outward act, or to any state 
of the intelligence or sensibility. 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



117 



CHAPTER V. 

MORAL CONDUCT. 
SECTION I. 

DEFINITION OF MORAL CONDUCT — THEORY OF MORALS — MANDEVILLE'S 
THEORY : OBJECTIONS — WOLLASTON'S THEORY : OBJECTIONS TO WOL- 
LA*STON'S THEORY — HUME'S THEORY: OBJECTIONS TO HUME — SEL- 
FISH THEORY: ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SELFISH SYSTEM — THEORY 
OF DISINTERESTED BENEVOLENCE : OBJECTIONS — THEORY OF SYM- 
PATHY : OBJECTIONS. 

By moral conduct is meant the conduct of moral 
beings, having reference to moral law and to moral 
obligation. It is conduct which has a moral qual- 
ity, and may be regarded as right or wrong, as vir- 
tuous or vicious. Dr. Abercrombie has with great 
care given the different theories of morals ; Dr. 
Alexander has done the same; and Dr. Thomas 
Brown still more extensively than either. We shall 
avail ourselves of the labors of these excellent 
writers, and give to the student the different theo- 
ries of morals. 



118 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



I. Mancleville's theory is, that virtue consists in 
a conformity of the conduct to the laws of the state. 
The motive governing the conduct is the love of 
praise. Man, he says, naturally seeks his own 
gratification, without any regard to the happiness 
of other men. But legislators found that it would 
be necessary to induce him, in some way, to surren- 
der a portion of his gratification for the good of 
others, and so to promote the peace and harmony 
of society. To accomplish this, with such a selfish 
being, it was necessary to give him some equivalent 
for the sacrifice made, and the principle of his 
nature which they fixed upon for this purpose is 
the love of praise. They made certain laws by 
which the general good was to be promoted, and 
then flattered man into the belief that it is praise- 
worthy to observe them, and noble to sacrifice sel- 
fish gratifications for the general good. Thus the 
whole of virtue is resolved into a love of praise. 
Man pretends to be virtuous simply that he may 
receive praise. 

There are two objections to this theory : 
1. It makes virtue to depend not upon eternal 
and immutable principles, but upon the enactments 
of human legislatures. Hence virtue changes with 
every change of law. Now, we intuitively perceive 
the difference between an act whose moral charac- 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



119 



ter is dependent on human legislation, and one 
whose moral character is inherent in the act. No 
law could make it right to murder, or steal, or rob ; 
nor, on the other hand, could make it wrong to be 
chaste, and honest, and to abstain from murder. 
Every one sees a great difference between the crime 
of smuggling and that of murder. Smuggling be- 
comes a crime, because of human legislation : mur- 
der is a crime in its very nature, and if there were 
no enactment against it, it would still be a crime ; 
whereas there would be no such crime as smug- 
gling, but for the laws enacted for the supposed 
good of the country. A system that would make 
all virtue thus mutable, is at once rejected as false. 

2. But, secondly, it really makes all virtue to 
consist in hypocrisy. Man pretends to be virtuous 
for the love of praise. Now, the very idea of hy- 
pocrisy supposes an excellence which is counter- 
feited. Hence the theory is self-destructive. There 
must be real virtue somewhere, or pretended virtue 
would have no existence. Just as counterfeit coin 
supposes real coin, so does counterfeit virtue sup- 
pose real virtue. 

II. The theory of "Wollaston and Clarke makes 
virtue consist in the conformity of the conduct to 
the fitness of things. 

We object to this theory, 1. Because it gives 



120 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

us no definite idea of virtue. A definition of 
virtue ought to be clear, and such as may not well 
be misapprehended ; but no one from this definition 
gets any notion of the thing attempted to be 
defined. 

2. We object to it, because it may apply almost 
if not quite as forcibly to vice as virtue. Vice is 
suited to accomplish its ends, as virtue is to 
accomplish its ends. Let a man, utterly destitute 
of the idea of virtue, learn that it is conduct 
characterized by fitness or suitableness, and then 
let him see vice suited to accomplish the woe, the 
destruction of peace, etc., and he must conclude 
that vice is virtue. 

3. We object to it, in the third place, because it 
is as applicable to the action of the lower animals, 
or even of a machine, as it is to the conduct of man. 
The action of the lower animals is in conformity 
with the fitness of things ; so is the action of the 
steam-engine. If pulleys, and wheels, and ropes 
act in conformity with the fitness of things, they 
become capable of virtue, according to this theory. 

4. We object, lastly, to this theory, because, 
while it ignores a moral principle, it goes upon the 
supposition that there is a moral principle which 
has already decided in reference to the end to be 
sought. On this subject, Dr. Brown remarks very 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



121 



justly : " The moral sentiments are necessary before 
we can feel the moral fitness, or moral truth, accord- 
ing to which we are said to estimate actions as 
right or wrong. All actions, virtuous and vicious, 
have a tendency or fitness of one sort or other, and 
every action which the benevolent and malevolent 
perform, with a view to a certain end, may alike 
have a fitness for producing that end. There is 
not an action, then, which may not be in conformity 
with the fitnesses of things; and if the feelings of 
exclusive approbation and disapprobation, that 
constitute our moral emotions, be not presupposed, 
in spite of the thousand fitnesses which reason may 
have shown us, all actions must be morally indiffer- 
ent. The fitness of virtue for producing serene 
delight, is not greater than that of vice for pro- 
ducing disquietude, and we act therefore as much 
according to the mere fitness of things in being 
vicious as being virtuous. If the world had been 
adapted for the production of misery, with fitnesses 
opposite indeed, in kind, but exactly equal in 
number and nicety of adjustment, to those which 
are at present so beautifully employed in the pro- 
duction of happiness, we should still have framed 
our views and our actions according to these 
fitnesses, but our moral view of the universe and 
6 



122 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of its Author would have been absolutely reversed. 
Since every human action, then, in producing any 
effect whatever, must be in conformity with the 
fitnesses of things, the limitation of virtue to actions 
which are in conformity with these fitnesses has no 
meaning unless we have previously distinguished 
the ends which are morally good from the ends 
which are morally evil, and limited the conformity 
of which we speak to the one of these classes." Here, 
then, we see the man first knowing the end to be 
sought, and then what is fitted to secure that end 
is to be regarded as virtue. But without the moral 
sentiment, he could have no idea of the good. He 
would as soon make the evil the end to be sought 
as the good. 

III. According to the theory of utility, as warmly 
supported by Hume, we estimate the virtue of an 
action only by its usefulness. He seems to refer all 
our mental impressions to two principles, reason 
and taste. Reason gives us a knowledge of truth 
and falsehood, and is no motive of action. Taste 
gives an impression of pleasure or pain : it thus con- 
stitutes happiness or misery, and becomes a motive 
of action. To this he refers our impressions of 
beauty and deformity, of vice or virtue. He has 
therefore distinctly asserted that the words right 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



123 



and wrong signify nothing more than sweet and 
sour, pleasant and painful. And hence he resolves 
all virtue into usefulness. 

To this theory we offer the following objections : 

1. It transfers the moral quality of the action 
from the motive, or intention, to the consequences. 
According to this theory, our whole system of juris- 
prudence is at fault. The law should not inquire 
into the motive, or animus, that prompted the action, 
but into the usefulness that follows it. Such a 
view of virtue is abhorrent to the moral sense of 
the world. 

2. We object to it, in the second place, because 
it leaves the action without any moral qualification 
until all its consequences are developed. Moral 
consequences are slow in following actions ; hence, 
according to this theory, it might be months or 
years before an action can be determined to be 
either right or wrong. 

3. A third objection to the theory of utility is, 
that, in confounding utility with virtue, it makes 
men's notions of utility determine their views of 
virtue. It gives no standard of virtue to which we 
can infallibly refer. As men differ in their notions 
of utility, so must they differ in regard to right and 
wrong. And in the midst of such confusion we 
have no means of determining with any degree of 



124 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

certainty in reference to a subject of the deepest 
importance to all. 

4. Another, and probably a still stronger, objec- 
tion to this theory is, that it degrades man to a level 
with the mule or ox, or even to a level with the 
tools with which he labors. If utility be the mea- 
sure of virtue, then may a steam-engine or any 
other instrument of usefulness be as virtuous as 
man. Mr. Hume saw the force of this objection, 
and added to his theory, that the actions must be 
performed by intelligent beings. ~Now this, to our 
mind, is a surrender of the theory. For if other 
principles than mere utility are to be considered in 
deciding upon the moral quality of actions, then the 
moral quality does not depend entirely upon the 
utility, 

5. The theory is proved to be false by the differ- 
ent feelings with which we view the inventor of 
some useful machine and a public benefactor in 
morals. The inventor of the printing-press may 
have done more good to the world than St. Paul 
himself, but we do not feel that he is therefore more 
virtuous. 

6. The theory is proved to be false by the absence 
of the thought of utility in thousands of cases 
of really virtuous action. " Of all the virtuous 
actions/' says Dr. Brown, " which are performed at 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



125 



any one moment on the earth, from the slightest 
reciprocation of domestic courtesies to the most 
generous sacrifices of heroic friendship, there is 
perhaps scarcely one in which this thought of the 
supposed scale of utility according to which his 
action is to be measured is present to the mind of 
the agent, and is the influencing circumstance in 
his choice — the immediate motive which confers on 
his conduct the character of virtue." Who is there 
that in the contemplation of Thermopylae, and of 
the virtues that have made that desolate spot for 
ever sacred to us, can think of Leonidas and his 
little band without any emotion of reverence, till 
the thought occur how useful it must be for a 
nation to have defenders so intrepid ? 

7. The theory is proved to be false by an appeal 
to consciousness. The admiration of the useful, 
and the reverence for the virtuous, are feelings 
essentially different. The moral approbation of the 
virtuous action is one thing, and the admiration of 
the useful is another thins: tot all v distinct in kind. 
In proof of this we have only to appeal to universal 
consciousness. 

Before closing our remarks upon this theory, it 
may be proper to remark, 1. Virtue is generally 
if not universally useful, but it does not follow that 
what is useful is virtuous. Virtue is always expe- 



126 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

dient; but the converse is not true, that what is 
expedient is always virtuous. Many an action has 
been characterized by expediency which is utterly 
destitute of every element of virtue. 2. In a few 
actions we may be compelled to measure their 
virtue by their utility. For example, two measures 
present themselves to the statesman : these measures 
have in them no moral quality : one course will be 
attended with good, the other with bad conse- 
quences to the country. It then becomes the duty 
of the statesman to bring his whole influence to 
secure such enactments as will advance the public 
good. In such cases always the utility is to be 
estimated before the policy is to be settled. In 
neglecting to pursue the line of policy which will 
advance the interests of the whole community, he 
becomes guilty of a breach of trust, as much so as 
if he were to appropriate to his own benefit money 
that had been deposited with him for the good 
of another. Here the crime is felt to be in the 
breach of confidence, in the violation of the trust 
reposed in him, and not in the departure from the 
principles of utility. 

In conclusion, I remark, in reference to this 
theory, the errors of which I have been endeavor- 
ing to expose, that although erroneous, it is not so 
positively degrading as the system of Mandeville. 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



127 



A man may make usefulness to others the great 
object of his life, and be capable of the most 
generous and virtuous actions. IsTor have we failed 
to concede to this theory the fact that utility is 
sometimes the proof of the existence of the obliga- 
tion ; and that, all other evidences being absent, the 
utility alone of the act may establish the existence 
of the obligation. Still, even in that case, we make 
the virtue of the act one thing, and its utility alto- 
gether different. 

IV. We next notice the Selfish System. The 
most unobjectionable presentation of this system is 
given by Paley. According to this theory, the fun- 
damental principle of the conduct of mankind is a 
desire to promote their own interest. Hence Dr. 
Paley defines virtue as the doing of good to man- 
kind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake 
of everlasting happiness. The good of mankind is 
the object, the will of God the rule, and everlasting 
happiness the motive of human virtue. If the 
question, then, be asked, why we should seek the 
good of mankind, according to this theory, the 
only answer is that it would promote our own hap- 
piness. Again, if the reason for making the will 
of God the rule of our conduct be required, Paley 
would answer, It would promote our everlasting 
happiness. 



128 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The objections to this theory are, 

1. The only difference, according to it, between a 
good man and a bad one is, that the good man is 
more prudent than the bad. For it is a conceded 
fact that all men desire happiness : hence the motives 
that actuate the man of exalted virtue are the same 
as those influencing the exactly opposite character, 
and the only difference between them is that one is 
w^er than the other. 

1. According to this theory, there is no intrinsic 
difference between virtue and vice, the only con- 
ceivable good being happiness, and virtue is only to 
be practiced as a means to its attainment. Hence 
all virtue is absorbed in self-interest. 

3. Like the system of utility, it transfers the 
moral quality from the intention to the conse- 
quences. A man must have sufficient foresight to 
determine whether an action will promote happi- 
ness or the opposite, before he can determine 
whether it will be virtuous or vicious. 

4. This theory makes no distinction between 
expediency and right. Paley says, " To constitute 
an action right, it must be expedient upon the whole 
— at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and 
remote, as well as those which are immediate and 
direct/' Here we have the unequivocal statement 
of the ablest and least objectionable advocate of the 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



129 



system, that what is expedient in the long run is 
right. Then if I could believe that murder is 
expedient, I should do right to commit it. 

5. It leaves the standard of virtue to every man's 
notions of expediency; consequently, right and 
wrong w T ould be changing their characters with 
every change of expediency. 

6. As happiness alone is the motive of action, if 
we could imagine the devil more capable of reward- 
ing us than the Divine Being, we should serve him; 
that is, we must serve the master that can give 
the highest wages, irrespective of any claims what- 
ever. 

7. It is opposed to the precepts of the Great 
Teacher. He says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and 
with all thy mind, and with all thy strength ; and 
thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' ' But, 
according to this theory, we should love our- 
selves with all our strength, and love God only 
because it would advance our own interests. Again 
He says, "If any man will come after me, let him 
deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow 
me." But, according to the selfish system, the 
terms of discipleship should have been, Promote 
self: be selfish. 

8. It not only opposes the precepts of the Great 

6* 



130 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Teacher, but it comes in direct conflict with his 
example. He sought not his own good, but ours. 
He sought not his own glory, but the Father's. 
He was the most unselfish of beings, and we are 
to be like him. 

9. It is opposed to universal consciousness. 
Every man is conscious of performing virtuous 
actions without once thinking of self-interest. 
The greatest self- approbation of which we are 
capable arises when we have performed a virtuous 
action without reference to self-interest. 

10. It degrades piety, and makes the Christian 
a mere hireling, working for reward. He does 
not love God because of the excellences of his 
character, because of the moral attributes which 
adorn and beautify the Divine nature, because of 
the infinite mercies bestowed and the countless 
favors shown, nor yet even because God so loved 
him as to give his Son to die for him ; but he loves 
him because he hopes to receive everlasting happi- 
ness for loving him. If the mother's heart warms 
to her child, and causes her to be patient, faithful, 
affectionate, kind ; if she spends sleepless nights in 
waiting by the suffering babe, or rejoices in the 
innocent prattle, the unfolding intellect, and the 
hopeful development of the morals of her offspring, 
it is all done and suffered and enjoyed because of 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



one all-absorbing feeling, self-interest. If the sick 
are visited, the poor relieved, the naked clothed, 
the ignorant instructed, the erring reclaimed, all 
this is accomplished from one sole motive — ever- 
lasting happiness. Now I put the question to 
every one, Does not this view of piety degrade it ? 
I put it to every one, if two individuals were to 
expose themselves to the same peril for the same 
common friend — the one has no other motive for 
this exposure than the wish of securing to himself 
a certain amount of happiness, at some time either 
near or remote, on earth or after he has quitted 
earth, the other no motive but that of saving the 
life of a friend, a life which was dearer to him than 
his own — in which case and in reference to which 
of these individuals would the feeling of approba- 
tion be the more intense ? "Would we, nay, could 
we feel that the man who was thinking of his own 
happiness alone was the moral hero? On the 
contrary, would not the universal sentiment ascribe 
moral heroism alone to the man who, forgetful of 
self, with a noble fearlessness of danger, and think- 
ing only of him whose life was exposed, sought 
his rescue from certain death? ""We should not 
hesitate long," says Dr. Brown, "in rejecting a 
theory of fluidity which should ascribe congelation 
to an increase of heat, and liquefaction to a dimi- 



132 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

nution of it ; and as little ought we to hesitate in 
rejecting a theory of virtue that supposes the moral 
approbation, which gives birth to our very notions 
of virtue, to arise only when the immediate motive 
of the agent has been the view of his own happi- 
ness in this or any other world.' ' 

V. A theory the opposite of the one we have 
just been considering, is that first propounded 
by Bishop Cumberland, and afterwards advocated 
by President Edwards and his pupil, Dr. Samuel 
Hopkins. According to this theory, all virtue 
consists in disinterested benevolence. 

This theory is not so objectionable, probably, as 
the selfish system, for very much of virtue does 
consist in good-will to others ; but still we regard 
the system as false, for the following reasons : 

1. If it were true, then brutes themselves may 
be capable of the highest virtue. How disinter- 
ested often is the dog in his devotion to his master ! 
Benevolence, at once earnest, constant, and disin- 
terested, often marks the conduct of this faithful 
animal. So with other animals, especially to their 
offspring. Now our argument is that, benevolence 
being predicable of the lower animals, which are 
universally admitted to be incapable of virtue, the 
whole of virtue cannot consist in benevolence. 

2. It makes man care more for the good of 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



133 



others than for his own. He is to love all others, 
but not himself. Now a whole is made up of 
parts. If he is to care for the whole, he must care 
for all its parts. But he himself is one of those 
parts : hence it is a virtue to have a prudent regard 
for self. The pursuit of happiness, where the 
rights of others are not violated, is not only allow- 
able, but commendable. 

3. It makes virtue indiscriminating, and therefore 
impracticable. We are to care no more for a friend 
than for a stranger ; we are to love our enemies as 
well as we do our benefactors. Now both reason 
and revelation teach us that virtue is discriminat- 
ing. We owe duties to ourselves, to our neighbors 
equally with ourselves, and then to strangers and 
enemies. 

4. It would even deprive of virtue the character 
of Christ, the most disinterested being that ever 
lived, because he, "for the joy that was set before 
him, endured the cross, despising the shame." 

5. Bishop Butler presents his objections to this 
theory in the following language: "It deserves to 
be considered whether men are more at liberty, in 
point of morals, to make themselves miserable 
without reason, than to make others so ; or disso- 
lutely to neglect their own greater good for the 
sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are 



134 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to neglect the good of others whom nature has 
committed to their care. It should seem that a 
due concern about our own interest or happiness, 
and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote 
it, is, I think, very much the meaning of the word 
prudence in our language; it should seem that 
this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty 
and blamable, since, in the calmest way of reflec- 
tion, we approve of the first, and condemn the 
other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This 
approbation and disapprobation are altogether dif- 
ferent from mere desires of our own and their 
happiness, and from sorrow in missing it. Again, 
suppose one man should by fraud or violence 
take from another the fruit of his labor, with 
intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, 
would have as much pleasure from it as would 
balance the pleasure which the first possessor would 
have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the 
loss ; suppose that no bad consequences would 
follow; yet such an action would surely be vicious. 
Nay, further: were treachery, violence, and injus- 
tice no otherwise faulty than as they are foreseen 
to produce an overbalance of misery to society* 
then if in any case a man should procure to him- 
self as great advantage by an act of injustice as 



M011AL CONDUCT. 



135 



the whole foreseen inconvenience, such a piece 
of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all." 

VI. We now notice the theory of Sympathy. 
Dr. Adam Smith, one of the most ingenious writers 
on metaphysics, is the author of this system. He 
maintained, that before we can decide upon the 
nature of an action, it is necessary to enter into 
the feelings both of the agent and of the person 
in reference to whom the action is performed. If 
we sympathize with the actions of the agent, we 
approve of his conduct as right ; if not, we consider 
his conduct as wrong. We thus observe our feel- 
ings in reference to the conduct of others ; then 
apply these rules to ourselves, and determine our 
own conduct. 
The objections to the theory are, briefly, 
1. It leaves us without any great fundamental 
rule of right and wrong. Our sympathy can in no 
sense be said to constitute an action either right 
or wrong ; nor can it be said to be the criterion of 
good; for then, every thing with which we sym- 
pathize would be good. But this is known not to 
be the case ; for we often sympathize with joy or 
grief which has no connection with moral con- 
duct. We even sympathize with physical suffering ; 
and Dr. Smith himself would not contend that 



136 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

physical suffering is a virtue, however deeply it 
might arouse our sympathies. 

2. Sympathy is too changing to be set up as the 
arbiter of right. "Sympathy for talent," says 
Cousin, "weakens the indignation for outraged 
virtue. "We overlook many things in Voltaire, in 
Rousseau, in Mirabeau, and we excuse them on 
account of the corruption of that century. The 
sympathy caused by the pain of a condemned 
person, renders less lively the antipathy excited by 
his crime. Thus sympathy turns, and wavers, 
and changes like ripples upon the surface of the 
ocean.'' 

3. Let virtue consist altogether in sympathy, and 
nothing is in itself good. The theory annihilates 
the distinction between vice and virtue. Good and 
evil become relative, and are precisely as each one 
feels them to be. Change the sympathy, and the 
action which a while ago was good becomes bad, 
and that which was evil becomes a virtue. 

4. Even if it were true that we always sym- 
pathize with the right, still the system would be 
incomplete ; for it presupposes, though it may not 
acknowledge, the action of an anterior principle 
which determines the right, and then the sym- 
pathies cluster about the man or action already 
recognized as virtuous. 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



137 



SECTION II. 

TRUE THEORY OF MORALS — VIRTUE DEFINED — INSEPAF.ABLE FROM 
THE AGENT — WHEN IT SHINES MOST BRIGHTLY — HOPE OF REWARD 
AND FEAR OF PUNISHMENT, CHARACTERISTICS OF VIRTUE ARGU- 
MENTS TO PROVE THE THEORY TRUE. 

Virtue is not an abstract principle ; it can only 
be conceived of in connection with a moral agent. 
It is the right willing of an intelligent being, who 
is the master of his own actions, and who has 
capacity to make moral distinctions. "We never 
separate the action from the agent, and are bound 
always to determine whether the action be virtuous 
or vicious, by our knowledge of the capacities, 
circumstances, and relations of the agent. Hence, 
virtue and vice are but other names for the virtuous 
and vicious. Two men may perform the same act, 
and with the same intention, and the one would be 
blamed, while the other would be pitied. A 
lunatic may intend to kill, and may effect his 
object, but no man would condemn him, as he 
doe3 the malignant but sound-minded murderer, 
although both the intention and acts are apparently 
the same. 

We have said that virtue is right willing. The 
question at once arises, What is right willing ? I 
answer, It is willing as we ought to will ; it is will- 



138 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing in conformity with moral obligation; it is 
willing in conformity to moral law. It is willing 
the things that ought to be done, and refusing to 
will those that ought not to be done. The virtuous 
man asks but one question — "What is duty? He 
then seeks to discharge it. Moral obligation with 
him is supreme and ultimate. "When once it is 
felt, though it may be opposed by self-interest, it is 
felt to be immutable, and its claims must be met. 

Virtue shines out brightly, and its outlines are 
most distinctly visible, when resisting temptation. 
Here is a man alone in the chamber of death. He 
has just received from his departed friend a valuable 
and sacred deposit. The last words that fell from 
those pallid lips directed him to transmit that 
deposit to another. It is known to no one besides 
himself. His own wants are clamorous. Self- 
interest utters loud her appeals to him. Bene- 
volence, weeping over needy wife and children, 
unites her solicitations to those of self-interest. 
He can lock the secret for ever in his own heart. 
The person to whom it was left is rich ; does not 
need it ; his condition would not be improved by 
it: no one will suspect him. Were ever circum- 
stances more favorable to crime ? But he resists. 
Duty demands the sacrifice. Moral obligation, as 
the voice of God, commands him to surrender the 



MORAL CONDUCT. 139 

treasure. Conscience rises upon her throne, claims 
supremacy, impels to duty, and restrains from the 
commission of the crime. He submits : the will of 
his friend is carried out; conscience is obeyed, and 
God is honored. He knows that he has done right; 
that he has not bowed to some fearful chimera; 
that he has not obeyed some mendacious law, but 
that he has obeyed a law universal, immutable, and 
true — a law obligatory upon all moral agents. It 
is the law made binding by the conscience, and to 
that court it always refers the decision of the ques- 
tion, whether or not the conduct has been in con- 
formity with it. Had the opposite course been 
pursued, remorse, in the midst of his ill-gotten 
gains, would have blighted his happiness and 
destroyed his peace. The one course is virtuous, 
the other vicious ; the one claims our approbation, 
the other our disapprobation ; the one is admired, 
the other loathed. Virtue consists not in the 
practicing of only one principle of right, but of all 
principles. Every thing that is embraced in the 
idea of oughtness, whether benevolent or just, 
whether negative or positive, is virtue. It may be 
virtue in the parent to inflict pain upon his erring 
child, in the judge to condemn the criminal, and 
in the magistrate to refuse pardon. Virtue, whether 
exhibited in justice, truth, or benevolence, is always 



140 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



that quality in the actions of a moral being per- 
ceived to be good. It is an act of which the moral 
faculty approves. "Without that faculty there could 
be no more idea of virtue than there could be of 
color without eyes, or of beauty without taste. 

A question arises here, Can an act which springs 
from the hope of reward, or the fear of punishment, 
be a virtuous act? In answer to this, I remark 
that rewards and punishments are schoolmasters to 
bring us to virtue. The terrors of the law may be 
the first means of arousing the transgressor to a 
sense of his responsibilities. He is driven by a 
slavish fear to change his conduct. But, in the 
language of another, that beautiful law of our 
mental constitution which accounts for the for- 
mation of what are called secondary desires, affords 
a means for the purification of the motive. At 
first, a man seeks money merely as a means of 
gratifying his desires ; but afterwards, the desire 
of money becomes a passion, and avarice is formed. 
Thus, in the progress of virtue, the duty which was 
first discharged because it was the best policy, the 
service of God which was first rendered to escape 
punishment or to secure reward, becomes at last 
the joy of the heart, the earnest, unbought homage 
devoutly rendered to Almighty Goodness. "We go 
still farther, and assert, that a prudent regard to 



MORAL CONDTJCT. 



141 



one's eternal happiness is compatible with the 
highest virtue ; nay, more, is itself a virtue. 

Virtue, then, may be known by the following 
characteristics : 1st. That it can never be considered 
in the abstract, but always in connection with a 
free, intelligent moral agent. 2d. That it always 
has reference to moral law. 3d. That it always 
implies moral obligation. 4th. That it implies that 
strange and indescribable feeling of moral approba- 
tion, which moral beings alone can experience or 
understand. 5th. That it involves that quality 
which God himself in his holy law, and conscience 
enlightened by that law, pronounce good. 

That this theory is correct, we infer from the 
following considerations : 

1. It makes the distinction between right and 
wrong so clear and broad, that one can never be 
mistaken for the other. Right is conformity to 
moral law and moral obligation, and wrong is a 
violation of moral obligation. They are immu- 
table — no power can change them. We speak it 
with reverence, as we look to that throne of 
omnipotence, justice, and truth, and say, it is not 
in the power of Omnipotence to reverse the moral 
quality of actions ; for this is only saying that God 
cannot act contrary to himself, or that "it is 
impossible for God to lie." Try to imagine that 



142 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

it is right to practice deception, to be cruel and 
unjust! You cannot do it. We can as easily 
imagine the annihilation of space as the annihila- 
tion of moral distinctions. 

2. This theory admits the universality and the 
supremacy of moral obligation. According to it, 
self-love, utility, and sympathy, as well as every 
appetite and passion must be silent when moral 
obligation lays its claim upon man. 

3. A prudent care for one's self, whether in 
reference to this world or the next, is justified 
according to this theory, but is not made supreme. 
Selfishness is rejected, and self-love, as an innocent 
part of our constitution, is made to hold its subor- 
dinate place. It is a happy medium between the 
selfish theory on the one hand, and that of disin- 
terested benevolence on the other. 

4. It makes God's law the moral law, and the 
highest virtue obedience to that law. 

5. It accords with universal consciousness : 1st. 
In that it makes the claims of moral obligation 
superior to all other claims, and puts the obligatory 
feeling above all other feelings. 2d. In that it 
determines the quality of the action by the inten- 
tion — always taking into consideration the circum- 
stances of the agent. 3d. In that it refers all moral 
questions to the conscience, and takes its judgment 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



143 



as final. 4th. In that it makes a wide difference 
between the nature of the feelings of oughtness and 
all other feelings ; between the feelings of remorse 
and other regrets ; and between the feelings of 
moral approval and all other feelings of pleasure. 

6. It does not determine the quality of an action 
by its consequences, but by its conformity, or want 
of conformity, to the principle of right. It distin- 
guishes clearly between duty and expediency, right 
and self-interest, moral obligation and sympathj 7 , 
harm and injury; and no other theory makes these 
distinctions, which are as universal as the race. 

The writer has thus patiently, carefully, and 
prayerfully sought to give the true theory of 
morals. He has been forced to differ from many 
wise and good men on this subject. His only aim 
has been to find and to present truth. Where so 
many have certainly erred, he can hardly hope to 
have escaped ; yet he humbly submits the theory to 
the severest tests to which candid criticism may 
subject it. And he most devoutly prays that the 
youth in whose hands this book may be placed 
may be led by its teachings to the cultivation of 
virtue, not only as a means to an end, but a& the 
highest end of their moral being. 



144 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



DEDUCTIONS. 

1. An action conforming externally to moral 
obligation, but which does not conform to obliga- 
tion in the intention, is not a virtuous action, 
because it lacks the main element of virtue, viz., 
conformity to moral obligation in the intention. 

2. An act may be outwardly good, and there 
may be a partial design to do good, but the 
main motive being self-interest, the act is not 
virtuous. For instance, if a man gives money to 
the poor, not from a sense of duty, but principally 
for the sake of adding to his popularity, the act is 
not virtuous. Even if the person is actuated by 
some desire to do good, that is by benevolence, 
unless he is governed by a sense of duty, by 
conscience as a motive, the act cannot be regarded 
as virtuous. 

3. Now, if the outward act fails to comply with 
moral obligation, and yet the intention is to comply 
with moral obligation, and the person acts from 
conscience as a motive, the question arises, Taken all 
together, is the act right? We answer, 1st. If the 
failure results from no fault of the actor, if he has 
sought, by all proper means, to enlighten his con- 
science, and to cultivate it, the act must be regarded 
as virtuous. 2d. If the failure to know his duty 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



145 



results from some neglect or from some vice in the 
agent, which is almost sure to be the case, the act 
is vicious, and he deserves punishment, although 
the one particular act has been a conscientious one. 
In order then to give a correct answer to the above 
question, we have simply to find out the cause of 
the defect. If man has voluntarily closed his eyes 
to the light, or if he has neglected his conscience 
until it has become seared and blunted, the fault is 
his, and he is responsible. 

SECTION III. 

CRITERIA OF MORAL CONDUCT. 

Before closing the chapter on moral conduct, it 
may be proper to present the student with certain 
criteria by which we may determine the right or 
wrong of external actions. These criteria may not 
be infallible, but in the absence of a knowledge of 
the in^tention, which always imparts character to 
the action, they may be of service in enabling us to 
determine the moral quality of actions. 

1. If an external action violate a law T of the 
Divine Being, as that law is revealed to us by the 
law of nature, or in the Scriptures, the action is 
vicious, and the actor is of course guilty. 

2. If an external action violate the law of civil 

7 



146 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PIIILOSOmY. 

society, provided the law of civil society does not 
contravene the law of God, the act is vicious. 

3. An act which violates a law of our physical 
being is wrong; hence any fashion which invites 
disease is regarded as sinful. Compressing the 
waists of young females, thereby injuring the 
health, bringing on disease of the lungs and spine, 
etc., is vicious, because it violates a physical law. 

4. A doubt concerning the rectitude of an action 
determines the action to be vicious, unless there be 
an equal doubt about the propriety of its omission. 
Then the only course is to remove the doubt, if 
possible, by comparing the action with the great 
standard of rectitude, as it is found in God's word. 

5. In the absence of any other means of deter- 
mining the character of the action, it may be deter- 
mined by its probable consequences. An action, 
then, w T hose necessary or probable consequences 
are supposed to be injurious to the human race, is 
to be judged as vicious, and shunned accordingly. 

6. An action recklessly performed, with no par- 
ticular regard to moral obligation, with no concern 
as to whether it is right or wrong, with no care for 
the consequences, is always a vicious act. As, for 
example, a man who fires a gun where it may do 
mischief, with no concern as to whether mischief is 
done or not, is guilty of a vicious act. 



MORAL CONDUCT. 



147 



7. An act becomes vicious which, wounding the 
feelings of another, is allowed to go unexplained. 
When the actor takes no pains to remove a false 
impression from the mind of another, though 
known to be laboring under a misapprehension, he 
is just as guilty as if he had originally intended 
injury. 

Reverse these rules, and we are able to determine 
the action to be right. 

1. It is right when it conforms to the law of God. 
2. To the law of civil society, with the limitation 
as above. 3. When it conforms to the laws of our 
physical being. 4. When after the most careful 
examination there is no doubt as to its rectitude, 
as to the duty of performing it. 5. When, without 
infracting obligation, it promotes the good of the 
race. 6. When it is performed with a due regard 
to obligation and to consequences. 7. When every 
effort is properly made to remove misapprehension. 

These principles are few and simple, and yet they 
are believed to meet almost every possible case of 
human action. 



148 



ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER VI. 

MOEAL GOVERNMENT. 
SECTION I. 

MORAL GOVERNMENT PHYSICAL GOVERNMENT — EVIDENCES OF PHY- 
SICAL GOVERNMENT EVIDENCES OF MORAL GOVERNMENT ANALYSIS 

OF MORAL GOVERNMENT — NECESSITY OF MORAL GOVERNMENT. 

Government implies control. "When government 
is properly constituted, it implies control in accord- 
ance with some rule or law. 

Physical government implies guidance, or con- 
trol, according to physical law. Thus it is that 
God governs the physical universe. The changes 
of the seasons, the regular succession of day and 
night, the growth of plants, the propagation of 
animals, rain and sunshine and harvest, are all 
evidences of the existence of a physical govern- 
ment. It is his atmosphere that envelops me, his 
wind that refreshes me, his sun that warms and 
enlightens me ; his voice speaks in the thunder, and 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



149 



his eye flashes in the lightning; his seasons come 
round in their grateful vicissitudes, and wherever 
I turn I see evidences of power, wisdom, and 
goodness. 

" The rolling year is full of Thee ; 
But, wandering oft, with brute unconsciousness, 
Man marks not thee, marks not the mighty hand 
That ever busy wheels the silent spheres." 

Truth and poetry are beautifully blended in these 
lines. God is in nature. He is the great efficient 
cause. " The phenomena of nature," says one, " so 
far as they show action or change, from the breaking 
of a bubble on the stream, up to the swift flight of 
the celestial orbs in their appointed paths, do not 
merely prove, but manifest directly his existence 
and glory.' ' 

Moral government is the government of the 
free-will in opposition to the government of 
physical force. It is a government in accordance 
with moral law. It is the government of moral 
beings, of beings capable of embracing, in its 
broadest sense, the idea of oughtness. The indi- 
cations of the existence of moral government are 
as clear as can be demanded, and it requires no 
small amount of skepticism to deny its existence. 
The impulses to virtue, the feeling of obligation, 
the peace of a pure conscience, the agonies of 



150 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

remorse, the happiness of innocence, and the 
miseries of crime, all indicate that we are under 
moral government. No harmonious action of the 
physical universe gives clearer evidence of physical 
government, than do the above-mentioned facts 
testify of moral government. 

A moral government implies, 1. A moral gov- 
ernor. 2. Moral law. 3. Moral agents, who are the 
subjects of moral law. 4. Moral obligation. 5. 
Moral character. 6. Retribution, or rewards and 
punishments, according as character is virtuous or 
vicious. 

1. Moral government is necessary, because 
without it there could be no such thing as moral 
happiness. Every agency, substance, and being 
in the universe must be under a government 
suited to its nature. But for this, the wildest 
anarchy and most frightful confusion must ensue. 
Hence man, as a moral being, must be under law 
suited to his nature, or he cannot attain the 
happiness of which he is capable. 

2. Moral government is necessary in order to 
present to man a moral standard. There could be 
no standard by which to distinguish virtue from 
vice, innocence from guilt, merit from demerit, it 
there were no moral government, and, conse- 
quently, no moral law. 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



151 



3. Moral government is necessary to the exist- 
ence of moral order. Destroy physical govern- 
ment, and no longer is physical order the admi- 
ration of the intelligent ; no longer is the beautiful 
fable of the music of the spheres the truthful 
representation of the harmony that pervades the 
physical universe. So let moral government cease, 
and moral order disappears. 

4. Moral government is necessary, in order that 
virtue be rewarded and vice punished. "Without 
moral government, such a thing as retributive 
justice, which rewards the virtuous and punishes 
the guilty, must for ever be unknown. 

SECTION II. 

GOD THE MORAL GOVERNOR — ARGUMENTS TO ESTABLISH THIS. 

Moral philosophy recognizes God as the moral 
governor. "We argue this, 

1. From universal consciousness. Every man 
feels that God is, and by right ought to be, the 
moral governor. 

2. It is implied in the very idea we have of the 
Divine Being. He is ever contemplated not only 
as the governor of brute matter, but as the gov- 
ernor of free moral agents. 

3. He, and he alone, is qualified, by virtue of his 



152 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

natural attributes, to be the great moral governor 
of the universe. He alone has the ubiquity, the 
wisdom, and the power fitting for that position. 

4. His moral attributes of inflexible justice, 
infallible truth, and perfect holiness, are such as 
fit him for the exercise of moral government. 
It is really a reflection upon his justice to say 
that he is not the moral governor. Equally does it 
reflect upon his holiness and goodness to say that 
he would create moral beings, and leave them, with 
all their hopes and fears, their powers and respon- 
sibilities, to themselves. But more than this, it is 
a direct reflection upon the veracity of God to say 
that he is not the moral governor. God has written 
a lie upon the conscience, which ever testifies to his 
moral government — he has practiced deception in 
the natural consequences of actions, as well as in 
the Sacred Scriptures, or he is certainly the moral 
governor. 

5. It is absolutely essential to the honor of God 
that he who created the universe should govern it. 

6. Our last argument is drawn from the Bible. 
In that book God, " whose ways are higher than 
our ways, and whose thoughts are higher than 
our thoughts," is always recognized as the moral 
governor. 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



153 



SECTION III. 

GOD'S RIGHT TO RULE — BY WHAT ESTABLISHED — WHAT IS IMPLIED IN 
THIS RIGHT. 

1. God's right to rule is established by his rela- 
tions to man as Creator and Preserver, aside from 
the still more weighty fact that he is the Redeemer. 

2. His right to rule is established by the intrinsic 
excellence of his character. If infinite perfection 
of character, in all its moral bearings, does not 
show his right to rule, we know of no argument 
that could be brought to convince of that fact. 

3. His right to rule is proved by the fact that 
his moral law is essential to the well-being of man. 
Now we hold that man as a moral being is the 
proper subject of moral government, and that that 
government which can best secure his virtue and 
happiness, is the one by which he ought to be ruled. 
This fact being admitted, establishes his right to 
rule. 

1. This right implies the right to give laws for 
the control or guidance of his subjects. 

2. The right to exercise moral government im- 
plies the right to judge moral conduct, and to de- 
termine its conformity or want of conformity to 
moral law, 

3. It implies the right to inflict such penalties as 

7* 



154 ELEMENTS .OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

justice may demand, and such as may be necessary 
for the maintenance of authority, for the promotion 
of virtue, and the prevention of vice. 

4. It implies the right to allow such vicarious 
suffering in the person of a substitute for the 
criminal as may subserve the ends of good gov- 
3rnment, and at the same time justify the pardon 
of the criminal. 

5. It involves the right to require such sacri- 
fices and to use such means as may be essential 
to good order, and hence of calling into action 
any amount of force that may be necessary for that 
purpose. 

From these principles we draw the following de- 
ductions : 

1. That God is a moral governor; and looking at 
him in that light, we can account for many of the 
dispensations of his providence otherwise unac- 
countable. 

2. Viewing him as a moral governor, we can 
appreciate the means which he uses to reform the 
vices, purify the morals, and in every possible way 
elevate the moral character of man. 

3. In viewing him as a moral governor, the reme- 
dial dispensation becomes plain, and the great work 
of the atonement is as philosophical as it is theolo- 
gical and true. 



PAET II. 



PRACTICAL ETHICS. 



PART II. 
PRACTICAL ETHICS. 



CHAPTER I. 

DUTIES TO GOB. 
SECTION I. 

INTERNAL DUTIES: TO KNOW GOD — CONFIDENCE — HUMILITY — REVER- 
ENCE — GODLY FEAR — DEPENDENCE — LOVE — SELF-CONSECRATION. 

The duties we owe to the Divine Being are em- 
braced under the term piety. A pious man is gov- 
erned by one law — the law of duty — and always has 
reference to God in the discharge of duty. The 
difference between a moral man and a pious man is 
this : the moral man performs an act of justice or 
charity without reference to the Divine Being ; the 
pious man would perform the same act in view of 
his obligations to his Heavenly Father. 

(157) 



158 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



The duties we owe to God may be embraced in 
two classes : the duties of the mind and heart, 
and the duties of the outer conduct. 

1. It is our duty to know all we can know of God. 

The "heavens declare the glory of God;" and 
" the invisible things of him from the creation of 
the world are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made." From these and many other 
similar passages of the Sacred Scriptures, we judge 
that God is made known in the works of nature. 
His power is made known in the thousands of 
worlds that are sown in the immensity of space, 
and his infinite wisdom in the harmonious laws 
that govern them. 

" Those mighty orbs proclaim his power, 
Their motions speak his skill." 

God, it is true, can only be partially compre- 
hended by our finite minds, for he is infinite and 
incomprehensible. 

" God," says Cousin, " in manifesting himself, re- 
tains something in himself which nothing finite 
can absolutely manifest ; consequently, it is not per- 
mitted us to comprehend him absolutely. In order 
absolutely to comprehend the infinite, it is necessary 
to have an infinite power of comprehension, and 
that is not granted to us." 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



159 



Still, by attending to the Divine manifestations, 
we may know not only his power and wisdom, but 
we may acquaint ourselves with his ineffable good- 
ness, his unwavering justice, his holiness and truth. 
We may learn to say: "Of old hast thou laid the 
foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the 
work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou 
shalt endure ; yea, all of them shall wax old like a 
garment ; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and 
they shall be changed ; but thou art the same, and 
thy years shall have no end." 

This knowledge commenced here will be per- 
fected in eternity. It is at once the most sublime 
and the most purifying of all knowledge. Then, 
by looking at nature's works, by investigating pro- 
vidence, and by examining God's written word, we 
must seek to know all that can be known of God. 

2. The second duty we owe to God is implicit 
confidence in him. 

The duty of trusting in God is deeply impressed 
upon us by a knowledge of his perfections. " Like 
as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth 
them that fear him." As children, then, should we 
confide in God, in his infinite goodness, wisdom, 
and power. This is a first truth of reason, that we 
should exercise toward God a faith absolute, un- 
wavering, and without limit. 



160 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

3. The third duty that we owe to God is humility. 
All beings, even angels and archangels, should be 
humble in the presence of God. All the hosts of 
heaven are satisfied each with the place assigned by 
the Almighty. This is humility, and this spirit 
should be universally cultivated. 

" Whatever grades of spiritual life," says Hickok, 
" there may be from human to archangel, through all 
the ranks of ' thrones, dominions, principalities, and 
powers,' that is humility in each, which, in reverent 
adoration of the Most High, cordially assents to its 
own place among the worshippers ; and the highest in 
this classified rank, while he casts his crown before 
the throne, and veils his face with his wings, will 
be as truly virtuous in his humility as the lowest.' ' 

4. We owe to the Divine Being reverence. 
When a man hoary with age, venerable for good- 
ness, and profound in wisdom, enters our presence, 
we almost involuntarily pay to him the homage of 
reverence. It is this feeling infinitely exalted that 
we owe to the awful Majesty " that inhabiteth 
eternity." His infinite duration, past and future, 
his omnipresence, which is everywhere and always 
visible, his unsearchable knowledge, and his omni- 
potent power, all should elicit a reverence profound, 
sincere, constant, and universal. 

5. Godly fear is due to God. He does not require 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



161 



a fear that excites such a dread of his character and 
presence as would make that presence uncomfort- 
able, and of course undesirable. This would not 
be a godly fear. The fear that is sought for, and 
that should be rendered to God, is such as Moses 
felt in the solitudes of the mountain, when the 
"bush burned with fire and was not consumed 
he reverently put his shoes from off his feet, be- 
cause the place on which he stood was holy, and 
yet he was attracted to the sacred spot. 

6. A feeling of dependence should be cherished 
and cultivated by all who would meet the claims 
which God has upon them. This feeling of depend- 
ence upon God as an infinite benefactor is a char- 
acteristic of the pious mind, and is a chief dis- 
tinction between the servant of God and the 
servant of sin. 

7. God claims our love. This is the sum of reli- 
gion and the essence of piety. It is the most 
reasonable claim that could be made. If you 
wished to gain the affection of a fellow -creature, 
you would seek to do so, not by telling him to love 
you, but by exhibiting such dispositions and per- 
forming for him such works as would excite his 
love. This has been the course pursued by our 
Heavenly Father toward us. He exhibits such 
excellences of character, such moral beauty, such 



162 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

goodness, that the heart should as naturally turn to 
God, as the heliotrope to the sun. 

"The real Creator," says Dr. Dwight, "has so 
formed his works, and so constituted his provi- 
dence, that the minds of men irresistibly esteem a 
benevolent being more than one of opposite char- 
acter. This is the dictate of the intelligence, the 
conscience, and the understanding. Any person 
who will make the attempt, will find it beyond his 
power to approve of malevolence at all." 

So attractive is benevolence, that God seeks to 
draw all men to him by his goodness. " God is 
love." How these words vibrate upon the heart, 
and meet a response in the human bosom ! " God 
is love" is uttered forth by a thousand voices, and 
each utterance makes an impression upon the great 
heart of our humanity, such as no other words 
could make. Omnipotent power, omniscient wis- 
dom, and even immutable justice, are the modifica- 
tions of his love. But love is not only claimed in 
view of the moral excellences which like a bril- 
liant constellation shine in the moral heaven, and 
illustrate the character of God ; it is also claimed in 
view of his frequent acts of kindness. In the 
works of creation he has manifested his concern for 
man. Equally for man he displays his regard in 
that special superintending providence which sup- 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



163 



plies his wants, wards off dangers, guards his foot- 
steps, and watches his slumbers. But still more in 
the great remedial dispensation, in the gift of his 
Son, in the agonies and death of that Son, and in 
all the instrumentalities connected with the dis- 
pensation of grace, he has done enough to excite 
love in the coldest heart. 

8. We owe to God the entire consecration of our 
persons. " Ye are not your own." God claims lis, 
soul and body, and to him we should surrender the 
cultivated intellect, the subdued appetites, the well- 
disciplined desires, and the heart's warmest and 
purest affections. The act of self - consecration 
should be entire, including the will and the con- 
science. In this act we are to recognize the Author 
of our being as possessing the right of absolute and 
unlimited control, and our duty of positive, im- 
plicit, and entire obedience. Eeason teaches that 
the finite should surrender to the infinite, and the 
dependent to the independent. 

"The will of God," says Mahan, "standing 
before us, as it does, in revealed and absolute har- 
mony with the dictates of infinite wisdom, know- 
ledge, rectitude, and benevolence, the first duty 
which conscience devolves on us is a distinct and 
unlimited surrender of his own to the control of 
the will of the Creator./ 9 



164 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION II. 

OUTWARD DUTIES: PRAYER — PRATER DEFINED — WHAT IT PRESUP- 
POSES — NATURAL VIEWS — SCRIPTURAL VIEWS DIFFERENT KINDS OF 

PRATER — PRIVATE PRATER — FAMILT PRATER PUBLIC PRATER 

POSTURE IN PRATER — ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FORMS OF 
PRATER — EFFICACT OF PRATER — OBJECTIONS ANSWERED — REFLEC- 
TIONS. 

Prayer is the expression of desires to the Divine 
Being, for things that are needful and lawful. 
Hence prayer is said to be the communion of the 
spirit of man with the Spirit of God. It consists of 
thanksgiving, adoration, confession, and petition. 

It presupposes, 1. A deep sense of want; 2. A 
feeling of entire dependence; 3. Implicit confi- 
dence; 4. A spirit of humility; 5. Submission to 
the Divine will ; 6. A desire to cultivate peace with 
all mankind. 

In reference to this duty we hold, that it is 
natural and almost universal. In proof of this 
position it may be stated : 

L That all persons when in great want naturally 
invoke aid of those who are able to assist. This is 
prayer, and it is thus proved to be natural and 
reasonable. 

2. All classes of persons in times of extremity 
have been known to call upon God in prayer. 
Even Atheists themselves have been known to pray. 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



165 



Wherever the belief in God exists, prayer has been 
invariably offered to him. Especially is this mani- 
fest on occasions of sudden calamity: then there 
arises a spontaneous petition to the God of heaven 
for light and counsel, for pardon and salvation. 

But in order to present this duty in a clearer 
light, we offer the following as the scriptural views 
on this subject. 

1. The Scriptures command us to pray. The 
commands are given with a frequency and an 
emphasis which at once manifest the importance 
attached to prayer by God. "Pray without ceas- 
ing." "Pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands." 
" Men ought always to pray." " Is any among you 
afflicted? let him pray." These, and many other 
similar passages, show how this duty is enjoined by 
Him to whom prayer should be offered. 

2. The Scriptures abound with striking promises, 
offered only to those who perform this duty. "Ask, 
and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; 
knock, and it shall be opened unto you." "Call 
upon me in the day of trouble : I will deliver 
thee." 

3. Instances are given of special answers to 
prayer. Abraham prayed to God, and he healed 
Abimelech. Elijah prayed, and in answer to his 
prayer God sent fruitful showers. lie prayed, and 



166 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

fire consumed the sacrifice. Hezekiah prayed, and 
life and health were restored. The centurion 
prayed, and Jesus answered. Cornelius prayed, 
and God testified, " Cornelius, thy prayer is 
heard." 

4. Prayer marks the distinction between good 
and bad men. David, Elijah, Daniel, Paul, and 
hundreds of others, are represented as "continuing 
instant in prayer;" while the wicked are repre- 
sented as saying, " What is the Almighty, that we 
should serve him ; and what profit should we have, 
if we pray unto him?" 

5. Jesus Christ is given as an eminent example 
of prayer. "Jesus fell on his face and prayed." 
"He went into a solitary place and prayed." He 
went to the mountain and prayed ; he stood by the 
grave of Lazarus and prayed ; he continued a whole 
night in prayer ; he prayed for his disciples, for the 
Church, for those that crucified him : his was a life 
of prayer. How important that we imitate that 
illustrious example! 

We notice, in the next place, the different kinds 
of prayer. 

1. Private prayer. The Great Teacher is very 
explicit in his instructions in reference to private 
prayer. " When thou prayest, enter into thy 'closet, 
and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



167 



Father which is in secret, and thy Father which 
seeth in secret shall reward thee openly. " Private 
prayer commends itself to us, from the fact that we 
have many private wants, that cannot be the proper 
themes of public prayers. It also commends itself 
to us because it brings us into the closest possible 
communion with God. There is also less to divert 
the mind when engaged in private devotion ; hence 
the prayer can generally be more devout than when 
offered in public. When a man finds himself alone 
with his Maker, and feels as though the w T hole 
attention of the great Jehovah w^ere directed to 
him, he is necessarily filled with most awful ideas 
of Him before whose gaze he bows, and for whose 
mercy he calls. 

2. Family Prayer. The sacredness of the family 
relation, the fearful responsibility of parents and 
masters, and the immense influence exerted by 
them for good or evil, make it clear that family 
prayer should not be neglected. The reading of 
the Sacred Scriptures in the presence of the family, 
accompanied by solemn, earnest, and affectionate 
appeals to the throne of grace, for light, support, 
and guidance, cannot but have an influence upon 
the entire domestic circle, as permanent as it will 
be salutary. In this connection we may mention 
prayers in the school. Every pious teacher feels 



168 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

himself in the place of a parent, and, as he gathers 
his interesting charge about him, a deep and pure 
vein of devotion characterizes the prayer which he 
offers for the lambs of his fold. 

3. Public prayer. If the worship of God is a 
duty incumbent upon each individual man, and 
upon man in the family circle, it is equally incum- 
bent upon man in society. God should be ac- 
knowledged in the great congregation, not only in 
songs of praise, in reading, explaining, and en- 
forcing his holy word, but in public confession 
of sin, and in public supplication for Divine 
mercy. 

Whether prayer should be offered standing or 
kneeling, is not a question of vital importance. 
~Nov do we think that there need be any con- 
troversy as to whether prayer should be read or 
offered extempore. Man may pray acceptably in 
either position, and either with or without a 
form. 

It is argued, on the one hand, that the whole 
congregation can more readily unite in the petition 
when they are supplied with a written form. It 
is also argued that we should never approach God 
but after the most serious preparation, and that 
this preparation can best be made by having a 
written form of prayer. And, finally, that our 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



169 



Saviour gave to his disciples a form of prayer, 
which he intended should be used and followed as 
a model. 

On the other hand, it is argued that the prayer 
when written becomes old and stale, and that we 
are apt to repeat it without that fervor and devo- 
tional spirit which should ever accompany prayer. 
Tt is also argued in favor of extemporaneous 
prayer, that no written form can be adapted to 
every peculiar circumstance and relation of the 
individual, the family, and the congregation. 

We notice briefly the efficacy of prayer. 

1. The efficacy of prayer is seen in the influence 
of prayer upon the subject. Its subjective influ- 
ence is such as few will have the hardihood to 
deny. It brings man into companionship with the 
pure Spirit of God. This very intimate commu- 
nion, by a law of his being, tends to make him 
better: his mind receives the illuminations of 
Divine grace; his tempers are chastened and re- 
fined ; his depravity removed, and his spirit 
purified. 

2. God makes prayer the condition on which 

blessings are to be received. It is to save the sick, 

to secure temporal blessings, and to procure the 

high rewards of religious consolation in this life, and 

it imparts the hope of life everlasting. Salvation 
8 



170 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is the great blessing which God has promised, on 
condition that it be sought with prayer. 

3. Prayer is made one of the great instrumen- 
talities for the world's conversion. It is to be 
efficacious in giving success and power to truth. 
" The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man 
availeth much," is a mysterious truth, but still a 
truth. Moral philosophy does not seek to deter- 
mine how it is that prayer affects others besides 
those that offer it ; nor can it reveal the mystery of 
its availing with God. 

The objections to prayer demand a slight notice. 

1. It is objected that God is all-wise and benevo- 
lent, and will therefore do what is best without 
prayer. 

In reply to this, we have to say that the objection 
can be made with as much force against any other 
duty as against prayer. If he can and will do 
what is for man's good, without his praying for it, 
he can and will do what is best without any con- 
dition, and man has merely to become a passive 
recipient, and need obey none of God's behests. 
We also reply to this objection, that it is compatible 
with the wisdom and goodness of God to require 
prayer, inasmuch as special answers to special 
prayers beget thankfulness and induce holiness. 

2. It is objected to prayer, that it is not 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



171 



consistent with the uniformity of nature, and, as we 
know that nature is uniform, we reject prayer. 

We answer, that this argument cannot apply to 
our moral wants, but only to our physical wants ; 
and, consequently, it has no force in reference to 
that for which our prayers are usually offered. We 
argue, also, that this assumption of the perfect 
uniformity of nature is made in ignorance. The 
man that asserts that nature is not influenced in its 
operations by God, through the prayers of the 
pious, asserts more than he knows. It is utterly 
impossible for him to know it, for he has no way 
of finding it out. This objection presupposes God 
to be inexorable, and that for no purpose will he 
vary the laws of nature. We have not so learned 
God. 

Finally, in answer to all these objections, it may 
be stated, that God usually works by second causes. 
He desires the earth to produce, and, in order to 
production, he gives us clouds, rain, and sunshine. 
Now, I would not say that God could not make the 
earth produce without rain or sunshine ; nor would 
I say that he could not bring rain without the 
clouds. But he has not chosen to do so. Rain and 
sunshine are the antecedents, and crops are the 
sequence. So, in the moral world, prayer is the 
antecedent, and the gift of the Holy Ghost is the 



172 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

consequent. And we can see as good reasons for 
this course of things in the moral world, as we 
can for rain and sunshine in the natural world. 

From this entire discussion, we draw a few prac- 
tical reflections. 

1. God, in requiring of us prayer, only meets 
a spontaneous demand of man's moral nature. 

2. The efficacy of prayer is not limited to time, 
but continues for ever. 

3. If to be prayerful constitutes an evidence of 
piety, to be prayerless constitutes an evidence 
of want of piety. 

4. If prayer is not specifically answered, it 
affords no evidence that prayer is wanting in 
efficacy. It is possible, nay, even probable, that 
the prayer may be efficacious, and the evidences of 
its efficacy be for a time withheld. 

SECTION III. 

SABBATH— ORIGINAL SABBATH — PALEY's THEORY: OBJECTIONS TO 

PALEY'S THEORY TRUE THEORY — MOSAIC SABBATH CHRISTIAN 

SABBATH — DAY CHANGED — PROOF THAT IT IS OBLIGATORY HOW 

TO BE KEPT. 

I. The original institution of the Sabbath. 

In regard to this there are two theories. 

1. Paley maintains that the Sabbath was not 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



173 



instituted at the creation, nor until a long time 
subsequent. After reciting a portion of the six- 
teenth chapter of Exodus, in which the account is 
given of the miraculous fall of manna in the 
wilderness, and of the large amount that fell on 
the sixth day, with the reason for the amount being 
doubled on that day, which was, " To-morrow is 
the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord/' Dr. 
Paley makes the following remark: "Now, in my 
opinion, the transaction in the wilderness above 
recited was the first actual institution of the 
Sabbath/' 

We object to this view of the Sabbath : 

1. Because it is evidently a forced construction 
of the narrative. In Exodus, the Sabbath is not 
spoken of as a new institution, but as a day well 
known to the Israelites. 

2. Because this hebdomadal division of time was 
not only recognized among the Jews, but was also 
recognized by the heathen. Hesiod speaks of the 
seventh day as being sacred; Homer also men- 
tions the seventh day as a sacred day. Other 
similar testimonies might be adduced. 

3. We object to Paley's theory, because, accord- 
ing to it, God postponed for twenty-five hundred 
years an institution which had been needed during 
that entire period, both for man and beast. 



174 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. We object to Paley's theory, because lie 
makes Moses recount two events as concurrent, 
which were actually separated by the space of 
twenty-five hundred years, if his theory be correct. 
"And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified 
it, because that in it he had rested from all his 
work which God created and made." This pas- 
sage is found in the second chapter of Genesis, and 
immediately follows the account of the creation. 
Now, says Paley, " the blessing and sanctification, 
i. e.j the religious distinction and appropriation of 
that day, were not actually made till many ages 
afterwards." Surely a theory must be poorly sus- 
tained which requires such wresting of the Scrip- 
tures to establish it. 

2. The second and true theory is, that the 
Sabbath was instituted at the creation. No other 
just interpretation can be given of the account 
recorded by Moses in the second chapter of 
Genesis. Upon this enactment of the law of the 
Sabbath, we remark : 

1. The institution was intended for Adam — that 
is, for the whole human family — and hence is of 
changeless obligation. 

2. The time was at the beginning of the world, 
which also shows that it was instituted for the 
entire race. 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



175 



3. The reasons assigned for the institution are 
general : "And God blessed the seventh day, and 
sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from 
all his work which God created and made. ,, Now, 
as long as the creation should stand as his greatest 
w r ork, the seventh day was to be hallowed as the 
monument of that grand work. If, however, a 
greater work should be wrought, God might change 
the day to commemorate that greater work. Still, 
the reason assigned is a general one, applying to 
the whole race, and shows the institution to be 
perpetual. 

II. The Mosaic Sabbath. 

The reenactment of the law of the Sabbath, as it 
is found in the decalogue, is in these words: "Re- 
member the Sabbath day to keep it holy : six days 
shalt thou labor and do all thy work ; but the 
seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God : 
in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, 
nor thy daughter, thy man-servant nor thy maid- 
servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is 
within thy gates; for in six days the Lord made 
heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, 
and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord 
blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it." Upon 
this we remark, 

1. That the manner of the ordination is the 



176 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

same as that employed in the original institution. 
God blessed the Sabbath day; that is, God or- 
dained the Sabbath to be a blessing to all nations, 
and through all time. He hallowed or sanctified 
it ; that is, he set it apart from a secular to a holy 
use. It was to be a blessing to all people, and for 
ever : it was to be kept holy by all nations, and for 
ever. 

2. We remark that this command to keep holy 
the Sabbath day is found in the moral law, which 
must, of course, in all its requirements, be of per- 
petual obligation. It is found side by side with 
such commands as are admitted to be of universal 
and changeless obligation. And the only reason- 
able inference that can be drawn from this juxta- 
position with permanent laws, is that the law to 
keep the Sabbath is of universal and perpetual 
obligation. 

3. It may be proper to add that the violation of 
this command met with the severest punishment. 
And in after years God by the mouth of one of 
his prophets speaks of the violators of this law in 
the following language : " Thou hast despised mine 
holy things, and hast profaned my Sabbaths. There- 
fore have I poured out mine indignation upon them ; 
I have consumed them with the fire of my wrath ; 
their own way have I recompensed upon their heads, 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



177 



saith the Lord God." This curse was inflicted upon 
those who hid the Sabbath from their eyes. 

4. Finally, we add that the Mosaic Sabbath was 
not only a day of rest, but a day set apart for reli- 
gious worship, and to its religious observers glow- 
ing promises were given ; as, for example, in the 
following beautiful passage found in the prophecy 
of Isaiah: "If thou turn away thy foot from the 
Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day ; 
and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, 
honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine 
own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor 
speaking thine own words ; then shalt thou delight 
thyself in the Lord ; and I will cause thee to ride 
upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee 
with the heritage of Jacob thy father; for the 
mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." 

III. The Christian Sabbath. 

As the original Sabbath commemorated the 

creation, and continued to be kept on the seventh 

day as long as the creation was God's greatest 

w r ork, so the Christian Sabbath was changed to the 

first day to commemorate the greater work of 

man's redemption, which was completed by the 

resurrection of Christ from the grave. That the 

Sabbath was changed from the seventh to the first 
8* 



178 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

day of the week may be proved by the following 
arguments : 

1. On this day, just one week from his resur- 
rection, Christ appeared to his apostles, thereby 
indicating that this was to be the great day of his 
Church. 

2. This day was signalized as the day of Pente- 
cost, on which the Holy Ghost descended upon the 
disciples who were assembled " with one accord in 
one place." 

3. We prove by analogy that the first day was 
ordained and sanctified as the Sabbath of the Lord. 
The Lord's Supper is so designated to intimate the 
holy nature of the supper : it is no common feast, 
but a feast consecrated to God. So the Lord's day 
must be a day ordained and consecrated to the 
Lord. 

4. The writings of Pliny and Tacitus prove that 
the special mark of a Christian was the observance 
of the Lord's day. 

5. The standing question put to the persecuted 
Christians by the Romans was, " Have you kept the 
Lord's day?" The usual answer is said to have 
been, "I am a Christian: I cannot omit it." 

6. All the early Fathers speak of this day as being 
universally observed by the primitive Christian 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



179 



Church. The following extract from one of the 
early Fathers — Justin Martyr, who wrote A.D. 140 — 
is a clear testimony on this point: "On the day 
called Sunday, there is a meeting in one place of all 
the Christians who live either in the town or in the 
country, and the memoirs of the apostles are read 
to them as long as suitable. "When the reader stops, 
the president announces the admonition, and ex- 
horts to the imitation of those noble examples ; after 
which we all arise and begin to pray. We all meet 
together on Sunday because it is the first day on 
which God turned the darkness into light, gave shape 
to chaos, and made the world ; and on the same 
day Jesus Christ our Saviour rose from the dead." 

7. The conclusion then is inevitable that the first 
day was substituted by Divine appointment for the 
seventh day. The apostles observed it ; they re- 
quired its observance by the early Christians — it was 
the mark of discipleship ; its observance was at- 
tended by the Divine blessing ; it was a monument 
of the great event in the completion of redemption ; 
and all the earliest Church historians speak of the 
Lord's day as holy time. 

If any, however, still doubt the propriety of the 
change, we add that the universal observance of this 
day by the Christian Church renders the observance 
of a different day impracticable. 



180 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 

We argue that it is still obligatory upon man to 
keep the Sabbath : 

1. Because it is just as needful to mind and body, 
to man and beast now as it ever was. If a day of 
rest was ever needful, it is just as needful at this 
time. If a holy day, designed for moral culture, 
was ever necessary, such a day is as necessary now as 
ever it was. Man needs as much repose, as many 
means of grace, as numerous incentives to piety, in 
this period of his history as at any former period. 
If, then, in the language of our Saviour, the " Sab- 
bath was made for man," we hold it to be ever 
obligatory upon man. 

2. We argue that it is still obligatory upon man, 
because it has never been abolished. Other institu- 
tions designed alone for the Jews have been abol- 
ished, but no authority can be found in the word of 
God intimating that the Sabbath has been abol- 
ished. 

3. But the Sabbath has been absolutely reenacted, 
as has been seen, under the Mosaic and Christian 
dispensations, and we do not see how any Christian 
man can come to any other conclusion than that it 
is still obligatory. 

4. God has ever honored the observance of the 
Sabbath. The morality and virtue of a community 
are in proportion to the observance of the Sab- 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



181 



bath. The neglect of the Sabbath is universally 
accompanied by the moral degradation of the peo- 
ple. When the Sabbath was desecrated and abol- 
ished by France, God visited her people with the 
most fearful punishment. The same is true of 
individuals. The downward career of crime fre- 
quently begins with a disregard of the Sabbath, 
and ends with the miserable and frequently the 
dishonored death of the unhappy criminal. 

IV. The manner of observing the Christian Sab- 
bath. 

1. "We are to abstain from all except necessary 
labor, or labor for the sake of charity. Necessary 
labor is illustrated by our Lord's parable of the ox 
falling into the ditch, and our being allowed to take 
it out on the Sabbath day. And as to works of 
charity, he says, "It is lawful to do good on the 
Sabbath day." 

2. We are to abstain from the pursuit of pleasure 
on the Sabbath. Assemblings of young people for 
the sake of amusement are to be avoided. Hunting, 
fishing, pleasure-rides, and kindred amusements, 
in themselves innocent on other days, are to be re- 
garded as a desecration of the "Lord's day." 

8. We are to require our children and servants to 
abstain from labor on the Sabbath day. In the 
language of the sacred ordinance found in the 



182 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

moral law, we are not to allow our " man-servant, 
nor our maid - servant, nor our cattle, nor the 
stranger within our gates," to work on the Sab- 
bath. 

4. "We are to make it a clay of religious contem- 
plation. It is the emblem of eternal rest, that 
"rest which remaineth to the people of God/' The 
cultivation of a spirit of devotion, reflection upon 
the goodness and mercy of our Heavenly Father, 
and the exercise of Christian graces, may well 
employ the hours of the clay designed for the reli- 
gious improvement of the race. 

5. We are to observe it as a holy day, and hence 
we are to attend God's house; to listen to the 
gospel, to offer praise, to observe the ordinances of 
the sanctuary, and, by every possible public mani- 
festation, exhibit our appreciation of the day whose 
observance is productive of so much good to com- 
munities and to individuals. 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 183 



CHAPTER II. 

PERSONAL ETHICS. 
SECTION I. 

SELF-PROTECTION — THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENCE — ARGUMENTS IN 
FAVOR OF SELF-DEFENCE — OBJECTION ANSWERED — SELF-INJURY TO 
BE AVOIDED — MAIMING TORTURE — SUICIDE. 

The duties which a man owes to himself may be 
embraced under three general heads. 1. Self-pro- 
tection; 2. Self-government; 3. Self-culture. 

1. Self-protection. The great principle of self- 
protection is that you have the right, and that it is 
your duty to protect yourself, by putting the inter- 
ests of an aggressor in just such jeopardy as that in 
which he may have placed yours. The aggressor 
has forfeited his rights by his assault upon yours ; 
and if his attack is such as to endanger your life, 
you have the right to disable him, and even to kill 
him, in self-defence. Every one allows that it would 
be wrong to passively submit to be maimed or 



184 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

killed by a wild beast, when it was possible to avert 
the injury by sacrificing the life of the beast. An 
enraged man seeking your life is no more to you 
than an enraged wild beast, and you have the same 
right to kill the one as the other. I know that 
some fanatical moralists of the present day have 
pushed the doctrine of forbearance to an extreme, 
and have proclaimed themselves non-resistants, and 
denied the right of self-defence. In proof, how- 
ever, that the position taken above is consistent 
with the purest morality, I offer the following argu- 
ments. 

1. Self-defence is instinctively resorted to by 
every one who is attacked, even before he has time 
for reflection. It is, then, in accordance with a 
universal instinct of human nature. It is a part of 
our constitution, and, as our constitutional impulses 
have a tendency to accomplish some wise purpose, 
they should not be thwarted. 

2. Every person is the natural protector of his 
own life ; and if an assassin should attack him, he 
would be recreant to his duty, and unfaithful to 
the sacred trust committed to him, were he not to 
defend his life, even at the expense of the life 
of the assassin. He that would not at once kill 
the assassin, would be controlled by cowardice, and 
would deserve the coward's death. 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



185 



3. Justice requires the course here indicated. 
In the case supposed, one or the other must die. 
Then, let the one that deserves death meet his 
doom, and let the innocent be spared. 

But we are met with the following passages of 
Scripture: "Resist not evil. ,, "If thine enemy 
hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink." 
"Love your enemies." 

All I have to say in reference to these, and other 
similar scriptures, is, that they are intended as a 
prohibition of vengeance. "We are not allowed to 
indulge a spirit of revenge. Nor do we believe 
the least spirit of revenge to be compatible with 
pure morality. The disabling of the aggressor, or 
the taking of his life, must be done as an act of 
pure self-defence, and not as an act of vengeance. 

The same principles hold in reference to the 
protection of your reputation. If you are slan- 
dered, you owe it to yourself to defend yourself 
against the slander, even though it should utterly 
destroy the reputation of the assailant. If one or 
the other must go down, let the guilty one be the 
sufferer. 

While it is the duty of man to protect himself 
from the aggressions of others, it is equally his duty 
to avoid self-inflictions. 

1. Maiming. An enlightened morality forbids 



186 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the practice of disfiguring and scarring the body, 
which is so often practiced among barbarous people. 
The emasculation of one's self, even for the sake 
of a more rigid religious life, is at once ignoble, 
unmanly, and degrading, and is as offensive to God 
as it is disgraceful to man. 

2. Self-torture. All penances which superstition 
requires of her votaries, such as long fastings, lash- 
ing one's body with whips, confining one's self in 
solitude, and all rigid austerities which inflict per- 
manent injury on the constitution, are at once 
opposed to the principles of a pure morality, and 
contrary to the spirit of the mild and merciful dis- 
pensation of Christianity. 

3. Suicide. It has been contended by some, that 
a man has a right to commit suicide when he feels 
that his life is a nuisance to society. The following 
considerations will show the falsity of this view : 

1. It goes upon the principle that man is per- 
fectly capable of determining whether his life will 
be useful or not, which is false. 

2. Even if he could know this, and be certain 
that he could never do any good, the spirit which 
would influence him to the commission of suicide 
is a rebellious spirit, coming in direct conflict with 
the providence of God. 

3. It is admitted that a man has not the right to 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



187 



take the life of another, except in self-defence ; and 
upon the same principle, he would not be allowed 
to take his own life, except in defence of that life, 
which is both absurd and impossible. 

SECTION II. 

SELF-GOVERNMENT: CONTROL OF THE APPETITES — SIN OF BECOMING 

SLAVES TO THE APPETITES — CONTROL OF THE PASSIONS ANGER — 

PRIDE AND VANITY ENVY — COVETOUSNESS. 

Self-government implies the control of the appe- 
tites and passions. 

I. Man must control his appetites. This prin- 
ciple forbids intemperance. Intemperance applies 
to immoderate indulgence of the appetites in eat- 
ing and drinking. For a man to pamper his 
appetites, to live for the sake of gratifying them, 
to eat simply for the sake of pleasure, is to lose 
sight of his own worthiness, and to forget the high 
destiny for which he was created. And then, that 
unnatural thirst for intoxicating liquors, which, 
when gratified, fires the blood, and constantly seeks 
gratification, and yet continues to cry, Give, give, 
finally sinks the spirit in irrecoverable ruin. That 
it is our duty to control the appetites may appear 
still clearer by the following reflections : 

1. Servitude to appetite is the worst form of 



188 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

bondage. ~No bondage is so low, so degrading as 
this. ISTo servility is so hopeless as the servility to 
a depraved appetite. When man once yields him- 
self a bondman to this exacting tyrant, he becomes 
heedless of the calls of duty : the claims of wife 
and children are forgotten; the high behests of 
Deity are disregarded; and all interests, temporal 
and eternal, are forfeited. He worships no god but 
appetite, and to that he yields a servile devotion, as 
degrading as it is unnatural and unmanly. 

2. Servitude to appetite destroys man's self-re- 
spect, and causes him to forfeit the respect of others. 
How debasing must be the slavery to appe- 
tite when it lowers man to the brute, makes him 
forget that he is a man, effaces from him the last 
vestiges of God's image, and makes him a fit com- 
panion for swine ! Men may pity the miserable 
wretch who has thus sold his birthright, but they 
cannot respect him. 

3. "When man yields himself a slave to appetite, 
he becomes a hopeless slave. To relieve himself from 
this slavery requires a moral power that he has 
lost, a strength of character that he has forfeited, 
a moral courage of which he is incapable, and an 
heroic energy which he is unable to put forth. 
His pledges, and high resolves, and noble purposes, 
yield like gossamer threads in the hands of this 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



189 



monstrous giant that lords it over God's heritage 
with an exacting tyranny that knows neither pity 
nor remorse. 

IL The second duty involved in self-government 
is the control of the passions and affections. 

1. Anger. "He that is slow to anger is better 
than the mighty ; and he that ruleth his spirit than 
he that taketh a city." " Be ye angry and sin not." 
"Whosoever is angry with his brother without 
a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment." 
From these, and many similar passages of Scrip- 
ture, we judge that anger uncontrolled is sinful; 
though anger properly controlled, and for a proper 
cause, may be innocent. Many a man has con- 
quered others, and has been unable to rule his own 
spirit. Violent anger is rash, cruel, vindictive, and 
lawless. It is swift to shed blood, relentless in the 
infliction of vengeance, and shows no mercy to a 
foe. It dethrones reason and conscience, and 
usurps their place. It storms and raves with 
ungovernable fury, utters words hard to be borne 
and difficult to be recalled; and, while it drives 
peace from the bosom of its miserable victim, it 
makes all around unhappy. The angry man is his 
own worst enemy. He is blindly driven by a 
passion which frequently places him in the power 
of his antagonist, and thus is made to sully his 



190 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

own fair name, to lose his influence, and sometimes 
his life. Again, like a raging maniac he commits 
an act for which a life of unavailing tears fails to 
make atonement. Rule your own spirit, repress 
your feelings of indignation, subdue your anger, 
conquer yourself. 

2. Pride and vanity. " Pride do I hate." " Pride 
goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit 
before a fall." "A man's pride shall bring him 
low." "Lest, being lifted up with pride, he fall 
into the condemnation of the devil." These 
scriptures show that pride is hateful, that it is 
destructive, that it is the precursor of a certain fall, 
and that it brings its victim into certain condem- 
nation. It involves a spirit of self-inflation and of 
egotism which prevents all improvement, and which 
degrades the subject in universal estimation. Pride 
has protean shapes, and arises from divers causes. 
Wealth, family connections, superficial attain- 
ments, fine dress, beauty of person, splendid equi- 
page, may each and all of them excite pride. It 
exhibits itself in "great swelling words," in loud 
boastings, in scorn and contempt of others, in 
sneers at the excellences which others possess, 
in a morbid love of flattery and anxiety to receive 
adulation, in repinings at neglect, and in un- 
governable rage when slighted. Such is pride. 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



191 



All men reprobate this spirit in all but themselves, 
thereby showing how utterly despicable it is. To 
repress it, we have but to reflect on its hateful 
character, and how unbecoming it is in a little, 
contracted soul to entertain such a feeling of 
self- exaltation. Our numerous imperfections, our 
close alliance with worms and dust, our very 
contracted powers when compared with the Infi- 
nite, should not only subdue but annihilate pride. 
It is utterly opposed to a pure morality, is a barrier 
to happiness, is the death of piety, and is the 
fruitful source of countless evils. It is unworthy 
of man, and he should bring all his strength of 
will to overcome it, and should look for help to 
Him who saith, " Whosoever humbleth himself 
shall be exalted.' ' I have but one more remark to 
make concerning pride, and that is, it is never 
"commendable;" it is always wrong. It is the 
exact opposite of humility. It makes us think 
of ourselves more highly than we ought to think, 
and we might as well speak of commendable ven- 
geance as of commendable pride. It is universally 
condemned in the Sacred Scriptures, and should be 
universally eradicated. 

3. Envy. We give this name to that malevolent 
affection which arises toward another, simply 
because of his prosperitj\ He is hated because 



192 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

he has been successful. Envy is said to arise 
between those who belong to the same class in 
society. It springs up between two belles in the 
same city, between rival candidates for the same 
office, between members of the same profession. 
It is said that fellow-students of the same class, and 
whose standing is nearly equal, are prone to be 
envious of each other, while no such feeling arises 
in reference to members of other classes, whatever 
may be their standing. That this is in the main 
true, will not be denied. But we often find those 
who dwell upon their own wants and disappoint- 
ments, and who draw sad comparisons between 
their own condition and the greater prosperity 
of others, whether belonging to their own or to a 
different class. And after comparison is made, 
they dwell with the most morose feelings upon their 
own sad fate, and indulge feelings of discontent, 
fretfulness, and petulance. Iteinecessary attendant 
is mental agony ; it clothes itself with hypocrisy, 
delights in slander, rejoices in iniquity, and 
comforts itself with the sorrows of others. It is 
sad when others rejoice, and indulges a malignant 
joy when others suffer misfortunes. He that would 
be either good or happy, must keep envy as far 
as possible from his heart. The character of an 
envious man is universally despised. His crime 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



193 



has no palliation, and there is no one so poor as 
to do him reverence. Let the evil be shunned by 
reflecting upon its opposition to all worthiness, 
its hideous deformity, its unmitigated vieiousness, 
and its ruinous consequences. Let constant and 
earnest prayer be offered to the Almighty that 
he would free our hearts from the direst curse 
which passion can bring. 

4. Covetousness. " Thou shalt not covet." "Be- 
ware of covetousness." "A heart they have exer- 
cised with covetous practices : cursed children, which 
have forsaken the right way." "But covetousness, 
let it not once be named among you." "Woe to 
him that coveteth." The desire which we term 
covetousness would appropriate that which belongs 
to another without giving an equivalent. Hence it 
is excessive desire of owning. Its rapacity is without 
bounds. It is the embodiment of selfishness. Its 
object is wealth, and to its attainment the covetous 
man bends every energy, sacrifices every comfort, 
forfeits peace of mind, disregards the principles 
of justice, and sets at naught the fearful mandates 
of the Almighty. It is more ravenous than death, 
and more cruel than the grave. The scruples of 
honesty, the monitions of conscience, the claims 
of duty, the esteem of the virtuous, and the favor 
of God, are alike disregarded. Sometimes this 
9 



194 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

passion assumes a peculiar form, when it seeks 
money for its own sake. "We may have some 
respect for the man who covets money as a means 
to obtain what may satisfy his w 7 ants ; but for a 
man who seeks money as an end we can only feel 
the contempt which the miser deserves. Other 
sinful passions may appear to afford some gratifica- 
tion, and in this delusive appearance may find some 
little palliation, but the miser makes himself a 
wretch by living and feeling only in his money. 
He worships gold ; he lives only to accumulate 
gold ; he hoards up gold ; and becomes as destitute 
of nobleness of purpose, of moral purity, and of 
manly dignity, as the gold to which he bows. Let 
all feel it to be their duty to govern themselves in 
reference to this passion ; and, by reflecting on the 
severe judgments which God visits on the covetous, 
on the misery with which it is always accompanied, 
on the barriers which it raises between man and 
God, and, above all, by appeals to the throne 
of grace, let its entire eradication be sought 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



195 



SECTION III. 

SELF - CULTURE — PHYSICAL CULTURE : DIET EXERCISE — DRESS — 

CLEANLINESS — CULTURE OF THE MIND : ENERGY — PERSEVERANCE 

SYSTEM — MORAL CULTURE .* PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE — CHERISHING 
THE SENSE OF OBLIGATION OBEDIENCE TO CONSCIENCE — SELF- 
EXAMINATION — REPENTANCE — PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE. 

The next duty which man owes to himself, is to 
perfect his own nature. 

I. To develop and perfect the physical system, is 
a duty which we owe to an organization at once 
the most complicated and the most delicate. 

1. This must be done, in the first place, by a 
proper regard to diet. "Wholesome food, carefully 
selected, well cooked, properly masticated, and 
taken always in moderation, is essential to the 
growth of the body, to its health, and its full devel- 
opment. In the early years of life the selection 
and preparation of the food depend upon the 
parents, and fearful is the guilt of many parents in 
this respect. In another department of practical 
morality the duties of parents will be fully dis- 
cussed : for the present we have to do only with 
personal duties. All rich and unwholesome viands, 
all "surfeiting and drunkenness," all gormandizing, 
are to be avoided, as injuring the tabernacle of the 
soul ; as rendering it unfit to perform its functions, 



196 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and as degrading the soul itself. It is believed, and 
upon good authority, that over-eating and improper 
drinking are fraught with more ruin to man than 
"war, pestilence, and famine." 

2. Proper attention should be paid to exercise. 
Exercise imparts strength to the body, activity to 
the limbs, hardness to the muscles, and vigor to. the 
constitution. It is the delight of childhood, and 
the necessity of age. It is compliance with a great 
law of our being, the neglect of which brings imbe- 
cility of body, weakness of nerve, loss of health, 
and premature old age and death. To violate this 
law of our physical constitution, under the pretence 
of excessive study, is to forfeit the very improve- 
ment which we are seeking. Exercise of the body 
is as necessary as exercise of the mind. An un- 
sound body must exert its influence upon the spirit. 
Exercise is better than medicine to promote health 
and prolong life. Every student should have his 
set time for exercise, and should not allow any 
ordinary circumstance to interfere with it. No 
man can neglect this without a corresponding 
failure of intellectual as well as physical energy. 

3. Dress. The philosophy of dress requires that 
such clothing should be worn as will most certainly 
secure the comfort and health of the wearer. In 
reference to dress we remark: 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



197 



1. It should always correspond in its texture to 
the climate and season. It should be such as to 
afford ample protection to the body against the 
inclemencies of the weather. 

2. It should be so adapted to the body, as not to 
cramp it, hinder its growth, prevent its healthy 
action, or enfeeble its energies. I am sorry to say 
that in this respect the women of America have 
rendered themselves especially liable to censure. 
The miserable habit of tight-lacing has brought 
unnumbered evils to them and . their posterity. 
Nor are they entirely free from a violation of the 
first maxim we have presented. Their dress is 
frequently of so frail a texture as to afford but 
little protection from the severity of the weather. 

3. The dress should never offend against modesty. 
When the dress is so arranged as to excite unchaste 
feelings in the spectator, it deserves the strongest 
reprehension by all lovers of virtue. It then 
becomes an immorality, as offensive to God as it 
must ever be disgusting to all pure-minded persons. 

4. Dress may, and generally should, correspond 
to the prevailing custom, unless that custom violate 
one of the above principles. Then there should be 
no hesitation between custom and fight. If cus- 
tom requires the sacrifice of modesty, or health, or 
comfort, then custom must not be obeyed. 



1.98 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

5. Other things being equal, that dress which is 
the most comely may be preferred. I can see no 
reason for preferring an uncomely dress to one that 
is comely. We almost involuntarily form some 
judgment of a person from his dress. And while 
all extravagance in dress is to be avoided, and all 
pride in dress is to be repressed as unworthy the 
dignity of human nature, a proper regard to 
comeliness of attire is by no means reprehen- 
sible. 

4. Cleanliness. " Cleanliness/' says a great 
divine, "is next to godliness.'' Frequent ablutions 
are absolutely essential to the preservation of 
health. One who lives in filth cannot have ex- 
alted notions of purity. Cleanliness brings its own 
reward, in the air of comfort which it imparts to 
the dwelling, in the elasticity which it gives to the 
spirits, in the health and vigor derived by the con- 
stitution, and in those loftier aspirations which can 
neither be excited nor encouraged in the midst, of 
foulness and stench. It guards the habitation 
against the inroads of sickness, and preserves its 
inmates in health. 

II. Self-culture involves attention not only to the 
body, but, in the second place, special care is to be 
had in the culture of the intellect. We have 
already shown that the desire of knowledge is con- 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



199 



stitutional, and this desire is to be gratified by a 
faithful improvement of the mind. In order to the 
cultivation of the intellect, there must be, 

1. Energy. No indolent man ever became dis- 
tinguished for knowledge. Indolence paralyzes the 
intellectual powers, represses curiosity, shrinks from 
investigation, is appalled by the difficulties attend- 
ing a process of reasoning, and causes its victim to 
pine in the poverty of ignorance, when he might 
luxuriate in the wealth of knowledge. Under its 
baneful influence the young remain stupid, are dis- 
couraged, leave school, enter upon business, make 
failures, and live and die in obscurity. No origin- 
ality of genius or brilliancy of intellect can begin 
to make amends for deficiency of energy. Energy 
masters difficulties, removes obstructions, over- 
comes imbecility, sharpens dulness, stores the 
memory, quickens the judgment, develops the 
understanding, accumulates knowledge, and in 
every way promotes intellectual advancement. 
Energy develops powers which would ever have 
remained dormant, and gives to those powers 
beauty, elegance, and polish. Nothing can resist 
it. In the cultivation of the intellect it is almost 
omnipotent. 

2. Intellectual culture requires perseverance. 
The efforts must not be spasmodic; they must 



200 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be continuous, in order to be successful. If the 
first effort does not solve the problem, or arrive at 
the truth, the effort must be repeated, perseveringly 
continued, until the truth is gained. The cultiva- 
tion of the intellect is not the business merely of 
youth, it cannot be accomplished in a few short 
years, it is rather the business of a lifetime. The 
mind is progressive, and is capable of infinite 
improvement. And it is to be lamented that intel- 
lectual culture is sought principally to fit one for 
the business of life, and when a partial qualifica- 
tion for that business is attained, the effort at intel- 
lectual progress generally ceases. This should not 
be. It should be felt to be a high duty to perse- 
vere in the culture of the intellect, as long as there 
is truth undiscovered, or knowledge unacquired. 
"Without fear and without faltering, inspired by a 
solemn sense of duty, man should be a student of 
the great volume of nature, as it lies open before 
him, revealing to his persevering gaze the wonders 
of God Almighty. From every source, human and 
Divine, in every department of science and litera- 
ture, in the works of man and in the works of 
God, at all times and in all places, by attention, 
observation, and persevering study, he should seek 
to be a learner. His field of thought should 
embrace man, the universe, and God ; and each new 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



201 



discovery should only fire his energy and increase 
his perseverance. 

3. System. The pursuit of knowledge is ren- 
dered both more pleasant and more successful by 
adherence to the most rigid system. A systematic 
arrangement of time appears almost to double its 
duration. Certainly, twice as much may be accom- 
plished, when your work is systematically pursued, 
as can possibly be done when you have no system. 
"We should seek by unfaltering energy, unwearying 
perseverance, and faultless system, to accomplish 
that intellectual culture which we owe to ourselves, 
our country, and our God. 

III. Moral culture. A personal duty of the 
highest moment is the culture of the moral 
feelings. 

1. You are to do all you can to know your duty. 
You must often inquire, Is this right ? 2sTo oppor- 
tunity must be allowed to pass of studying your 
relations and obligations, and the best methods of 
fulfilling them. This investigation must be made 
in a docile spirit, remembering your great liability 
to self-presumption. It must be humbly made, it 
must be perseveringly made, until an answer clear, 
full, and satisfactory is obtained. In inquiring 
what is right, it will be well to look into the con- 
sequences of the action ; to examine as far as 
9* 



202 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

possible all its bearings upon the individual actor, 
and those in reference to whom it is performed. 
It is absolutely essential to inquire what motives 
are prompting to its performance, as the motives 
always determine the quality of the action. Look 
into God's word — "the perfect law of liberty" — 
and continue therein, until from its infallible 
pages you have learned "the way, the truth, and 
the life." In it, as in a mine, seek for a knowledge 
of duty, more earnestly than the lapidary seeks 
for the priceless diamond. Read other good books ; 
they will refine the taste, exalt the intellect, and 
improve the conscience. Associate with the good, 
and receive, in a willing mind and a grateful heart, 
the words of purity and wisdom that they utter. 
Take some faultless character as your model, and 
dwell often and long upon its moral excellences. 
Have ever before your mind the character of Him 
who is the embodiment of goodness, justice, and 
truth. By pursuing this course, you will hardly err 
in reference to a knowledge of duty. 

2. Cherish the feeling of obligation ; let nothing 
dissipate it. Remember that this feeling is essen- 
tial to a well-developed moral character ; and that 
it places man in a high position, and dignifies his 
actions. Remember that the godless sneer, the 
ribald jest, and the infidel scoff, have often put to 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



203 



flight a feeling, the loss of which cannot be repaid 
by all the philosophy infidelity ever invented. 
Remember that he who regards the obligatory 
feeling as a weakness, is himself unworthy of 
confidence. Cultivate, exercise, strengthen, and 
perpetuate this feeling of moral obligation, as 
implanted by the Divine Being, and as leading to 
issues of the greatest magnitude. 

3. Cultivate the habit of obeying the impulses of 
conscience, as the most authoritative faculty of your 
nature. Dare to do right; be courageous in the 
discharge of duty ; let not the seductive smiles of 
indolence, the imperious calls of ambition, the loud 
trump of fame, the fierce clamors of appetite, the 
tyrannical claims of selfishness, the insidious fasci- 
nations of pleasure, or the wild cries of fanaticism, 
prevent a noble, fearless, and consistent obedience 
to the impulses of your moral principle. Remem- 
ber that the highest aspect of human nature is seen 
when, struggling with misfortune, beset with 
temptation, and assailed by countless adversaries, 
it moves forward in the great tasks of life, un- 
appalled by danger and unawed by opposition. 
Be careful to distinguish between the impulses of 
conscience, and those of a blind fanaticism. False 
philanthropy sometimes usurps the place of con- 
science, and leads its victims to the wildest and 



204 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

most impracticable schemes. Keligious frenzy is 
sometimes mistaken for the impulse of enlightened 
conscience, and in its name sheds blood, establishes 
the inquisition, and produces the most alarming 
results. Conscience is the highest function of the 
reason, as well as of the sensibility, and is as 
rational as it is sensitive. Then, be careful to 
guard against any irrational impulse, and fanatical 
ebullition of feeling, as the dictates of a rational 
conscience. 

4. Subject yourself to frequent and rigid self- 
examination. Go into your own heart and search 
its inmost recesses. Do this with single eye, 
without prejudice, and without partiality. Do this 
in the light of God's word, and with submission to 
its dictates : let its radiance illuminate the secret 
springs of action, and bring out under the broad 
light of truth the most obscure motive. Do this 
work earnestly, as though life and death, time and 
eternity, were all involved in the issue. Be willing 
to know the whole truth, to see the entire character, 
however unpalatable the truth, and however de- 
formed the character. Make no apologies for 
yourself ; seek not to conceal even the half-formed 
thought, or the merely budding passion. Per- 
form this work not once, but often ; and always 
with humble reliance upon that Almighty Being, 



PERSONAL ETHICS. 



205 



from whose eye the intention cannot be concealed, 
and in whose infallible judgment character is every 
thing, and circumstances are nothing. 

5. If you have done wrong, repent ; be sorry for 
it. Avoid, hereafter, the temptation by which you 
fell. Notice the course of thinking that led you 
into sin, and shun that course in the future. If 
you have done an injury to another, show the depth 
of your repentance by making restitution, as far 
as it may be in your power. Restitution is a means 
of moral culture taught by the Great Teacher, and 
it is probably the most effective that has been sug- 
gested; it mortifies self, subdues pride, exalts 
virtue, and enthrones the conscience. 

6. Put these principles into practice. Let the 
outward act correspond with the inward principles ; 
let the whole life be principles in action; let no 
duty be neglected, however it may tax the patience, 
or require the putting forth of energy in the per- 
formance. 



206 ELEMENTS 0E MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER III. 

HUMAN ETHICS. 
SECTION I. 

JUSTICE : DEFINITION — JUSTICE TO PERSON FORBIDS MUTILATION 

DESTRUCTION OF LIFE : HORRORS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER — 
DUELLING : ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT. 

By justice is meant that temper of mind which 
prevents us from infracting the rights of others— 
which causes us to leave them in the unmolested 
enjoyment of those rights. 

We are required by the principles of justice to 
refrain from injuring the person of another. 

1. We are bound not to inflict any mutilation 
upon the body of another. Let us apply this to 
ourselves, and the horror which we feel at the 
very idea of being mutilated in body is an evid- 
ence of the turpitude of the crime. Besides this, 
the universal indignation which it excites in all 
civilized communities is an evidence of its deep 
criminality. 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



207 



2. Justice requires us to abstain from injury to 
the life of another, except in the case of self-de- 
fence. It is needless to present any arguments 
exhibiting the horrors of the crime of murder. 
The remorse of conscience felt by the murderer 
is an evidence that God has placed in man's own 
bosom a punisher which, by its fearful inflictions, 
shows the detestation in which the Divine Being 
holds the crime. But there is a question in con- 
nection with homicide which it is important for 
moral philosophy to decide. Has a man the right 
to expose his own life, or to take the life of his 
antagonist, in a duel? "A law of honor having 
affixed the suspicion of cowardice to patience under 
an affront, challenges are given and accepted, with 
no other design than to wipe out such suspicion." 
This, then, being the design of the challenging 
party, we are prepared to examine the criminality 
of duelling. 

"We hold that for such object, and with such de- 
sign, no man has the right to expose his own life. 

1. Because the object is not of sufficient magni- 
tude to justify such exposure. Now, for a man to 
expose that which is of great value, without a pros- 
pect of gaining something of equal value, is, to say 
the least, very unwise. In this case two valuable 
lives are exposed for a point of honor. 



208 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. Because, if lie loses his own life, or takes the 
life of another, nothing is gained. No one regards 
suspicion removed, or the stain wiped out, because 
he may have been successful in taking the life of 
his antagonist. 

3. But the objection to duelling becomes still 
more forcible, when we take into consideration the 
fact that the duellist risks the happiness of his 
family. Why should a man imperil the happiness 
of his own family, and that of his antagonist, w T hen 
really nothing is to be gained by such risk ? 

4. No good is ever accomplished, nor is any de- 
cision ever made by the issues of the duel, for the 
innocent as often falls as the guilty. And whether 
the innocent or the guilty may fall, nothing is 
proved, except that one or the other is the more 
expert in the use of the gun. 

5. The testimony of duellists themselves is against 
the practice. In the solemnities of death, when 
man is apt to be honest with himself and with 
his God, the fallen duellist has exhibited the deepest 
remorse for the crime committed. This is said to 
be almost universally the case. Some of the most 
touching scenes are recorded in which both have 
fallen, and both have lived sufficiently long to express 
their horror of their crime, and to ask and obtain 
forgiveness each of the other. The point of honor 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



209 



for which they had perilled all was lost sight of 
amid the fearful realities revealed by the light of 
eternity. Such testimony, under such circum- 
stances, is almost overwhelming against a practice 
as revolting to humanity as it is opposed to the 
principles of our holy religion. 

6. The statutes of nearly all civilized states are 
against the practice. This shows that the universal 
mind of Christendom is opposed to it, and con- 
demns it as not only foolish but criminal. 

7. The tendency of duelling is bad : it creates a 
morbid excitement in the public mind, degrades 
the morals, and lowers the taste of the community. 
Recklessness of human life becomes the order of 
the day. Bullying takes the place of decency, 
and the barbarism of the middle ages threatens to 
destroy the civilization and refinement of the nine- 
teenth century. 

8. The whole duelling code is founded upon 
false principles of honor. It is false honor, if such 
a term is legitimate, which causes men to arm 
themselves, and with vindictive coolness or savage 
barbarity seek each other's lives. The whole idea 
of honor is based upon public opinion, instead of 
the interior principles. BTot to advance his own 
worthiness, not to correct his own principles, not 
to purify his own character, does the duellist seek 



210 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

his brother's blood ; but he fears the public may 
esteem him a coward, or that in public opinion 
some suspicion may rest upon his reputation, and 
hence he kills his friend, or lets his friend kill 
him. It is moral cowardice that makes the duel- 
list : he has not the moral courage to face public 
opinion for the sake of a great principle. 

9. The practice is most unchristian. It is mur- 
der, cold-blooded and deliberate murder, and is 
condemned by the Divine law, and should be con- 
demned by every human law. It amounts to no- 
thing more nor less than assassination, and the 
professional duellist is an assassin of the deepest 
dye. 

SECTION II. 

JUSTICE AS IT KESPECTS CHARACTER — DEFINITION OF CHARACTER — 

PERFECTION THE STANDARD WHAT JUSTICE REQUIRES — THE GUILT 

OF INJURING CHARACTER. 

By character is meant the present real condition 
or state of the individual. It includes intellect 
and morals, and in some circumstances may apply 
to the physical man. 

President Mahan makes perfection the standard 
of character ; and character is either high or low, 
good or bad, according as it does or does not ap- 
proximate perfection. Character may be degraded 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



211 



or debased ; and justice demands that we do no- 
thing that can possibly lower the character. It is 
especially in a moral point of view that the guilt 
of injuring the character is seen. To injure a 
man's morals is to affect him most injuriously: 

1. Because, when properly estimated, a pure 
morality is the highest possession of humanity. 
Make a man guilty, rob him of his innocence, 
corrupt his principles, and you have done him 
more serious injury than you could have done in 
any other way. To defraud him of his property, 
or blast his reputation, or even to deprive him 
of life, could not be so base as to degrade his 
moral character. 

2. The exceeding turpitude of this crime is 
seen by examining the motives which influence 
the act. If all actions are to be judged by their 
motives — and we know of no other measure — then 
does the crime of making a human being worse 
appear to be of startling magnitude. 

1. The person may be influenced by hate. He 
may hate with a deep, malignant hatred, and this 
may determine him to seduce his innocent victim 
from the paths of virtue. How much like his 
father the devil must be the man who from 
very hate seeks the pollution of the pure, the 
degradation of the virtuous! 



212 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. Or, as is more generally the case, selfishness 
is the motive to injure the character of another. 
It is that he may make another pander to his own 
low and debased principles, that he may make 
another the victim of his own unchaste passions, 
that he " compasses sea and land" to effect the 
work of corruption. He cares not how much suf- 
fering and ruin he may bring, how much happi- 
ness may be blasted, so he may accomplish his sel- 
fish purposes. How intense must be that selfishness, 
how blind to all virtuous principles, which to sub- 
serve its own base ends will sacrifice all that is 
lovely in youth, all that is dignified in manhood, 
and all that is venerable in age ! 

We notice in the next place the manner in which 
this principle of justice in regard to character is 
violated. 

1. It is violated when any efforts are made to cor- 
rupt the imagination or to vitiate the taste of 
another. This is done by exhibiting lascivious pic- 
tures, the creations of salacious imaginations. Or 
it may be accomplished by inducing the person to 
read such works as are adapted to excite the lower 
propensities of our nature. The wicked novels 
which have been temptingly placed in the hands 
of young persons by corrupt booksellers are fraught 
with the worst of consequences, and have served 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



213 



the ignoble and criminal purpose of bringing many 
to ruin. 

2. We effect the ruin of the moral character 
when we make another the minister to our corrupt 
principles ; as, when we bribe a man to commit 
a crime. Many a man, and, alas ! many a woman, 
have prostituted themselves to crime for the sake 
of gain. 

3. The same object is effected by ministering to 
the bad passions or corrupt appetites of others. 
As you minister to a taste already vicious, it 
becomes more vitiated. Minister to the appetite 
for liquors, and you confirm the man in drunkenness. 

4. The character may be injured by weakening 
moral restraints. This is done principally by 
ridicule. The holy associations of home, the 
purifying influence of a pious mother and sweet 
sisters, the teachings of the old family Bible, and 
the sage precepts of an honored and beloved father, 
are alike forgotten amid the ribald and scornful 
jests of ridicule. The teachings of piety, and 
their influence for years around the hearthstone, 
are made to disappear before the jeers of in- 
fidelity and the scoffs of licentiousness. It requires 
a manly nerve, a settled purpose, an unwavering 
attachment to principle, to withstand the " world's 
dread laugh." 



214 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

5. It is a violation of justice to present actual 
temptations to crime, and the stronger the temp- 
tation the greater the injustice. How often is this 
done by men occupying the highest positions ! 
And how few there are who are able to resist! 
There is as much wisdom as piety in the petition, 
"Lead us not into temptation !" 

SECTION III. 

JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION REPUTATION DEFINED CIR- 
CUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT MAY BE LOWERED SLANDER ITS 

TURPITUDE. 

By reputation is meant the estimation in which 
a person is held by the community. The difference 
between reputation and character is this : Character 
is the man's actual condition; reputation is the 
estimation of that condition by others. The cha- 
racter may be good, and the reputation may be 
bad; or the reputation may be good when the 
character is bad. Justice requires that the repu- 
tation always correspond with the character. 
Hence circumstances may exist which may justify 
us in lowering the reputation of another. 

1. When, in order to meet the ends of public 
justice, it is necessary to lower a man's reputation, 
the reputation should be sacrificed rather than 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



215 



that the ends of public justice should not be met. 
Hence it is the duty of every good citizen to see 
that the claims of justice be met, at whatever 
sacrifice of private reputation. 

2. We have the right to lower the reputation 
of another when it is necessary in order to the 
preservation of our own. This is in accordance 
with the law of self-defence, as already laid down. 
We have the right, and it is our duty, to defend 
ourselves by jeoparding the interests of another, 
in so far as he may have jeoparded our interests. 
If you are innocent and another guilty, you have 
the right, and it is your duty, to sacrifice the guilty 
in public estimation, and save yourself. 

3. We have the right, and it is our duty, to bring 
a man into disrepute, when it may be necessary in 
order to save the innocent. This may occur when 
the innocent is about to suffer instead of the guilty, 
whom we know; or it may occur when an in- 
nocent man is about to be corrupted by a vicious 
one. Then it behooves lis to place the virtuous 
man on his guard, by giving him the true character 
of his associate. So far as known to the writer, 
these are all the circumstances in which we are 
justified in lowering the reputation of another. 

Justice, in reference to the reputation, is 
violated by the crime of slander. 



216 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. Slander is committed by reckless conversation, 
in which no regard is shown to the reputation 
of another, 

2. It is committed when we assert as fact what 
is not known to be such, and, consequently, the 
assertion is based entirely upon suspicion. 

3. It is slander when only a part of the truth 
k asserted, and such material part is omitted as 
will cause the assertion to make a false impres- 
sion. 

4. By stating what is really true, but from 
malicious motives, and without any sufficient 
reason of publicity, we incur the guilt of slander. 

5. "We are guilty of slander when we come to a 
conclusion concerning a man's character from one 
wrong act, and then give publicity to it. As, for 
instance, a friend of mine became intoxicated. 
It never occurred but once. For this one unfor- 
tunate act, to have published him as a drunkard 
would have been slander. 

6. Slander is committed by attributing to a man 
a bad motive when the outward act was really good. 
Persons are often guilty of this crime against those 
who give liberally. They admit the outward 
generosity, but attribute it to a bad motive. 

7. Sometimes slander is committed by gossiping, 
talebearing, revealing secrets, etc. 



II U MAN ETHICS, 



217 



8. It is committed by stating the fact, but with 
such a version, or with such an emphasis, as to 
make a false impression. 

9. Slander is committed by giving publicity to 
indefinite rumors, and asserting them as facts. 

10. By coming to conclusions from doubtful 
facts, or by denouncing a man as totally destitute 
of good traits, because of some equivocal acts, the 
guilt of slander is incurred. 

That the crime of slander is one of no little 
magnitude, may be proved by the following argu- 
ments : 

1. It is classed by Him who is too wise to err 
among the crimes of adultery, murder, theft, etc. 
Now the argument is infallible that a crime thus 
classed by the Divine Being must, at least, assimi- 
late in its turpitude to those with which it is thus 
classed. 

2. We argue the baseness of the crime of slander 
from the admitted value of that which is injured. 
Just as we argue the magnitude of the crime of 
murder from the value of human life, so we argue 
the turpitude of slander from the value of repu- 
tation. 

3. Its turpitude is seen in that its tendency is 
evil, and only evil, and that continually. Xeno- 
phon says that at least three persons are injured 

10 



218 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



by slander. 1st. The slanderer is made worse by 
the reflex influence of slander upon his own 
character. 2d. The person to whom the slander 
is told, by as much as he indulges a depraved 
passion in delighting to listen to an exposure of 
the foibles of others. 3d. The person slandered. 

4. Human jurisprudence shows in what light 
slander is held by our law -makers. Slander is 
condemned as a base and ignoble crime, without 
one redeeming trait, and the slanderer is considered 
a vile wretch, deserving universal detestation. 

5. Consider the motives which prompt the 
slander, and it will appear in all its vileness. 
Envy, jealousy, malice, these and other like 
passions, are the motives which prompt to the 
commission of the crime. These passions, so 
unworthy of human nature, set on fire the tongue, 
and cause it to utter words of defamation, which 
in a day may destroy the work of years. The 
slanderer appears to be aware of the vice, and 
seeks to conceal it behind insinuations, innuendoes, 
and spiteful suspicions, all of which have a covert 
tendency to defame, without positively holding 
him responsible to the law for his great crime. 

It has been shown, and we believe the fact is 
admitted, both in law and morals, that the truth 
made public, when there is no necessity for the 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



219 



publicity, may be regarded as slander. It becomes, 
then, a moral question whether there is any differ- 
ence in the crime of slander when it is committed 
by the utterance of truth, and when it is committed 
by the utterance of falsehood. It has been argued 
that the greater the truth, the greater the slander, 
because truth can do more injury to the reputation 
than falsehood. My own view of this subject is 
different. 

1. I argue that when the slander involves a fabri- 
cation, the crime of falsehood is added to that of 
slander. Hence the culprit is involved in two sins, 
instead of one, as in the case where the slanderer 
publishes the truth. 

2. I argue that it exhibits deeper malice for a 
man to originate a falsehood, and then propagate 
it as true, than it does merely to propagate a truth 
which justice demands should not be made public. 

3. A malicious fabrication has no palliation what- 
ever; but & malignant propagation of a truth may 
have the palliation that it is true ; and even in a 
court of justice the truth might be pleaded in 
extenuation of the slander. 

4. Finally, in the case where truth is propagated, 
the slandered party might deserve the injury 
received; but we can imagine no case in which the 
innocent man could suffer justly. 



220 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
SECTION IV. 

JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS PROPERTY — DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT OF 
PROPERTY HOW THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS ACQUIRED THE VARI- 
OUS WAYS IN WHICH IT IS VIOLATED — FRAUD THEFT — ROBBERY 

— RULES THAT SHOULD GOVERN BUYER AND SELLER. 

Property implies value which can be appro- 
priated to individual use. 

The fruits of the earth, and the flesh and skins 
of wild animals slain in the chase, are recognized 
as property in the purely savage state. In the 
nomadic state, flocks and herds and tents are owned 
by individuals, but the land is generally owned in 
common. In the agricultural state, land is owned 
by the cultivators of the soil. 

Property is divided into real and personal : per- 
sonal property is such as can be carried about with 
the person : real property is not regarded as mov- 
able; it consists of land and tenements, and is 
called real estate. 

The right of property implies the right to use 
any thing as I may wish, so that I do not interfere 
with the rights of another. It is controlled by the 
laws of the State ; and property must always be 
held subject to taxation by the State. 

The right of property is also modified by the 
nature of the property owned. Alan has no right to 
use animate property in the same way that he uses 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



221 



inanimate. Man can own animals, but they have 
rights as well as he, and those rights must be 
respected. This is more emphatically the case in 
regard to property in man. Your fellow-man may 
be your slave, and owned as property, but the right 
of ownership is greatly modified by the fact that he 
is your fellow-man. 

That the right of property is sacred, and, with 
the exceptions named, is exclusive, and that conse- 
quently it should be respected, may be established 
by the following considerations: 

1. God has given to every man the desire of 
owning. Hence he must have intended him to 
own property, and of course designed that his 
right should be respected. 

2. The right to property in some form is univer- 
sally acknowledged. This principle obtains even 
in communities where most property is held in 
common. Some things are still set apart as private 
property. This is manifest from the fact that all 
languages have the possessive pronouns mine, 
thine, his, etc. 

3. That this right should be held sacred, may be 
argued, further, from the sad consequences which 
would result to society from its violation. It is 
unnecessary to dwell upon these consequences. 
The destruction of the right of property would be 



222 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

followed by the destruction of our civilization, and 
a return to the grossest barbarism. 

4. The Scriptures teach that the right of pro- 
perty is a sacred right. "Thou shalt not steal," 
"'Thou shalt not covet," are commands which 
clearly indicate in what light the right of property 
is regarded by the infallible Lawgiver. 

The right of property may be acquired, * 

1. By labor. " Thus, game and fish, though they 
be common while at large in the forests or in the 
water, become the property of the person that 
catches them." President Mahan illustrates the 
acquisition of property by labor, by supposing the 
following case : "We meet a man with a bucket of 
water. The water has just been drawn from a well, 
or dipped from a fountain. To do this required 
labor. Hence, while we consider the water in the 
fountain as free, we regard that in the bucket as 
private property. 

2. The right of property may be acquired by 
gift. "When a person owns property, and volun- 
tarily transfers it to another without an equivalent, 
it becomes the property of the one to whom it is 
transferred. He is said to acquire the same right 
as that possessed by the original owner, by virtue 
of the transfer. 

3. By inheritance. When a parent or other 



U U M A N ETHICS. 



223 



relative dies, without a will, the laws of the State 
decide to whom the property shall descend. 

4. By will. When a man of sound mind dies, 
he is granted the privilege of determining the direc- 
tion of his property. The laws generally secure to 
the person to whom the property is left by the will 
of the deceased, the same right which had been 
possessed by the deceased. 

5. By exchange. When two persons agree to 

a mutual transfer, an exchange of property is 

effected, and each acquires the right originally 

possessed by the other. 
« 

6. By prescription. When an individual has 
had long and undisputed possession of property, 
and when no one comes forward to dispute the pos- 
session, or to present a better claim, the property 
becomes his by right of prescription. It will be 
seen that these different modes of acquiring pro- 
perty are regulated by the^civil laws, and are of 
course modified by those laws; Consequently, a 
man is bound to hold his property amenable to the 
laws of the State. 

We notice in what manner the right of property 
is violated. Justice requires that we permit every 
man to remain in the unmole-sted enjoyment of the 
property to which he has the right. This principle 
is violated, 



224 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. "Whenever a man desires to possess the pro- 
perty of another, without being willing to give 
a just equivalent for it. 

2. The right of property is violated by taking 
advantage of another's ignorance, and getting his 
property at less than its real value. 

3. It is violated by taking advantage of a man's 
necessities, and thereby obtaining his property for 
less than its value. 

4. The right of property is violated by using 
unjust means to induce a person to buy or sell his 
property. By appealing to one's fears, to his pride, 
his ambition, or his vanity, and thereby inducing 
him to part with his property for less than its 
worth, or to purchase property for more than its 
worth, you do him an injustice, and violate his 
right of property. In a word, you appeal to some 
weak point in order to cheat him out of his money, 
if you wish to sell, or out of his property, if you are 
the purchaser. 

5. The right of property is violated when the 
equivalent offered is not what you represent it to 
be. A man may make a shrewd trade, and get 
property for half its value, by making a false 
impression in reference to the equivalent which he 
offers, but he cannot have correct notions of justice 
or of truth. 



II U M A N ETHICS. 



225 



6. When donations are obtained under false pre- 
tences, it is a violation of the right of property. 
Here, it is true, no equivalent is offered, but by a 
false representation the generosity of another is 
aroused, and he is influenced to give, when, had all 
the facts been known, he would not have done so. 

7. When an individual, or a number of individ- 
uals, monopolize some necessary of life, and are 
thus able to extort extravagant prices, the right of 
property is violated. 

In short, all cheating, double-dealing, all viola- 
tion of contracts, all failing to pay debts, all eva- 
sions of law in order to avoid payment, are 
regarded as a violation of pure morality, as they all 
ignore human rights. 

We have thus far given examples of the violation 
of the right of property by fraud. It is also violated 
by theft. 

By theft is meant the taking of the property of 
another without his consent, in a clandestine man- 
ner, and when it is supposed that his consent would 
not be given, were he aware of the existence of the 
desire to possess the property. Such is theft ; and 
whether practiced by the rude boy, who stealthily 
enters his neighbor's orchard, and steals his fruit; 
or by the youthful collegian, who enters, un- 
der the cover of a dark night, some defenceless 
10* 



226 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

poultry-yard, and steals a turkey; or by the man 
of mature years, who creeps into the stable, and 
steals a horse ; or into the store, and seizes mer- 
chandise; or with false keys enters the "strong 
box," and fills his pockets with money; it is 
stealing, a violation of God's command, and a reck- 
less disregard of another's rights. 

Again, the right of property is violated by 
robbery, or by the taking of the property of 
another with his consent violently obtained. 
"Your money or your life," is the cry of the 
highwayman, and one or the other must be for- 
feited. The crime has no advocates, and is 
universally detested. 

In closing this section, we notice the rules that 
should govern the buyer and seller. 

1. The buyer is bound to give a full equivalent 
for the article bought. 

2. The buyer is bound to use no improper influ- 
ence to cause the seller to take less than the regular 
market price. All such efforts to reduce the price 
of goods as are sometimes resorted to by the 
purchaser, are unworthy an honest man. 

1. The seller is bound to offer the article at the 
market value. 

2. He is bound to give a correct and honest 
statement of the quality of his goods. 



HUMAN ETII ICS. 



227 



3. He is bound to use no improper influence to 
cause another to buy ; he must not, by flattery or 
any form of deception, induce another to purchase 
his goods. 

SECTION V. 

JUSTICE AS IT REGARDS BELIEF — WHAT TS MEANT BY JUSTICE IN KE- 
" FERENCE TO BELIEF VERACITY — LOGICAL TRUTH MORAL TRUTH 

paley's theory: objections to paley's theory. 

Justice in regard to the belief of another requires 
that we should not cause him to believe to be true 
what is known to be false ; justice here requires 
conformity to truth, or, in other words, it involves 
the law of veracity. 

Veracity or truth is divided into two kinds — 
logical, speculative, or physical truth, and moral 
truth. Logical truth is, when the words conform 
exactly to the reality of things as they exist. Moral 
truth consists in the conformity of our words to our 
opinions ; consequently, a statement may be logi- 
cally true, and morally untrue ; or it may be 
morally true, and logically untrue. When the 
statement conforms to the opinion of the person 
making it, but not to the reality of the thing itself, 
it is morally true, but logically untrue. The only 
criminality that can attach to such statement, 



228 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

arises from the want of proper caution in making 
the statement. An investigation as thorough as 
possible should be made, before risking a statement. 
Sometimes sad consequences have resulted from 
honest statements which, having been made with- 
out sufficient examination, have proved to be false. 
"When the statement conforms to the reality, but 
not to our opinion of the reality, it is logically true, 
but morally untrue. Here the crime is that of 
falsehood; as the person intended deception, and 
actually spoke the truth without intending it. 
When the statement conforms to our opinion and 
to the reality, then it is both morally and physically 
true. 

The obligations to veracity are shown by the fol- 
lowing facts : 

1. The relations established by God between 
man and man — relations of mutual dependence and 
reciprocity — indicate most clearly that we are under 
obligations to tell the truth. 

2. The dignity of human nature indicates the 
same thing. No greater indignity or dishonor can 
be done to a man, than is done by an attempt to 
deceive him. In the language of Hickok, "It is 
an assumption that he is but a thing, to whom no 
respect is due, but who may be made the sport of 
delusions without indignity/ ' 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



229 



8. The countless evils resulting from deception 
show the obligation to avoid falsehood, and always 
to tell the truth. 

4. The obligation to tell the truth is shown by 
the character of the motives to deception. They are 
always of a low order, such as cowardice, selfishness, 
covetousness, etc. 

5. The obligation to tell the truth is clearly and 
forcibly expressed in the word of God. "Ye shall 
not steal nor lie." "Lie not one to another." 
"Speak every man truth with his neighbor." 

The law of veracity binds us to speak according 
to the exact relations of our intelligence to those 
subjects in reference to which our communications 
are made ; that is, we should honestly intend, in all 
our communications to others, to make our words 
correspond with perfect exactness to the ideas or 
opinions which we entertain of the subjects of con- 
versation. And, on the other hand, the law binds 
you not to intend to deceive others, in the commu- 
nications which you make to them. This is the 
law ; and now the question arises, Is all intentional 
deception criminal? Or, in other words, is all 
intentional deception a lie ? 

Paley answers this question in the negative. He 
says : "A falsehood is not a lie when no one is 
deceived." By this he means, that a falsehood is 



230 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

not criminal unless deception is actually practiced. 
To this we have several objections. 

1. According to Paley, the criminality of lying 
does not depend upon the intention of the person 
uttering the falsehood, but upon the capacity of 
another to detect the deception ; that is, he trans- 
fers the criminality from the intention of the person 
telling the falsehood, to the intellect of the person 
to whom it is told. The falsehood is a lie if told 
to a weak or credulous person, but is not a lie if 
told to one of sufficient sagacity not to allow him- 
self to be deceived. 

2. We object to this view, because it involves the 
absurdity that the same person, for the same act 
and at the same time, may be regarded as a liar and 
not a liar, as true and false, as innocent and guilty. 
"With the same intention to deceive, he makes the 
same statement to two different persons, at the 
same time: one is deceived, and the other is not 
deceived. In reference to one, he is innocent ; in 
reference to the other, he is guilty. He is con- 
demned, because one is credulous ; he is innocent, 
because the other is sagacious. 

3. The third objection to this view is, that when 
a man has lied so often as to lose all character for 
truth, he becomes incapable, by his very depravity, 
of practicing deception, and is, consequently, no 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



231 



longer guilty of crime. He never deceives, unless 
it is when lie tells the truth ; and as, according to 
Dr. Paley, there is no lie except where deception is 
practiced, it would follow that an habitual liar is 
only guilty of lying when he tells the truth ; for it 
is certain that such characters never deceive by 
indulging the habit of falsehood ; they are too well 
known to deceive any one. And is it not absurd 
to acquit a man of guilt simply because his con- 
tinued depravity prevents his accomplishing his 
object? 

Dr. Paley says that a falsehood is not a lie when 
the person to whom the communication is made 
has no right to know the truth. This theory is 
liable to the same objection as the former. It does 
not make the guilt depend upon the intention of 
the person telling the falsehood, but upon the right 
of the other to know the truth. Such methods of 
determining guilt cannot be recognized in any sys- 
tem of pure morality. We must look to the prin- 
ciples, to the intention of the person, and not to 
the rights of another. It is true that we are not 
bound to tell a man the truth who has no right to 
know it, for we need not open our mouths: we 
can keep silence. This we have a perfect right to 
do, and surely it is much more commendable than 
falsehood. 



232 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Malian says that a falsehood is not a lie where 
no confidence is reposed. He illustrates the prin- 
ciple by the deception which General Washington 
practiced on General Clinton during the w^ar of the 
Revolution. He says that here no confidence was 
reposed, and hence no guilt incurred. That Wash- 
ington was not guilty we admit, but that the 
principle is a sound one we doubt. In some cases, 
such as the one mentioned, it will hold good, but 
in by far the majority of cases the principle is a 
very bad one. According to Mahan's theory, a 
man has only so to conduct himself as to lose the 
confidence of the community, in order to enable 
him to lie with impunity. A man, then, who has 
forfeited your confidence by continuous lying, can 
utter as many falsehoods as his wicked heart may 
dictate, without incurring any guilt of lying. 

I hold that there is no general principle that can 
justify falsehood. The general principle is to tell 
the truth, and there may be particular instances in 
which a departure from this general principle is 
allowed. 

1. It is not, in certain circumstances, a lie to 
deceive a lunatic ; though I hold it to be best in the 
main to tell the truth even to a lunatic. A mili- 
tary officer visited his brother, who was a lunatic, 
and confined in an asylum : his room was in the 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



233 



third story of the building. The officer happened 
to be dressed in his uniform, and was armed with 
sword and pistols. The lunatic was pleased to see 
his brother, was delighted with his uniform, and 
very earnestly solicited that the entire dress, pistols 
and all, might be placed upon his person. The 
officer had no sooner granted the request, than the 
unfortunate lunatic, with frantic madness, ordered 
him to leap from the window to the ground, or he 
would shoot him. The officer quietly replied, that 
he could perform a much more wonderful feat than 
that : he could go down and leap up. The lunatic 
was deceived, the life of the officer was saved, and 
no guilt was incurred. 

2. A man, in particular cases, where there is no 
violation of some great principle, may practice 
deception to save his life. In cases where principle 
is violated, as in the cases of the Christian martyrs, 
deception is never admissible. 

3. When no great moral principle is violated, 
deception may be practiced to save one's country. 
This covers the case of "Washington. Had decep- 
tion been practiced under the protection of a flag 
of truce, his case would have been different, and 
he would have incurred the odium of the civilized 
world. 

The great and safe principle of veracity is, 



234 ELEMENTS OE MOKAL PHILOSOPHY. 

never to practice deception, either in jest or 
earnest, except in particular instances which rarely 
occur. 

SECTION VI. 

SINCERITY AND FIDELITY HOW SINCERITY IS VIOLATED SELF-AGGRAN- 
DIZEMENT SELF-ABASEMENT FLATTERY HYPOCRISY — MENTAL 

RESERVATION — EQUIVOCATION — EXAGGERATION AND EXTENUATION 

FALSE IMPRESSIONS IGNORANT ASSERTIONS LYING PROMISES : 

WHEN NOT BINDING — CONTRACTS. 

Moral truth is divided into two kinds : veracity 
in respect to the past and present, and veracity in 
respect to the future. The former is called sin- 
cerity, and the latter fidelity. Consequently, sin- 
cerity consists in stating a thing as we suppose it 
to exist or to have existed, and fidelity consists 
in the keeping of our word, or compliance with 
our promises. 

Sincerity is violated in several ways : 

1. By self-aggrandizement or arrogance. In this 
we are guilty of boasting and of representing 
ourselves to be greater than we are. Such in- 
sincerity is at once contemptible and wicked. 

2. Sincerity is violated by self-abasement, or 
pretended humility. It is often the case that 
persons disparage themselves, not because they 



HUMAN ETHICS. 235 

feel unworthy, but with the hope of elevating 
themselves in the estimation of others. 

3. Sincerity is violated by flattery — by endeavor- 
ing to puff up another with the idea that he pos- 
sesses merits of which he is destitute. The words 
of flattery fall upon the ear like the sweetest tones 
of music ; they drop like new honey, they flow like 
oil. They deceive, they charm, they destroy. The 
flatterer is the embodiment of obsequiousness and 
the impersonation of hypocrisy, a sinner against 
the dignity of human nature, and an infamous en- 
courager of pride and vanity. He speaks without 
sincerity, panders to a morbid and vitiated taste, 
deceives without remorse, and glories in his shame, 

4. Sincerity is violated by hypocrisy. This is 
acting rather than speaking a lie. It consists in a 
man's assuming a character which does not belong 
to him, in acting a part, in expressing by speech, 
habit, and action, not his own character, but that of 
him whom he undertakes to represent. He is a base 
counterfeit, a walking cheat, a living, moving, act- 
ing lie. 

5. Sincerity is violated by mental reservation. In 
this the person withholds something that materi- 
ally affects a statement, and which, if disclosed, 
would essentially change its import. " Mental re- 
servations,' ' says Thorn well, "when what is sup- 



286 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

pressed is not obvious from the circumstances, 
and it is necessary to prevent deception, are down- 
right lies. It is only where what is suppressed is 
essential to the truth, and is suppressed for the pur- 
pose of deceit, that the reservation comes under the 
censure of the moralist.' ' 

6. Sincerity is violated by equivocation. When a 
word is used which is understood in one sense by the 
person making the communication, and known to 
be understood in a different sense by the person to 
whom the communication is made, it is called equi- 
vocal, and the person so using it is guilty of equivo- 
cation. As an example, we may give the case of 
the collegian, who, being asked his excuse for ab- 
sence from recitation, answered, " Indisposed/ ' He 
was guilty of fraud which deserved rebuke. 

7. Sincerity is violated by telling only a part of 
the truth, when you profess to tell the whole truth, 
and that with the intention of inducing a false 
judgment. The same insincerity is manifest when 
some facts are magnified and others extenuated 
with the same object in view. 

8. Sincerity is violated when real facts are so 
arranged as to make false impressions upon the 
hearer, and with the design of making false im- 
pressions. 

9. Sincerity is violated when a statement is made, 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



237 



the truth of which is not known or sincerely be- 
lieved. 

10. It is violated, finally, when the statement 
made is known to be false. This is lying, and 
should be universally denounced. 

Thus have we shown the principal forms in 
which sincerity is violated, and we have done this 
with a strong desire to guard against an evil 
which is wide-spread, and whose turpitude is com- 
pared to the basest crimes by which our humanity 
can be polluted. 

As sincerity respects the past and present, so 
fidelity respects the future. We have seen that 
human character is utterly destitute of virtue if it 
lack a sacred regard for truth. We will now pro- 
ceed to consider the law of veracity in reference 
to fidelity, which involves the philosophy of duty 
in reference to promises and contracts. 

I. Promises. 

By a promise is meant the making or the endea- 
voring to make the impression upon the mind of 
another that you will do or not do something 
which is intimated by words or gestures. 

The great rule in reference to the promise is 
that it must be fulfilled as it is known to be un- 
derstood by the person to whom the promise is 
made. To promise, and not to fulfil the promise, 



238 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is deception, and hence Dr. Paley defines a lie to 
be a "breach, of promise." 

To promise, and not to perform the promise, 
as it was known to be understood by the pro- 
misee, is deception, if possible, more reprehensible 
than a bold breach of faith. For example, the 
Romans promised an opposing army that they 
would abstain from all injury for forty days; 
and went by night and plundered the camp of 
the enemy. Their excuse was, they had promised 
to abstain from injury for so many days, but said 
nothing about the nights. "" Temures promised 
the garrison of Sebastia that if they would sur- 
render, no blood should be shed. Upon this pro- 
mise they surrendered, and Temures buried them 
all alive." Now both these were cruel violations 
of promises, as they were known to be understood 
by the promisees. Nor does it mitigate the crime 
to say that the Romans and Temures carried out 
their promises as they understood them, and as they 
intended at the time of making them. 

Still, there are circumstances in which the pro- 
miser may be freed from the performance of his 
promise. 

1. The promiser is not bound to fulfil his pro- 
mise when it would be unlawful .or sinful for him 
to perform it. No man can bring himself under 



HUMAN ETHICS. 239 

obligation to do a sinful act. It can never be a 
man's duty to commit sin. The error is in making 
the promise. But it is impossible to incur guilt by 
refusing to do wrong. This, in the language of 
Wayland, would be to suppose a man guilty for not 
being guilty, which is absurd. 

2. The promise is not binding w T hen it is impos- 
sible to fulfil it. If a man promises to meet another 
at a certain time and place, and in the meantime is 
prostrated by sickness, he is not culpable for failing 
to fulfil his promise. If, however, the promiser 
knew that he was making a promise which he could 
not fulfil, he is culpable for making the promise, 
but is not to be blamed for failing in the perform- 
ance of that which is impossible. But suppose the 
promiser create the impossibility. In that case, the 
guilt attaches to him for putting difficulties in the 
way of duty, and hence he is held responsible for a 
violation of his promise. 

3. A promise is not binding when the promiser 
has been released from it by the promisee. This 
release may be honorably sought, and properly 
granted, and then no guilt is incurred. If, how- 
ever, the release is sought and obtained by improper 
means, the promise is still binding, and the pro- 
miser incurs guilt in its violation. 

4. When a promise has been violently extorted, it 



240 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is not binding, unless it would have been right to 
make the promise without the violence. 

5. A promise made to a maniac is not believed to 
be binding. 

6. When the promise is made upon conditions 
found afterward not to exist, it is not binding. As, 
for example, if I promise money to one who pro- 
fesses to be an agent for a benevolent institution, 
and afterward learn that he is an impostor, I am 
liberated from my promise. 

II. Contracts. 

By contract is meant a mutual promise. A pro- 
mise binds one party : a contract binds two parties. 
Hence it is an agreement to do or to neglect to do 
something for a consideration. The general prin- 
ciples that control promises control contracts also. 
In view, however, of the slight difference between a 
promise and a contract, there are a few special prin- 
ciples which are applicable only to contracts. 

1. When one party to a contract fails to perform 
his part, as a general rule the other is released. In 
the case of the marriage contract, however, except 
for actual infidelity, the one party is not released by 
the failure of the other. The husband may violate 
his contract to be affectionate, attentive, devoted, 
and yet, unless he is guilty of adultery, the wife is 
bound still to fulfil her part of the contract. 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



241 



2. When a person for a bribe already received 
contracts to do some wickedness, lie is not bound to 
fulfil the contract; for he cannot bind himself to do 
wrong. His duty in this case is to return the money 
for which he had contracted to do the wrong. It is 
said of Lord Bacon that when he was Chancellor 
he received many bribes, but always decided the 
cases, not according to contract, but according to 
law and equity. Had he returned the money, it 
would have been evidence of his conviction of guilt, 
and of his determination to be just; but his retain- 
ing the money made him universally odious, and 
proved his ruin. 

Vows are promises made with great solemnity to 
Almighty God. The same principles apply to them 
as to promises and contracts. 

SECTION VII. 

OATHS : THE JUDICIAL OATH — OFFICIAL OATH — LEGALITY OF OATHS — 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF OATHS — PERJURY .* ITS TURPITUDE. 

Oaths are of two kinds, judicial and official. 

By the judicial oath is meant the oath taken by 

the individual " to tell the truth, the whole truth, 

and nothing but the truth,' ' under the severe 

penalty of the forfeiture of the Divine favor, if 

the truth be not told, and it consequently closes 

with the words, "So help me God." 
11 



242 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The official oath is the solemn affirmation of the 
man, that all the duties connected with his office 
shall be fulfilled faithfully, to the best of his ability, 
under the same penalty as that connected with the 
violation of the judicial oath. 

Dymond, in his Essays on Morality, opposes the 
morality, and hence the legality, of oaths. We 
therefore offer the following arguments in support 
of both their morality and legality. 

1. The Divine Being binds himself by the solem- 
nities of an oath: "I have sworn by myself, the 
word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, 
and shall not return." Isaiah xlv. 23. "For I 
have sworn by myself, saith the Lord, that Bozrah 
shall become a desolation." Jeremiah xlix. 13. 
" The Lord God hath sworn by himself, saith the 
Lord the God of hosts, I abhor the excellency of 
Jacob, and hate his palaces." Amos vi. 8. 

2. Christ upon his trial answered upon oath 
when interrogated by the high-priest, thus giving 
his sanction to the oath. "And the high -priest 
answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by the 
living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the 
Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him, 
Thou hast said." Matt. xxvi. 63, 64. 

3. The apostles frequently placed themselves 
under the solemnities of an oath: "Moreover I call 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



243 



God for a record upon my soul, that to spare 
you I came not as yet unto Corinth." 2 Cor. i. 23. 
" God is my record, how greatly I long after you." 
Phil. i. 8. " For neither at any time used we 
flattering words, as ye know, nor a cloak of covet- 
ousness; God is witness." 1 Thess. ii. 5. In 
reply to these arguments it has been quoted, 
" Swear not at all." " Let your communication be 
yea, yea ; nay, nay ; for whatever is more than these 
cometh of evil." It is obvious to the mind of the 
writer, as it is to the universal mind, with the 
exception of certain small sects of Christians, that 
these passages refer to profane oaths used in 
ordinary conversation, and not to the judicial oath. 
To have the conversation interlarded with profane 
oaths, is as unworthy of man as it is dishonoring 
to God. But the judicial oath is in no respect 
similar, and is perfectly consistent with the purest 
morality. 

The philosophy of oaths appears to be this : the 
state needs the solemn sanctions of the oath in 
order to arrive at the truth, and thereby mete out 
justice. It is a humiliating fact, that men will lie — 
at least, they have been known to lie — when their 
interest may be secured by falsehood. It then 
becomes the interest of society, and the duty of 
the state, to make it their highest interest to tell 



244 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the truth. This is believed to be done by the 
administration of the oath. The phrase, " So help 
me God," implies two things. 1st. It implies an 
earnest prayer to God for help, to deliver us from 
the power of temptation, and to enable us, in the 
midst of our weakness and our proneness to err, 
to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth." 2d. It implies the imprecation of 
Divine desertion, if we do not speak the truth : 
that is, So help me God only as I speak the truth, 
and if I speak not the truth, I agree to an eternal 
forfeiture of the Divine favor. In what a fearful 
position of responsibility the individual is placed 
to whom the oath is administered, is at once seen. 
He is brought into the very presence of God ; he 
makes him his witness, puts his soul in jeopardy 
in such manner as to exclude all levity, as to fore- 
stall all disposition to prevaricate, as to excite the 
deepest solemnity, drive away all heedlessness and 
carelessness, and impress the mind the most deeply 
with the majesty of truth. It is here made the 
highest interest to tell the truth. Time and 
eternity blend all their interests, for the truth must 
be told, or life, honor, fortune, reputation- — in 
short, all that is included in the Divine favor will 
be forfeited. 

When truth is violated under oath, the crime 



HUMAN ETHICS. 245 

is called perjury. The considerations that deter- 
mine the turpitude of the crime of perjury are the 
following : 

1. The very strong and solemn obligations which 
are violated by the perjured man exhibit, to some 
extent, the fearfulness of his crime. These obli- 
gations to tell the truth are voluntarily assumed 
when he takes the oath. 

2. Perjury is the grossest insult and the most 
impious defiance that can possibly be offered to 
Almighty God. It is the worst form of blasphemy, 
the more heinous as it is attended with the greater 
solemnity; and it is the highest irreverence of 
which man can be guilty. 

3. Perjury is universally ranked among the worst 
of crimes, and this universal voice is strong proof 
of its turpitude. It is a deliberate crime. It is also 
a most reckless crime. The dignity of human 
nature, the nobleness of truth, and the honor of 
God, are alike disregarded by him who dares to 
stain his soul with the crime of perjury, 

"We have but one more remark to make in 
reference to oaths. They should never be adminis- 
tered except on important occasions. The too 
frequent administration of oaths causes them to 
lose that solemn force which they are designed to 



240 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

have. This remark is especially true in reference 
to the oath of office. This oath is administered to 
every village postmaster, and to other officers 
whose entire duties are scarcely worth the adminis- 
tration of oaths. And it is well known that 
they are frequently administered to be broken. 



SECTION VIII. 
benevolence: positive duties which we owe to MAN — PROOFS 

THAT WE SHOULD PERFORM THOSE DUTIES. 

As the duties of justice require us to refrain 
from injuring others, so the duties of benevolence 
require us to do good to others. The former are 
negative duties ; the latter are positive. The duties 
of benevolence involve not only the desire for the 
good of others, but the actual putting forth of such 
efforts and the performing of such actions as may 
promote the good of others. It is benevolence in 
action, energetic, zealous action, that is the duty 
of man to his fellow -man. That such is man's 
duty may be established by the following argu- 
ments : 

1. All men need the benevolence of others. 
No man, in whatever position, is independent of 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



247 



his fellow-man. All have kindred wants, and are 
alike liable to disappointment, suffering, and death. 
If then all are liable to stand in need of benevolent 
acts from others, they should readily bestow them 
upon others. 

2. As all men are liable to need acts of benevo- 
lence, so no man lives who has not, at some time 
or other, been the recipient of such acts. In the 
years of helpless infancy, if at no other period, acts 
of kindness have been received, and therefore all 
should feel bound to bestow them. 

3. It is a strong argument in favor of active 
benevolence, that the act of kindness has a reflex 
influence. It blesses the man that performs it. 
It is more blessed to give than to receive. Its 
tendency is to the destruction of selfishness, and 
to the promotion of a noble and enlarged philan- 
thropy. The luxury of a good, of a benevolent 
action, is the highest luxury. 

4. The example of benevolence is found in the 
character and the acts of God. Our lives give 
constant exhibitions of his benevolence. The 
warmth and light of the sun, the pleasantness and 
variety of the seasons, the successions of day and 
night, the blessings of health, food, and raiment, 
the beauty of the heavens, the fertility of the earth, 
the interchanges of thought and feeling by means 



248 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of language, the pleasures of social intercourse, 
the capacity for grasping truth, and for improve- 
ments in the arts and sciences, the light of Divine 
revelation, and the peace and comfort afforded by 
the remedial dispensation, are all evidences that 
our Father in heaven is benevolent. If then we 
wish to be godlike — and surely we can have no 
higher aspiration — let us be benevolent. 

5. We are taught still more forcibly the same 
lesson by the example of Him who "went about 
doing good." The most beautiful example of be- 
nevolence is found in the character of Jesus Christ. 
Men can see and feel the force of this example, for 
Jesus was a man. As man, he indulges the holiest 
sympathies, weeps over the sorrowing, and claims 
brotherhood with the afflicted. We may admire, 
adore, and worship him as God. But it is as man, 
as a sharer of our nature and a partaker of our 
sorrows, as shedding tears for our woes and sym- 
pathizing with our infirmities, that he is brought 
into closest communion with us, and by his 
benevolent example claims the exercise of bene- 
volence toward all that suffer. 

6. It is the command of God that we exercise 
benevolence. The second great commandment of 
the law is this, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself :" a precept most beautifully illustrated in 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



249 



the example of the good Samaritan. Luke x. 25- 
37. We are, moreover, required to do good to them 
that hate us, and of course, by the stronger reason, 
to all others. The great test of discipleship in the 
last day will be this: "I was an hungered, and ye 
gave me meat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me 
drink ; I was a stranger, and ye took me in ; naked, 
and ye clothed me : I was sick, and ye visited me : 
I was in prison, and ye came unto me." Matt, 
xxv. 35, 36. 

SECTION IX. 

THE PROPER OBJECTS OF BENEVOLENCE — THE POOR — SICK — UNFORTU- 
NATE — AFFLICTED — IGNORANT — DEPRAVED. 

1. The poor. Our duty to the poor is to bestow 
charity, in such a way as not to encourage indolence. 
But to help the poor, to give them employment, to 
encourage them by rewards to improve their con- 
dition, and to afford them gratuitous supplies of 
such necessaries of life as they are unable to obtain, 
are duties which we must not neglect. To supply 
them with fuel, with clothing, with food, and with 
some of the comforts of a dwelling, to protect them 
from the inclement weather, is a duty which the 
benevolent readily perform, either with or without 
requiring labor, as the poor may or may not be 

able to perform it. 
11* 



250 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. The sick. When man is prostrated by sick- 
ness, helpless as an infant, unable to help himself 
to a cup of water, tortured with the indescribable 
agonies of disease, he claims our sympathy, and 
appeals loudly to our benevolence. 

3. The unfortunate. "When persons are suffering 
from sudden and fearful calamities, it is required by 
the law of benevolence that we seek to lighten the 
force of the blow, to alleviate the sufferings occa- 
sioned by it, to stanch their wounds, and if possible 
cause them, by our acts of kindness and our genial 
charities, to forget the severe losses which have 
befallen them. 

4. The afflicted. Bereavements crush and over- 
whelm the spirit, they sadden the heart, and fill 
the bosom with irrepressible grief. ]STo sight is 
more pitiable than that of a mother bewailing her 
first-born, or of a father in stern and mature man- 
hood bathing with his tears the lifeless body of the 
loved and lost. "It is better to go to the house of 
mourning than to the house of feasting." At 
such time a kind look, a word of sympathy, some 
delicate attention, a letter of condolence, may do 
much to soften the affliction, to soothe the grief, 
and to impart consolation and peace to hearts 
almost broken. 

5. The ignorant. To those who are suffering 



11 U M AN E T 11 1 C S . 251 

from ignorance, it is the duty of benevolence to 
offer knowledge. Common schools should be 
established, teachers should be sent abroad in the 
land, institutions of a high grade should be erected, 
and every effort should be made to dissipate the 
darkness of ignorance by the light of truth. A 
powerful instrumentality, in this work of benevo- 
lence, is the Sabbath -school. In this most of us 
can become teachers, and can afford opportunities 
of instruction to those who must otherwise remain 
in the region and shadow of death. 

6. The depraved. Depravity always brings suf- 
fering, for a greater than man hath said, " The way 
of transgressors is hard." Benevolence to the 
wicked requires us to seek their reformation. Here 
is a wide and inviting field for usefulness, and into 
it all may enter and labor. 

1. The reformation of the wicked is to be sought 
by an example of blameless purity. In this all 
may participate. To influence one to virtue, by 
setting an example of moral goodness, is a work 
which well becomes our humanity, as indeed it is 
not unworthy of an angel. The exhibition of a 
meek and quiet spirit, of undissembled humility, of 
faultless candor, of sincere honesty, and of deep 
and earnest piety, will serve to draw men from sin 
to virtue with more than magnetic force. 



252 ELEMENTS 0E MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. We are to seek their reformation by precept. 
The mild reproof, the faithful warning, the fearless 
exposure of the turpitude of sin, the earnest call to 
duty, all emanating from a benevolent heart, may 
arouse fears and hopes and resolves which may 
restore the profligate to purity and virtue. In 
seeking by this means to effect reformation, mild- 
ness should blend with firmness, courage with 
humility, and earnestness with affection. 

3. We can effect this noble work, ofteu, by direct- 
ing the mind to good books. As bad books are 
corrupting, good books are purifying in their 
nature. The unpretending tract, the biography of 
some good man, some such work as Nelson on Infi- 
delity, and above all the Bible, may do what both 
example and precept may have failed to accom- 
plish. 

4. The reformation of the wicked may be accom- 
plished by presenting to them examples of good 
men. Such characters of moral excellence as Paul, 
as "Wesley, as Howard, as Jonathan Edwards, may 
be the means of leading the erring from the error 
of his way, and of causing him to enter upon a new 
course of life. The influence of such models of 
exalted virtue can never die. Let it ever be 
brought to bear upon those who, though they may 
give evidences of the deepest corruption, still are 

9 



HUMAN ETHICS. 253 

not incorrigible, and may yet become bright and 
shining lights. 

SECTION X. 

BENEVOLENCE TO THE INJURIOUS THE DOCTRINE OF FORGIVENESS — 

WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES BENEVOLENCE TO THOSE WHO ARE 

SLANDERED — MANNER OF BESTOWING BENEVOLENCE. 

We will now notice the duty of benevolence to 
the injurious. 

" Take heed to yourselves : if thy brother trespass 
against thee, rebuke him ; and if he repent, forgive 
him. And if he trespass against thee seven times 
in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to 
thee, saying, I repent, thou shalt forgive him." 
Luke xvii. 3, 4. 

I do not think that unconditional forgiveness of 
injuries is required by the law of God. On con- 
dition, however, that the injurious person repents, 
we are never to refuse forgiveness. " If thy 
brother repent, forgive him. ,, We expect to obtain 
forgiveness on condition of our repentance, and 
we are required to forgive on the same condition. 
The repentance should be as public as the act 
of injury. 

That this view of the subject is correct, will 
appear from the nature of forgiveness. When we 



254 ELEMENTS OF MOllAL PHILOSOPHY. 

forgive a man, we no longer liold him guilty of the 
injury. But we cannot regard the man innocent 
who continues his course of injury, or who fails to 
make the reparation involved in repentance. Sup- 
pose a man slanders you, and will make no repara- 
tion for the injury done: can you forgive him as 
long as he continues his injurious course? 

Our Heavenly Father has set us the example. 
He requires us to repent before we can expect for- 
giveness; and he presents that method as an 
example for us. "We are to forgive as we expect 
forgiveness. We expect forgiveness only on con- 
dition of repentance ; consequently, we are to forgive 
only on the same condition. To withhold forgive- 
ness after repentance, would be cruelty to another ; 
to bestow it before it was asked, would be unjust to 
one's self. 

Having thus shown on what condition forgive- 
ness of injuries is to be bestowed, we proceed 
to the consideration of the entire treatment toward 
the injurious required by benevolence. 

1. We are to show a spirit willing to forgive 
at any time that the injurious person may ask for- 
giveness. The exhibition of this spirit is taught by 
our Saviour, when he requires his disciples not only 
to forgive seven times, but seventy times seveu. 

2. By as much as the man's conduct is vicious, 



HUMAN ETHICS. 



255 



we are to exercise toward him compassion, and to 
seek if possible his reformation. 

3. You are to love your enemy. This love is to 
be discriminating. It is not to equal the love you 
have to your benefactor ; but you are to love him 
so well as to do him no harm, and so well as to do 
him all the good you can. 

4. You must ever return good for evil. This is 
godlike. It requires a lofty spirit, a manly unsel- 
fishness, and a heavenly meekness, to be able to 
repress all anger and wrath, to subdue revenge, or 
to overcome even those natural feelings of resent- 
ment which rise up against those who have injured 
us. It is an exhibition of the moral sublime, 
when man, injured in person, defrauded of pro- 
perty, or deprived of his good name, is found with 
a sweet spirit doing good to his enemy, praying for 
the one that despitefully used him and persecuted 
him, and blessing him from whom he received 
nothing but injuries and curses. 

The duty of benevolence to those who are slan- 
dered demands a brief notice. 

1. Benevolence teaches us to go forward and 
seek to rescue the slandered person from the unjust 
infamy under which he is suffering. We are too 
prone to pursue the opposite course. "When a man 
begins to lose the high position which he once held, 



256 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and his good name begins to suffer from the in- 
famous tongue of slander, we are too apt to join 
" the hungry pack" that are so eager in the chase, 
2. "We should show our appreciation of the 
character of the innocent man, by ever treating 
him with the greatest respect, manifesting for him 
our sympathy, and exhibiting to him our con- 
fidence. 

Before closing the discussion of our positive 
duties, we offer a few thoughts on the manner in 
which they should all be discharged. 

1. They should be performed with as little show 
as possible. 

2. Our acts of benevolence must be discrimina- 
tive in their character : thus, if two persons claim 
our benevolence, and we are under obligations to 
one and not to the other, we should ever prefer the 
former. So we should always select the most 
worthy. The members of a man's household have 
the first claims to his benevolence. 

3. Our acts of benevolence should be as much 
individual acts as possible. We should perform 
them ourselves, not merely by means of societies 
or associations for benevolent purposes. 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



257 



CHAPTER IV. 

POLITICAL ETHICS. 
SECTION I. 

NECESSITY OF HUMAN GOVERNMENT — OWNERSHIP OP PROPERTY — TITLE 
OP PROPERTY TO BE ADJUDICATED — BIBLE VIEW OF CIVIL GOVERN- 
MENT — OBJECTIONS TO HUMAN GOVERNMENT — OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 

That human government is necessary will appear 
from the following considerations: 

1. It is necessary to the prosperity of a commu- 
nity that there be ownership in property. This 
cannot exist without law to regulate and govern 
the right of property, and laws securing the right 
of property cannot exist where there is no govern- 
ment. 

2. Human government is necessary, in order that 
there be a registration of the titles to property. 

3. It is necessary to protect us in the right to 
property, and thus save us from fraud, theft, and 
robbery. 



258 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. Where there are conflicting claims, human 
government is necessary for their proper adjudi- 
cation. 

5. Without government there would be no 
security to human life; hence, it is necessary for 
the protection of life. 

6. It is necessary for the protection of reputation 
and character. 

The necessity of human government being estab- 
lished, the question arises, Has the government the 
right to exercise the authority needful to carry out 
the objects above set forth? The following facts 
will show that this question should be answered in 
the affirmative : 

1. Man is a proper subject for human gov- 
ernment. 

2. The necessity of the existence of human 
government, in order not only to the well-being of 
man, but even to his continued existence, shows that 
human government has the rights claimed for it. 

3. The following passages from the Bible show 
in what light human government is regarded by the 
Divine Being: 

"Let every soul be subject unto the higher 
powers ; for there is no power but of God : the 
powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, 
therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordi- 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



259 



nance of God ; and they that resist shall receive to 
themselves damnation ; for rulers are not a terror 
to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not 
be afraid of the power ? Do that which is good, 
and thou shalt have praise of the same ; for he is 
the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou 
do that which is evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not 
the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a 
revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth 
evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only 
fox wrath, but also for conscience sake." Eomans 
xiii. 1-5. "Put them in mind to be subject to 
principalities and powers, to obey magistrates." 
Titus iii. 1. " Submit yourselves to every ordi- 
nance of man for the Lord's sake : whether it be 
to the king, as supreme ; or unto governors, as unto 
them that are sent by him for the punishment of 
evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well." 
1 Peter ii. 13, 14. 

From these passages we do not infer the Divine 
right of kings ; nor do we suppose that all govern- 
ments are theocratic ; but we do infer that human 
governments are authorized by God. Nay, more, 
the state is an ordinance of God ; and as govern- 
ment is essential to the state, it may be regarded as 
existing also by his ordinance. The true theory 
appears to be this: 



260 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

" The entire body of people living together in a 
condition of mutual dependence, for protection and 
liberty, are the state f which is of course the 
creation, the institution of God. Then the form 
and administration of the government are left with 
the state; but some form of civil government is 
absolutely required for the existence of the state, 
and hence is ordained by God. 

" The true conception of a primitive state,' ' says 
Hickok, "is that of an organic existence, first 
attained in the natural development of humanity 
itself. It is no possible product of man's procuring, 
but an ordinance of God in the very process of 
nature's ongoing." "The powers that be are or- 
dained of God," says Paul. 

Notwithstanding such authority as has here 
been presented for the existence and authority of 
human government, objections have been urged 
against it which we deem it our duty to answer. 

1. It has been objected to human governments 
that they are all tarnished by crime, founded in 
injustice, and consequently they are all wrong, and 
there is a "higher law" by which we should be 
governed. 

In answer to this objection, we may admit that 
human governments are imperfect; yet much 
greater wrong, far grosser injustice, and infinitely 



4 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 2G1 

more evil, would result if they were all abolished. 
Besides, the Divine Being teaches subjection to 
human governments, and they cannot therefore be 
altogether wrong, 

2. It is objected to civil governments, that God 
allows them to exist, merely as he allows Satan to 
exist, and makes them accomplish his purposes, just 
as he sometimes makes Satan do so. 

In answer to this objection, we have to say, that 
God never required us to obey Satan, but he does 
require us to obey civil government. 

3. It is objected that God says, " Vengeance is 
mine;" but that the state claims the right of 
avenging wrongs committed against itself or its 
citizens. 

In reply to this, it can be justly said that the 
language of the Divine Being was used as a re- 
buke to the exercise of private revenge, and not 
against the infliction of a just penalty to violated 
law. The government may be God's minister to 
inflict vengeance. 

4. It is urged by some fanatical Christians that 
Christ's kingdom is intended to subvert all govern- 
ments, and that in the day of the Millennium no 
human government will be allowed to exist. 

This objection, to my mind, proceeds upon a 
mistaken view, both of the kingdom of Christ and 



262 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of human government. "My kingdom/' say3 
Christ, " is not of this world." It is the design 
of the Christian system to purify all human gov- 
ernments, but not to subvert them. Christ said, 
"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." 
And he governed his own conduct by this maxim. 

The state, therefore, is an ordinance of God 
directly, and civil government is his institution 
indirectly, if not directly; but the particular form 
of government is left to be determined by the 
people. This is manifestly proper, because there 
can be no permanent form established, inasmuch 
as the form of government must be made to vary 
according to circumstances. The particular form 
of government must depend upon the present so- 
cial, intellectual, and moral condition of the peo- 
ple. Hence, as no permanent form can be estab- 
lished, God has left the form to be decided by the 
state. 

SECTION II. 

THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ADVANTAGES OF A REPUB- 
LICAN GOVERNMENT WHEN PREFERABLE — THE RIGHTS AND OBLI- 
GATIONS OF GOVERNMENT — REVOLUTION. 

1. Military despotism. By a military despotism 
is meant the government of a military despot, whose 
will is the law, and who, assuming the reins of 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



263 



authority, generally in a time of anarchy, oppresses 
the people with an iron rule. In times of great 
corruption of morals, such government may be 
allowable ; it is certainly better than anarchy. 

2. Absolute monarchy. In an absolute monarchy, 
as in a military despotism, the whole power is vested 
in one man — the monarch. He generally considers 
himself as reigning by Divine right, and usually 
exercises despotic sway over his subjects. His gov- 
ernment is of a more permanent character than 
a military despotism, and is usually hereditary in 
its nature. 

3. Limited monarchy. A limited monarchy is 
that form of government in which the sovereign is 
limited in his power. It may be elective or heredi- 
tary. He has a parliament or congress, by which 
his authority is restrained, and which usually con- 
stitutes the law-making power. 

4. Republic. In a republican form of govern- 
ment, all power belongs to the people. They elect 
their own officers, and through those officers make, 
alter, repeal, adjudicate, and execute their own laws. 
It may be simple, as where there is but one state ; 
or it may be complex, as where there are several in- 
dependent, sovereign states united in one federal 
republic. In this form of government the federal 
constitution may determine the rights and powers 



264 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the several states. They may be allowed by that 
instrument to nullify the laws of the republic, or to 
secede, or these rights may be denied them. Or the 
constitution may grant certain rights to the repub- 
lic, while all others are secured to the states. This 
federal constitution is of course formed by the 
several states which meet together in convention for 
that purpose. Hence they will explicitly express 
whatever is granted by them to the republic, and all 
else is reserved to the states. The federal republic 
would of course have the right to use all the power 
granted in the constitution ; but the general govern- 
ment could use no other powers without oppressing 
the states. Such a government is believed to con- 
form to the principles of morality, and to have 
advantages above every other form, when the people 
are enlightened and virtuous. 

1. Because it interests all the people in the gov- 
ernment. Each man feels that the government rests 
to some extent upon his shoulders. 

2. It stimulates each citizen to become intelligent, 
lie desires to understand the many complicated and 
perplexing questions that enter into the practical 
workings of the government. He therefore reads 
and hears addresses upon these subjects, looks into 
the votes of the representatives, with the reasons 
given for them, becomes familiar with the history of 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



265 



the country, and thus a mighty stimulus is given to 
the acquisition of knowledge. 

3. It of course must promote the cause of educa- 
tion. In a country where the people elect their own 
rulers, where the right of trial by jury is guaranteed, 
and where every man may be elevated to some 
office, universal education becomes an absolute 
want. Common schools, high, schools, and colleges 
are therefore fostered by the government, and 
patronized by the people. 

4. It offers the highest incentives to patriotism to 
all its citizens ; it knows no nobility of birth, or 
blood ; it gives the privilege of rising to distinction 
to all, however humble their origin, and thus keeps 
alive that love of country which is one of the surest 
safeguards of its permanency. 

The rights of government are now to be noticed. 

1. A government has the right of self-protection. 
It has therefore the right to prevent or to suppress 
all fraud, all acts of injustice and violence among 
the citizens. As vice, licentiousness, and acts of 
injustice tend to destroy a nation, the government 
has the right to repress lawlessness^ cost what it 
may. 

There are rights which a nation has in reference 
to its own citizens. It is a question among moral 
philosophers whether a nation has the right to pro- 
12 



266 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tect itself against outward violence, against the 
attacks of another nation. To employ force to 
defend our persons is a sad and melancholy duty 
that sometimes devolves upon us. We admit it to 
be the last expedient which should be resorted to. 
The same duties that devolve upon the individual in 
defending himself devolve upon the nation. We 
hold that war is not only the right, but may be the 
duty of a nation. But the right of making war 
belongs to nations no further than maybe necessary 
for their own defence, or for the maintenance of 
their rights. 

The law of nations makes three just grounds of 
war. 1. To recover what belongs or is due to us. 
2. To provide for our future safety by punishing the 
aggressor or offender. 3. To defend ourselves from 
injury by repelling unjust violence. So, then, the 
foundation of every just war is injury done or 
threatened. 

When the existence of a nation is threatened, she 
has the right to defend that existence to the last 
extremity. Nothing save the immutable principles 
of right should be regarded as too sacred to be sacri- 
ficed in defending her own existence. She may 
destroy the lives of thousands of her assailants, and 
sacrifice the lives of thousands of her own citizens, 
when her ow^n existence is at stake. 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



267 



"War," says Hickok, " is righteous in defence 
of the national freedom. Against a foreign enemy 
a nation cannot maintain its rights by law ; it can 
only resist his violence to public freedom by arms. 
There can be no question of weaker and stronger, 
of expediency and inexpediency; for the weaker 
nation, like the weaker man, when driven to fight 
for life, must resist and defend as it may." 

There is nothing that appeals more to universal 
sympathy than the sight of a weaker nation strug- 
gling against a mighty and merciless tyrant, and 
determining to sink, if sink it must, nobly battling 
for the cause of freedom. 

We know that these views do not accord with the 
principles of non-resistance and pseudo- philan- 
thropy, as they have been industriously propagated 
of late years ; but as they are believed to accord 
with the purest morality, and are not opposed to 
the teachings of the Bible, we do not hesitate to 
present them. 

War, indeed, is a terrible calamity, even when 
it is resorted to in the cause of right, and when 
the nation whose cause is righteous is the victor. 
We would approve, then, of all honorable means 
which a wise philanthropy could suggest to prevent 
hostilities. A congress of nations may constitute a 
high court, to which all questions pertaining to peace 



268 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and war could be appealed, and whose decision 
should be final. 

2. A government has the right to be supported 
by the people. This support may be derived by 
taxation, either direct or indirect. While the gov- 
ernment has the right to lay taxes, it is bound to do 
so in accordance with the principles of a pure mo- 
rality. Hence, a nation is bound to equalize the 
burdens, and must not tax the people upon any other 
than just and equitable principles. It is also claimed 
that the people taxed shall have the right of repre- 
sentation. 

3. A nation has the right to perfect itself. This 
may be done by promoting the cause of education ; 
by establishing agricultural and other scientific 
schools ; by encouraging commerce ; by securing to 
the citizens the benefits accruing from their inven- 
tions ; by encouraging literature, in the granting of 
copyrights ; by works of internal improvement of 
national importance ; by liberal postal arrange- 
ments ; by fostering religion, and recognizing it as 
the only safeguard of the nation ; in short, by every 
means that can perfect the character of the people, 
and develop the resources of the country. 

4. A nation has the right to do every thing which 
may be necessary for its defence or advancement, 
with the single limitation that no act of wrong 



POLITICAL ETIIICS. 



269 



or injustice, or one invading private rights, is 
allowed. 

The compact existing between a government and 
the citizens requires duties which may not be neg- 
lected by either the one or the other. These duties 
are reciprocal, and are equally binding upon both 
parties to this compact. 

1. Every man, so soon as he becomes a citizen, 
binds himself to the duty of reciprocity, and the gov- 
ernment is bound to observe the same duty; that 
is, every citizen is bound to do to the government 
as he would have the government do to him, and in 
like manner the government is to act toward the 
citizen. 

2. The citizen is to look to the government for 
protection of life, property, and reputation ; and the 
government is bound most faithfully to protect the 
citizen from all injuries to person, property, or 
reputation. 

3. The citizen is to throw upon the government 
the duty of avenging wrong. Private revenge is to 
be entirely ignored by the citizen : 

1st. Because the government can avenge wrong 
much more effectually than it can be done by the 
individual. With all the instrumentalities possessed 
by the government, with officers both judicial and 
executive, and with resources such as no private in- 



270 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

dividual can have, the government can become the 
minister of justice with much more propriety and 
success than can any private individual. 

2d. Because the government is armed with au- 
thority from God, and " beareth the sword" as the 
minister of his vengeance. 

3d. Because by giving up this matter to the 
government, the punishment is inflicted without 
the indulgence of that private malice, and that 
spirit of revenge, which are so reprehensible. 

4th. Because in this manner crime will be pre- 
vented, while if vengeance is inflicted by the indi- 
vidual, crime will be increased. 

4. The government is bound to redress all the 
wrongs of the citizen. 

5. It is the duty of the citizen to advance the 
government toward perfection ; and it is especially 
the duty of government to advance the citizen in 
every thing that pertains to the perfection of his 
character. The citizen is under obligation to fur- 
nish all the means necessary to the perfection of the 
nation ; the government is bound to exact from the 
citizen no more than may be needful to effect this 
object. 

When this compact is carried out, no rights are 
really surrendered by the citizen. ISTo man has a 
natural right to do wrong. And in this compact 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



271 



he voluntarily submits to those restraints that may, 
on the one hand, prevent the commission of crime, 
and, on the other, may develop and perfect his own 
character. That this principle is correct may be 
inferred from the fact, that the more closely this 
compact is observed, the happier are the people, 
and the more prosperous is the government. 

Suppose this compact has been violated by the 
government: have the people the right to revolu- 
tionize it? 

Dr. Wayland points out three possible courses to 
be pursued when the government violates this com- 
pact : 1. Quiet submission to the wrong : of this he 
disapproves. 2. Revolution, which he also opposes. 
3. Suffering in the cause of right : this he regards 
as the proper course. You may plead with the 
government, but you may not engage in revolution. 
On the contrary, we hold that revolution is the best 
course. A government that is not adapted to the 
people, that oppresses them, that prevents theii 
progress, should be put down by force. The nation 
should revolutionize the government. 

The same right of revolution belongs to colonies 
which may be oppressed by the mother country. 
They are ready to become a nation : the mother 
country represses their aspirations for freedom and 
independence, imposes upon them heavy burdens 



272 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

too grievous to be borne, taxes them without allow- 
ing the privilege of representation : then such 
colonies have the right, and it is their duty, to 
engage in revolution. It requires moral heroism to 
take the first step in such a work. He that first 
opens his mouth and raises his voice for revolu- 
tion is apt to fall a martyr to his principles, 
but he should be willing to hazard every thing 
for principle. If, like "Washington, he is success- 
ful, he is hailed as the saviour of his coun- 
try; if, like Kossuth, he is unsuccessful, he is a 
rebel and an exile, or, worse, he fails to make his 
escape, and is garroted like Lopez, or hung upon a 
gibbet. 

Revolutions are frequently attempted too soon, 
when the people are not ready for them — before, by 
their virtue and intelligence, they are capable of 
self-government; then they are sure to fail. 

SECTION III. 

THE DIFFEltENT DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT: LEGISLATIVE, JUDI- 
CIAL, EXECUTIVE THE CONSTITUTION THAT GOVERNS ALL — THE 

BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED THE DUTIES 

OF THE LEGISLATOR — OF THE JUDGE AND JURY — OF THE EXECUTIVE. 

Every properly organized government fulfils its 
duties by means of three departments, called the 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 273 

legislative, judicial, and executive. In a military 
despotism, or an absolute monarchy, the autocrat 
or despot may fill all these departments; but we 
shall consider them as three separate departments, 
in the hands of different officers, whose duties are 
separate and distinct. 

The instrument which controls these officers is 
called the constitution. The two great progressive 
constitutional governments, at this time, are the 
English and North American. The constitutions 
of both these grant freedom to the citizens ; but 
there are some distinctions which may be readily 
pointed out. 

3L The American is a written constitution ; and 
the British is unwritten : the authority of the latter 
is derived from precedent. 

2. The American constitution was framed by the 
sovereign States of the American Union, assembled 
in convention for that purpose. Each State sent 
her own delegates to the convention, which repre- 
sented her in that body, by which the constitution 
was framed. The British constitution has grown 
up with the state, and has the authority of custom, 
to give it power over the officers of government. 

3. The American constitution makes its govern- 
ment elective. The President of the Republic m 
himself elected by the people, holding his office for 

12* 



274 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

only four years, and is sworn to support the consti- 
tution. The British constitution does not make its 
government elective entirely. It acknowledges an 
hereditary monarchy. 

4. The American constitution was adopted by 
independent, sovereign States granting certain 
powers to the general government, and reserving 
all others to themselves. It is an instrument, 
therefore, designed for a federal republic, com- 
posed of different States, each sovereign within 
herself, and each having a separate written consti- 
tution for her own government. The British con- 
stitution has been established by precedent, is 
designed for a limited and hereditary monarchy, 
and has none of these peculiarities. 

The legislative department is usually divided 
into two branches — the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, or the Lords and the Commons. 

The duties of the legislator are, 

1. To understand fully the constitution by which 
he is to be governed in making laws. 

2. It is his duty to make himself thoroughly 
acquainted with the wants of the people, and to 
learn the best means of meeting those wants, so 
far as the laws of the country can meet them. He 
ought therefore to understand political economy, 
and to know the practical workings of the different 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



275 



and opposite systems which have been adopted at 
various times by the legislature for the purpose of 
advancing the interests of the people. 

3. He should enact such laws, in accordance with 
the constitution, as will best subserve the interests 
of society. He must not claim to have any " higher 
law" than the constitution. And he that swears to 
support the constitution, and then, under pretence 
of rendering obedience to a "higher law," violates 
that instrument, is to all intents and purposes 
morally perjured. 

It has been for a great while a question among 
statesmen and moralists, whether the legislator is 
bound to conform his action to the will of his con- 
stituents. 

Perhaps the best answer to that question is this : 
When the will of his constituents is known, and he 
can conscientiously conform his action to it, and of 
course would not violate the constitution by so 
doing, it would be consistent with a pure morality 
for him to carry out their will. But if, upon emer- 
gency, he has to decide some question upon which 
he has had no opportunity of consulting his con- 
stituents, he must in that case be governed by his 
own judgment and conscience. Finally, if he 
knows the will of his constituents, and cannot con- 
scientiously or constitutionally conform his action 



276 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to it, let him resign. Let him prefer a good eon- 
science to any office. 

The judicial department is also divided: its duties 
are fulfilled by the judge and the jury. 

It is the business of the judge to expound the laws 
enacted by the legislature, determine their constitu- 
tionality, and require that they should be enforced. 
It is therefore the duty of the judge, 

1. To understand the law. 

2. To understand the constitution, so that he 
may compare the law with that instrument, and 
determine its conformity or want of conformity 
to it. 

3. He must know all the facts in the case, so 
that he may sum them up, and give a clear and 
impartial presentation of them to the jury. 

4. It is his duty to decide according to law, with- 
out fear, favor, or affection. 

It is the duty of the jury to decide according to 
the law and evidence, without fear, favor, or affection. 

" The trial by jury," says Blackstone, "has been, 
and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory 
of the English law. It is the most transcendent 
privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish for, 
that he cannot be affected either in his property, 
his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous con- 
sent of twelve of his equals." 



POLITICAL ETIIICSc 



277 



Fearful is the responsibility of those to whom is 
committed the decision of cases which involve all 
that is dear to man on earth. Let those upon 
whom the responsibility is devolved, discharge it 
with an honest and fearless spirit. 

It is the business of the executive to execute 
the law as enacted by the legislature and interpreted 
by the judiciary. 

In the case of simple executive officers, their 
duties are exceedingly plain, as they have but 
to execute the laws, without inquiring into their 
justice or constitutionality. A sheriff, for example, 
must imprison or even hang a man without inquiring 
into the justice of his punishment. Though it is 
his duty as an officer to execute the laws, he 
must not forget that he is a man, and that the poor 
condemned criminal is also a man. While he 
performs his unpleasant duties^ he should do all 
that delicacy or benevolence may suggest for the 
comfort of the convict. 

On executive officers whose duties are complex, 
much greater responsibility devolves. The Presi- 
dent of the United States, and the governors of 
the different sovereign States^ are executive officers 
whose duties are complex. It is their duty to 
recommend such measures as they may think 
beneficial to the country, to affix their signatures 



278 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to the laws passed by the legislature, and in 
certain circumstances to exercise the appointing, 
the pardoning, and the veto power. 

The duties of the executive may be summed up 
as follows : 

1. He must understand the constitution of his 
country, that he may know when to approve and 
when to veto an act of the legislature. 

2. He should appoint such men to office as are 
"honest and capable. ,, This principle will not 
prevent him from rewarding his friends, but it will 
prevent him from removing an honest, faithful 
public servant, and appointing in his stead an 
unprincipled and brawling politician. 

3. He should exercise the veto power with great 
caution. He should remember that a republic is 
the government of majorities ; and when a majority 
have enacted a law, a law it should be, unless it 
violate the constitution, or be deemed exceedingly 
detrimental to the public welfare. 

4. He should guard against any abuse of the 
pardoning power. It may be proper for the execu- 
tive to exercise this power after the sentence, when 
there has come up new evidence which may justify 
or require its arrest. But an abuse of this power, 
whether brought about by bribery, by too great 
sympathy for the criminal, or by any want of 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



279 



virtue in the magistrate, is sure to be attended 
with, the worst consequences. The probabilities 
of punishment being lessened, the amount of crime 
is greatly increased. Eeprieves may give license 
to crime, lessen the power of the judiciary, bring 
our courts of justice into contempt, and throw wide 
open the very flood-gates of iniquity. 

SECTION IV. 

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS DIFFERENCE IN CRIMES LEGAL CRIMES 

MORAL CRIMES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ARGUMENTS IN ITS FAVOR 

— WHEN IT MAY BE INFLICTED — HOW TO SECURE THE ADMINIS- 
TRATION OF JUSTICE. 

A legal crime is one that is not vicious per se: 
it is an act that does not violate moral law ; as, for 
example, smuggling. This would not be a crime 
but for the tariff laws. It would not only be 
innocent, but it would be highly commendable for 
individuals or companies to bring goods into the 
country, and thus meet the wants of society, if 
there were no law against it. Hence the crime 
of smuggling is the result of legal enactment, and 
is called a legal crime. 

A moral crime is a crime per se : it is a violation 
of moral law ; and if there existed no legal enact- 
ments against it, it would still be a crime. For 



280 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

example, murder : this is a crime in the nature of 
things ; it is a crime, and would be a crime, even 
if there were legal enactments requiring its com- 
mission. So it is with theft. The enactment by 
the Spartan Lycurgus encouraging theft did not 
absolve those who committed it from crime. It 
was a crime in spite of the law. 

In regard to punishment, the great principle 
established among moral philosophers and jurists 
is, that the heaviest punishment must fall upon 
him who commits a crime which affects most 
deeply the peace, fortunes, or lives of men; and 
the lightest punishment is to be inflicted for the 
crime which does not greatly affect the peace, 
fortunes, or lives of men. 

It is still a question among moral philosophers 
whether any circumstances will justify or demand 
the infliction of capital punishment. 

In the opinion of the present writer, capital 
punishment is required by the law of God, both 
as it is exhibited in the light of nature, and as it 
is revealed in his word. 

1. We hold that the great objects of punishment 
may be best accomplished by the infliction of the 
death-penalty. These objects may be the reform* 
ation of the criminal, the prevention of crime, 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



281 



or restitution to the injured party. That crime 
is more effectually diminished by the death-penalty 
will hardly be denied, inasmuch as it lessens the 
number of criminals, and is the greatest terror to 
evil-doers. But another and still higher object 
is to administer justice to the criminal. This 
design of punishment can be accomplished only, 
in certain cases of aggravated crime, by the inflic- 
tion of capital punishment. 

2. The penalty of death is required by the 
great law of self-preservation. It is the duty of 
the state to use such efforts and enforce such 
penalties as may be necessary to the preservation 
of her citizens, and essential to the prevention 
of anarchy. Let murder go unwhipped of justice ; 
let the blood-stained criminal lose all fear of the 
death -penalty; let it be proclaimed that this 
most fearful of all punishments is abolished, and 
the darkest picture of iniquity appalls the imagi- 
nation, and ruinous inroads are made upon the 
morals, liberty, and life of the people. Judging, 
then, by the light of nature alone, we must come 
to the conclusion that capital punishment should 
be inflicted. 

We now turn to the teachings of revelation. 
The following scriptural argument is condensed 



282 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

from two masterly sermons on the subject of 
capital punishment by the Eev. Dr. Mitchell.* 

" ' Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his 
blood be shed.' 

" The law was enacted by the Divine Legislator 
after man's depravity had been fearfully manifested 
and awfully punished. At the commencement of 
a new era in man's history, ere another Cain 
should raise his fratricidal hand, and cause a 
brother's blood to cry for vengeance, this righteous 
law is proclaimed for the benefit of the human 
family. There it stands on the statute-book of 
Heaven, unannulled, unrepealed, in as full force 
and virtue, to all intents and purposes, against the 
cruel and bloody man, as it was in the lifetime of 
the son of Lamech. It is a generally received 
maxim that a law stands as long as the reason for 
its enactment stands ; but the reason for the enact- 
ment of this law still remains, and ever shall 
remain, unaltered. 'In the image of God made 
he man.' This law was reenacted and promulgated 
in the law of the Ten Commandments. Again in 
Leviticus : ' He that killeth any one shall surely 
be put to death.' In the book of Numbers it is 



* These sermons are in manuscript, but it is hoped the learned 
author will consent to their publication. 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



283 



recorded, 'Blood defileth the land; and the land 
cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, 
but by the blood of him that shed it/ 

" It is evident, then — unless it can be proved by 
the word of God that murder is not so great a sin 
in our enlightened age as it was in the days of 
Moses — it is an inevitable deduction that blood 
still defiles the land, and that the land cannot 
be cleansed of the blood shed therein but by the 
blood of him that shed it." 

These are the arguments derived from the Old 
Testament; the following are taken from the 
New: 

1. Jesus Christ, the boldest of teachers, never 
uttered a word against the law, either as existing 
among the Jews or Romans. 

2. He in spirit reenacted the law in his Sermon 
on the Mount. 

3. He recognized the justice of the death-penalty 
in reference to the malefactors that were crucified 
with him. ""We indeed justly," said one male- 
factor to the other. Then, if ever, could Jesus 
have uttered his anathemas against the barbarous 
statute given to Noah. 

4. Paul admits that the death-penalty may be 
just when he uses the following language: "If I 
have committed any thing worthy of death, I 



284 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

refuse not to die." Again,- in the Epistle to the 
Romans : "If thou do that which is evil, be afraid, 
for he beareth not the sword in vain ; for he is a 
minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon 
him that doeth evil." 

"In conclusion/' says Dr. Mitchell, "God has 
not left it discretionary with civil government, he 
has not left it optional with man, to say what degree 
of punishment shall be inflicted upon the wretch 
who perpetrates that horrible crime which occupies 
an awful altitude on the mountain of human guilt. 
He declares with a voice of thunder; he speaks the 
announcement in tones of terrible majesty; he in- 
terweaves its solemn sanction with the several reve- 
lations which he makes to man — on Ararat, on Ho- 
reb, on Calvary, in Patmos, by patriarchs, by pro- 
phets, by apostles, by Jesus Christ himself — that not 
only is government authorized and required to put 
the malicious murderer to death, but that the omis- 
sion to inflict the penalty entails a curse on any 
nation." 

For what crimes should this penalty be inflicted? 

1. For murder. 2. For arson, as that crime most 
recklessly puts to hazard human life. 3. The for- 
cible violation of chastity. 

The best means of securing the administration of 
justice are, 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



285 



1. We should have an able and impartial judi- 
ciary. Our judges must be men of exalted virtue, of 
inflexible justice, and of commanding talents. 

2. We should have our judiciary as nearly as pos- 
sible independent. 

3. Popular education should become universal, as 
it is absolutely essential to the administration of 
justice. 

4. The citizens should be intelligent, moral, and 
virtuous. No bribed jurors will give righteous 
decisions. 

5. The executive should be composed of such 
men as will guard the constitution, recommend 
the wisest measures, and see that the laws are 
rigidly enforced. 

SECTION V. 

DUTIES OF CITIZENS— OBEDIENCE — VOTING — UNION— INTELLIGENCE AND 
VIRTUE — DEVELOPING RESOURCES — DEFENCE — CORRECTION OF EVILS. 

The duties of citizens are embraced in the one 
word patriotism — love of country. This principle 
is the destruction of sectionalism, it weakens the 
power of party, and embraces the entire country, 
its government, its institutions, its citizens, and 
all that is embraced within its limits. 

1. The citizen is to render implicit obedience 
to the laws of his country. 



286 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. He is to exercise the right of suffrage. He 
is bound to vote ; it is a duty which he must not 
omit, a right which he is not at liberty to prosti- 
tute. By his vote he is ever to seek to place that 
man in office who will impart to it dignity, dis- 
charge faithfully its duties, and best promote the 
interests of the country. 

3. It is the duty of the good citizen to seek to 
strengthen the bonds which unite together the 
different portions of his country. He must not 
make aggressions upon the rights of his brethren 
occupying a different section, nor seek to wound 
their feelings. 

4. It is his duty to be intelligent and virtuous, 
and to seek to increase the intelligence and virtue 
of his countrymen. 

5. The good citizen should neglect no means of 
developing the resources of his country. 

6. It is his duty to defend his country from the 
assaults of her foes. "With a brave heart, when 
occasion serves, he is to confront her foes, and do 
battle for her cause. No danger must appall him, 
no bribe must tempt him, no power must awe 
him, no opposition deter him from a fearless and 
patriotic discharge of duty. 

7. It is his duty to seek by all means to reform all 
abuses which may have crept into the government. 



POLITICAL ETHICS. 



287 



Whether these abuses have arisen from extrava- 
gance or corruption, the good citizen should endea- 
vor to correct them. It may, therefore, be his duty 
to fill high posts in the service of his country. It 
is not only compatible with the Christian character, 
but it may be the duty of the Christian man to sit 
upon the bench, to enter the halls of legislation, to 
lead armies, or to occupy the chair of state. Good 
men, because of the temptations connected with 
place and power, and of the wickedness that 
exists in high places, have no right to withdraw 
themselves from the councils of the nation. Let 
them go amidst the corruptions of the court, or the 
wickedness that sometimes stains the escutcheon of 
the republic, and, retaining their purity un corrupt 
and incorruptible, let them seek the purification of 
the political atmosphere, and the advancement of 
the country's welfare. 



/ 



288 



ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 



CHAPTER V. 

FAMILY ETHICS. 
SECTION I. 

MARRIAGE— TO WHAT OPPOSED — ARGUMENTS AGAINST POLYGAMY. 

Marriage is the union of one man with one 
woman "so long as they both shall live." It is 
indicated by Christ in the following language : 
" Have ye not read, that He which made them in 
the beginning, made them male and female, and 
said, For this cause shall a man leave father and 
mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they 
twain shall be one flesh." 

The conjugal relation is believed to be opposed 
to polygamy, and in this view there is great una- 
nimity among enlightened nations. The following 
arguments will substantiate this position: 

1. When God created man, he made one man 
and one woman — "male and female created he 
them;" thereby showing that there should only be 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



289 



a pair united in this sacred relation. If ever a man 
should have had more than one wife, it should have 
been at that period, when the earth was destitute of 
inhabitants. 

2. Polygamy tends directly to the deep degrada- 
tion of woman : it makes her a slave ; her power 
and influence are gone, and her light is quenched. 

3. Polygamy must produce constant strife and 
discord in the domestic circle. Jealousies and con- 
stant wranglings exist among the wives of the 
harem, and vexation and distrust on the part of 
the husband. Mutual confidence is destroyed, and 
real conjugal affection is unknown. 

4. Polygamy tends to the degradation of the chil- 
dren. The masculine energy of the father, as well 
as the womanly tenderness of the mother, is needed 
in the rearing of children. If the mother's tender- 
ness is wanting, the children become savage ; if the 
father's energy is withdrawn, they become effemi- 
nate. It is impossible in the unnatural state of 
polygamy for the father to give the proper attention 
to the intellect, the morals, and the entire develop- 
ment of his children. 

5. Polygamy tends naturally to weaken the race. 
The tendency of licentiousness is ever in that direc- 
tion. It enervates the race both in mind and body. 

6. Polygamy tends to produce unnatural crimes, 

13 



290 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and the grossest and most loathsome forms of licen- 
tiousness. Some men, being deprived of wives, 
resort to crimes which are too abominable to be 
mentioned in a work of this kind. 

7. The New Testament is very clear on this sub- 
ject, though it has been said to utter nothing against 
it. Christ says, "Whosoever putteth away a woman 
save for fornication, and marrieth another, com- 
mitteth adultery.' ' Now, in what does the adultery 
consist? Not, of course, in putting away one wife, 
but in marrying another during the lifetime of the 
first wife. If, then, the marrying of a second wife, 
after the first is improperly put away, constitutes 
adultery, then by the stronger reason is it adultery 
to marry a second or a third wife while living with 
the first. This, to all believers in the Bible, must 
be a very strong argument, as it makes polygamy 
nothing more nor less than adultery. 

8. God has most clearly indicated his will on 
this subject by causing the number of males and 
females born to be about equal. This very fact 
makes it a gross immorality in any nation to allow 
polygamy. In legalizing this vice, adultery is 
legalized, the sacred family relation broken up, the 
express will of God violated, the freedom of society 
sinned against, and countless evils are brought 
upon the human race. 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



291 



SECTION II. 

THE DESIGN OF MARRIAGE — DOMESTIC HAPPINESS — A NUMEROUS AND 
HAPPY POSTERITY PATRIOTISM CHASTITY. 

1. It is the design of marriage to promote indi- 
vidual and domestic happiness, and especially the 
happiness of woman. By the union of interests 
and sympathies, joys are increased, and the sorrows 
of life are greatly tempered and mitigated. Morose- 
ness is nearly always the attendant of a life of celi- 
bacy ; and this is especially the case with woman. 
This evil is fully prevented when the design of 
marriage is accomplished. Marriage should ever 
calm the turbulent propensities of human nature, 
impart mutual confidence, add new charms to exist- 
ence, brighten the hopes of the future, and strew 
the path^of life with flowers, almost as fragrant as 
those which grew in paradise. 

2. The design of marriage is the production of 
the greatest number of healthy children, together 
with their proper nurture and successful education. 
The health and energy, the intellect and disposition, 
the discipline and habits, the present and the future 
welfare of children, all depend upon the sanctity of 
the marriage relation. 

3. Its design is to excite that deep and ardent 
devotion to country which is necessary to the 



292 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

country's welfare. It makes the parents feel that 
the country is not only theirs, but that it is to be 
the country of their children and their children's 
children, and hence it begets an interest in the per- 
manent welfare and glory of their country. 

4. Its design is the promotion of chastity. God 
has wisely implanted certain propensities in human 
nature, which meet their appropriate and lawful 
gratification alone in the marriage relation. To 
prevent the promiscuous, unlawful, unnatural, and 
vicious gratification of those propensities is one 
great object of the conjugal relation. As the young 
of both sexes grow up with the confident expecta- 
tion of entering this relation, it tends to repress 
licentiousness in its very incipiency. 

It may not be improper to refer in the most 
delicate manner to certain offences against chastity 
which it is the design of marriage to prevent. 

1. To prevent those solitary vices which, in both 
sexes, have been found so detrimental to health, so 
destructive of intellect, and so ruinous to morals — 
crimes against which those who have the control 
of the young should especially direct their efforts. 

2. To prevent fornication, or the indulging of the 
sexual passion between persons not married. God 
has signified his reprobation of this crime, not only 
in his written word, but by often visiting upon the 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



293 



licentious the most loathsome disease that can affect 
the body. 

3. To prevent incest, a crime at once the vilest 
and most revolting to every chaste and refined 
mind. But, however revolting, it prevails wherever 
polygamy prevails. God has set the seal of 
his disapprobation upon this crime, by visiting 
the iniquity of the guilty parents upon their 
offspring. 

SECTION III. 

THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN BOTH PARTIES IN FORMING 
THE CONJUGAL RELATION. 

1. This union should be based upon love. No 
two persons should ever think of uniting them- 
selves in wedlock without love. 

2. Those marrying should be very nearly of the 
same age. A great difference in the ages of the 
parties is almost sure to beget unhappiness, and 
is too frequently the cause of crime. As age comes 
on, the tastes change, and the habits become con- 
firmed; and with dissimilar tastes and habits, it is 
almost impossible that husband and wife can live 
together in that harmony which is essential to hap- 
piness, if not to virtue. 

3. Both parties should belong to the same class 



294 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in society. I have but little sympathy with the 
lady who marries her father's coachman. When 
this principle is violated by an amalgamation of 
the races, it becomes absolutely revolting. 

4. Equality of fortune should be a governing 
principle. It rarely happens that marriages of per- 
sons with fortunes very unequal are happy. 

5. The choice of both parties should be free. 
No one — not even a parent — has the right to 
constrain the choice in reference to so solemn an 
engagement. 

6. The selection must be mutual. Each must 
choose the other in preference to any other person. 
This is a very important principle ; and no man, 
however well he may love a woman, should desire 
her to be his wife, unless her preference for him 
be hearty and unbiased. 

7. The principle of constancy should govern both 
parties in making their betrothment. It should not 
be suddenly made, and, after it is made, no ordinary 
circumstance should prevent their marrying. A 
breach of promise of marriage is an immorality of 
high grade. It is true that circumstances may 
arise after betrothment which may forbid mar- 
riage. In such circumstances it is right for the 
party upon whom these influences bear to obtain a 
release from the other party. If such release is 



FAMILY ETHldS. 



295 



refused, then the only course appears to be to violate 
the engagement. A man must not swear to love a 
woman whom he does not love, and for whom he 
does not even entertain respect; as would neces- 
sarily be the case in the conditions supposed. 



SECTION IV. 

RECIPROCAL DUTIES OF THE CONJUGAL RELATION: LOVE — SYMPATHY 

HELP CHASTITY CONFIDENCE MUTUAL INTEREST AFFECTION 

FOR COMMON OFFSPRING — MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY. 

The duties which are presented in the following 
section are mutual, and equally obligatory upon 
both husband and wife. The sacred institution is 
now supposed to be entered into, and for better or 
for worse the twain have become one. 

1. There must be mutual love. Without this as 
an all-pervading principle, they can in no circum- 
stances be either moral or happy. The solemn 
marriage vow is upon them, in which they have 
pledged to love each other with an undying devo- 
tion. The palace becomes loathsome, wealth a 
curse, social intercourse disgustful, magnificent 
equipage and costly furniture give no delight, 
and even the gardens and walks of literature are 
planted with thorns, to the miserable pair who 
are united but in form, and whose very union 



296 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is a lie. In spite of wealth, position, and the envy 
of the multitude, they must pass through life with 
constant, bitter, and unavailing regrets. 

2. Mutual sympathy. We are creatures of sym- 
pathy, and one of the highest duties of the conjugal 
relation is mutual sympathy. This world is cold 
and dark without it. The wife should sympathize 
in her husband's plans, his aims, his toils in his 
trade or profession, and in his disappointments and 
trials. The husband should equally exercise sym- 
pathy with her who has left all to be his wife, with 
her who, by kindness, cheerfulness, and affection, 
has sought to make his home happy. 

3. Mutual help. The spheres and duties of hus- 
band and wife may be to a great extent different ; 
but still it is the duty of each to help the other. 
The wife may become accountant, clerk, corre- 
spondent, to lighten the toils of her husband. The 
husband may render assistance frequently in the 
matters of the household. In attending to the 
children — the pledges of mutual affection — he can 
often assist his toilworn wife. 

4. Mutual chastity. " Thou shalt not commit 
adultery." The violation of chastity is the viola- 
tion of this command. It is a fearful crime, upon 
which God both in nature and in revelation has 
placed the direst curse. It is as binding upon the 



FAMILY ISTlIir.-. 



207 



husband as upon the wife, and a violation of the 
command is as criminal in one as in the other. 

5. Mutual interest. What belongs to the husband 
belongs equally to the wife. The marriage relation 
blends all their interests, their property is common, 
their reputation common, and all that belongs to 
one belongs equally to the other. This should be 
felt. There should be no selfishness on the part 
of husband or wife. No mine nor thine should be 
uttered or felt in reference to what should be com- 
mon. 

6. Mutual parental affection. When children 
bless the conjugal relation, they should be objects 
of mutual affection, and thus should serve to bind 
still more closely the marriage bond. 

7. Mutual responsibility. "Neither," says Wins- 
low, " can say, This is my duty, and this is yours. 
The duty is common to both. They are mutually 
and equally pledged to do all in their power to 
secure the prudent management of their secular 
interests, the order and peace of their households, 
the right training of their offspring, and all those 
temporal and everlasting benefits for which the 
domestic constitution was established.' 1 



298 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION V. 

DUTIES OF HUSBANDS : MAINTENANCE PROTECTION — POLITENESS — 

TENDERNESS CARE IN SICKNESS. 

When persons enter the conjugal relation, they do 
not lose their individuality. Duties arising from 
difference in sphere and relation devolve upon both 
husband and wife. 

We first notice those of the husband. 

1. Maintenance. The husband owes it to his 
wife, to himself, to a manly independence, to sup- 
port his wife. No man with vigor of health or 
strength of mind should consent to be maintained 
by the toil of his wife. Men who are so indolent 
as to depend upon their wives for maintenance are 
a disgrace to their sex. Their indolence is a crime, 
their imbecility a burning shame, and their mean- 
spiritedness a degradation. 

2. Protection. Every husband should feel it his 
duty to protect his wife. In his presence and under 
his protection she should ever feel safe. She has 
left the home of her childhood for him, and with 
all the confidence of woman she relies on him to 
protect her from exposure, and guard her from 
danger. Such confidence should not be misplaced. 

3. Politeness. When he was wooing her who is 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



299 



now his wife, how delicate were his attentions, how 
gallant his bearing ! His whole conduct was char- 
acterized by politeness. This should continue 
through life. 

4. Tenderness. Woman in her entire organiza- 
tion is far more delicate than man. "Words of com- 
plaint and harshness coming from him whom she 
loves more dearly than life, pierce her bosom and 
give her indescribable anguish. "Husbands," says 
Paul, " love your wives, and be not bitter against 
them." Col. iii. 19. "Love your wives, even as 
Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for 
it." Eph. v. 25. As Christ loves and cherishes 
the Church, so should the husband love his wife. 
No unkind word should ever escape his lips, but the 
law of kindness should control both words and 
actions. 

5. Finally, it is the husband's duty to attend with 
unabated love upon his wife in the time of sickness. 
Then she needs his care. By her couch he should 
be found performing acts of kindness, which, more 
than the medicine he administers, will serve to 
restore her to health. Never does a husband's love 
appear so precious as when it manifests itself in 
unremitting attention to a wife upon whom disease 
is making its fearful ravages. 



300 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION VI. 

DUTIES OF WIVES! OBEDIENCE — FIDELITY— KINDNESS — DILIGENCE — s 
PROVIDENCE — CONTENTMENT PATIENCE — KEEPING AT HOME. 

We now notice the duties of wives. 

1. Obedience. " Wives, submit yourselves unto 
your own husbands.' 9 This is the command of God : 
it must be obeyed. The husband is universally 
acknowledged as the head of the family. 

2. Fidelity. " The heart of her husband doth 
safely trust in her." She is prudent in speech, and 
frugal in her management. 

3. Kindness. " She will do him good and not 
evil all the days of her life." 

4. Diligence. " She worketh willingly with her 
hands : she riseth also while it is yet night." 

5. Providence in household matters. " She look- 
eth well to the ways of her household, and eateth 
not the bread of idleness." 

6. Contentment. She should ever be cheerful 
and content with her lot. Her husband may be 
poor, disappointments may come over him, and mis- 
fortunes may crush him; then the smiles of his 
wife, her courage to meet difficulties, and her forti- 
tude in bearing adversity, will be a source of con- 
stant and unceasing comfort. 

7. Patience. Amid the trials of married life, no 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



301 



virtue shines with a milder, purer radiance than 
patience. A woman with a morose husband who 
neglects her, who is unkind, has no sympathy, 
and suffers her to pine in want, has much need of 
patience. It is for her good and the good of her 
sex that she be patient under all the ills of an 
unfortunate marriage, rather than hastily seek a 
divorce. 

8. Keeping at home. Home is woman's sphere ; 
it is her kingdom, and here let her reign without 
a rival. Let her make home the most attractive 
place on earth to her husband. Let her keep 
it neat and tidy, ever giving a cordial welcome 
to her husband. "With a neat person, a pleasant 
home, a smiling face, a cheerful and brave heart, 
let her seek to make her husband happy. Her 
reward will be domestic peace, the confidence of 
her husband, the love of her children, and the 
respect of all. 

SECTION VII. 

DIVORCE — MAY BE GRANTED BY THE STATE — ON WHAT GROUNDS. 

Circumstances may exist which may justify the 
state in granting divorces. This fact does not lessen 
but rather increases the solemnity and binding 
nature of the marriage contract. Certainly the 



302 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

original intention of this contract was to bind the 
parties for life. 

Mr. Hickok says, " One cause only is admitted as 
a justification of divorce, and that an already sun- 
dering the nuptial tie by the adulterous infidelity 
of one of the parties.' ■ He then quotes in proof 
of this position from Matt. xix. 9 : "I say unto you, 
Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for 
fornication, and shall marry another, committeth 
adultery; and whoso marrieth her which is put 
away, committeth adultery.' ' 

"It occurs to me," says Mahan, "that the ques- 
tion propounded to Christ was in reference to what 
might occur prior to marriage, and not to what 
might occur after marriage, and be a sufficient rea- 
son for divorce. This was the question agitated 
among the J ews. For what cause, existing prior to 
marriage, and discovered after the consummation of 
the relation, might a man put away his wife ? The 
answer was, For licentiousness, or fornication. Paul 
gives another reason for the dissolution of the bonds 
of marriage. In the seventh chapter of 1st Cor- 
inthians, he teaches that the departure of one of the 
parties from the other absolves the forsaken one 
from the marriage bonds. He tells us that in 
such circumstances the injured party is no longer 
bound by law. In the light, then, of these scrip- 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



303 



tures, we give two and only two causes for di- 
vorce. 

" L For infidelity either before or after the con- 
jugal relation is entered into. If a man marries a 
woman who he afterwards learns was impure at 
the time of marriage, he is freed from the bonds, 
and may morally seek a divorce. By the stronger 
reason, if guilt in this respect attaches to either 
party subsequent to marriage, the other may seek a 
release from the contract. 

"2. In cases where either party forsakes the 
other, or refuses the nuptial rights, then there is 
just ground for divorce. In this view we are sus- 
tained by the ablest commentators, and certainly by 
the wisest legislators." 

These are the views of President Mahan, and 
are seen to be opposed to those of Professor 
Hickok. According to the latter, there can be but 
one cause of divorce : according to the former, there 
can exist but two causes. So both views make the 
marriage contract one of most binding obliga- 
tion. 

The greater facility with which this bond is legally 
sundered, the greater the prevalence of licentious- 
ness and the evil to society. Let legislators re- 
member this, and not disgrace their statute-books 
with so many divorces. 



3Q± ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION VIII. 

PARENTAL. DUTIES I MAINTENANCE PHYSICAL EDUCATION INTEL- 
LECTUAL EDUCATION MORAL EDUCATION. 

Among the original principles of our nature 
is the love of offspring. "Without this it would be 
almost impossible to fulfil the duties that are 
connected with this important relation. Next to 
the relation of husband and wife, the relation of 
parent and child is the most important. Upon the 
correct understanding and proper discharge of the 
duties connected with this interesting relation 
depends the prosperity of the country. If parental 
responsibilities are felt, and if parental duties are 
faithfully discharged, the influence is seen in a 
virtuous, intelligent, and patriotic offspring, who 
will ever be found battling courageously for truth, 
piety, and freedom. If, on the contrary, these 
responsibilities are not felt, and these duties are 
not discharged, the influence is seen in a vicious 
offspring, who are ever found on the side of vice, 
fighting against truth and virtue. "We may just 
observe that guardians and step-parents are to treat 
their wards and step-children as they do their own 
offspring. 

The duties of parents may be thus classified: 
I. Maintenance. It is the duty of parents to 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



305 



maintain their children. Their very helplessness 
pleads for this. Unable to maintain themselves, 
their only reliance is upon their parents. 

1. This maintenance should be equal and im- 
partial. Parents should carefully guard against 
making a difference in this respect, for partiality 
here is attended with the worst consequences. 

2. The maintenance should be according to the 
means possessed by the parents. Extravagance 
should be avoided on the one hand, and parsimony 
on the other. Parents should not be ambitious 
of display, and thereby involve themselves in 
debt. 

II. Physical education. It devolves upon parents 
to attend to the development of a healthy and 
vigorous constitution in their children. Many 
sickly constitutions have been the result of parental 
negligence. Whatever weakens the constitution, 
unfits the future man for the duties of life, to the 
full extent of the weakness. Both the State and 
the Church can justly claim of parents to fulfil 
this obligation ; for a feeble man can hardly meet 
the expectations of either the one or the other. In 
order, then, that a vigorous constitution be de- 
veloped in the child, the parent must see: 

1. That children have the proper kind of food, 
suitably prepared, at the proper times and in the 



306 ELEMENTS OF MOB, AL PHILOSOPHY. 

proper quantities. They should not be allowed 
to indulge in eating to excess, nor should they be 
stinted in their food in such manner as to prevent 
physical development. 

2. Parents should see that children are suitably 
clothed. The clothes should vary with the sea- 
son : they should not be of such a nature in their 
cut and make as to hinder the growth of the 
children. 

3. Children should not only be allowed but 
required to take proper exercise. They should be 
required to work, to use the axe or hoe, and thus 
be inured to labor. 

4. They should be restrained from all things 
that weaken the constitution, such as stimulating 
drinks, indolence, eating at irregular times, and 
especially late at night. 

5. Parents should guard with great vigilance 
the health of their children. They should not 
expose them to an unhealthy atmosphere, to 
unwholesome work, to pestilential diseases, or 
impose upon them burdens which they are unable 
to bear. 

III. Intellectual education. An ignorant com- 
munity is almost sure to be idle and vicious. If 
children are allowed to grow up without instruc- 
tion, they must form an ignorant community, and 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



307 



must suffer all the evils entailed by idleness and 
vice. A heavy responsibility rests upon parents 
in reference to the education of their children. 
They owe it to their country and their God to 
meet this responsibility, as it becomes those to 
whom so high a trust is committed. It is the duty 
of parents to impart the first knowledge to their 
children. This nearly all parents can do, and this 
early training they ought to intrust to no other. 
In addition to this, it is the duty of parents: 

1. To procure teachers faithful and competent. 
Let them not employ teachers because they are 
cheap, but because they are earnest and faithful. 
A teacher possessed of industry, patience, amia- 
bility, and talent, is a priceless treasure to a family 
of children, and no pains or expense should be 
spared to obtain such a one. At the same time, 
the parents should give encouragement to the 
children, and urge them on in the career of 
knowledge. 

2. Parents should see that the teacher per- 
forms his duty. No good teacher will object 
to this. A visit from the parents is an evidence 
of their interest in him and his interesting charge, 
and an earnest of their cooperation if he is found 
discharging his duty. 

3. Parents should show by their words and 



308 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

actions that they place education above wealth 
or position. Let them be zealous in its promotion. 
Let them be found in such associations and ex- 
erting such influences as must cause their children 
to feel that education is regarded by them as no 
minor matter, as no affair of secondary consider- 
ation. Children are very apt to imbibe the views 
of their parents ; and if they see that educa- 
tion is a prominent object with them, regulating 
their thoughts, and to a considerable extent govern- 
ing their movements, it will be sought after with 
more enthusiasm, perseverance, and success. 

IV. Moral education. As the moral principle 
is higher in its nature, and vastly more important 
in its influence, than the physical or intellectual, 
by so much the more important is moral educa- 
tion. It is in reference to moral education that 
Solomon says, " Train up a child in the way he 
should go, and when he is old he will not depart 
from it." 

1. Parents should teach their children self- 
control. The early subjugation of the appetites 
and passions to reason and conscience, is abso- 
lutely- essential to the harmonious development of 
character. Children that are allowed to control 
others, and not required to control themselves, will 
grow up with a tyrannical, overbearing, and un- 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



30D 



governable disposition, which will cause them to 
be an annoyance both to themselves and their 
associates. 

2. Parents should teach their children obedience 
to authority. The duty of obedience should be 
exacted, cost what it may. To effect this may often 
require sternness and inflexible resolve on the 
part of parents. Punishment may be required ; if 
so, it must be administered, not in anger, not in 
a gust of passion, but in a mild, Christian spirit, 
and with firmness. Let them be taught obedience 
to family government, that they may readily submit 
to the government of the school. Children obed- 
ient to parents become good citizens, obedient 
to the authority of government, and, above all, 
obedient to the law of God. 

3. Self-reliance. It is the duty of the parent 
to teach the child self-reliance. No man who relies 
solely upon others can fulfil his destiny. He must 
ever be imbecile, without strength of character, 
and destitute of that decision which is an attribute 
of moral greatness. To be truly great or good, 
man must feel that he is responsible for his own 
words and actions, and that, to a great extent, his 
destiny is placed in his own hands. 

4. Love of truth. Let the first lessons of child- 
hood be lessons of truth. Let a love of truth be 



310 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

imbibed in the nursery. Let deception, in every 
form, be shunned as a deadly moral poison. Let 
parents, with anxious solicitude, impress the young 
mind and heart with an inviolable regard for the 
truth. Children should be made to feel that lying 
is cowardly, ignoble, base. Exhibit before them 
the purity of truth, its godlike, noble nature, its 
lofty birth, and its glorious rewards. Let false- 
hood be punished sooner than almost any other 
vice, and be ready to forgive a wrong when it is 
candidly confessed. Encourage, both by precept 
and example, a rigid adherence to truth, in all 
circumstances. 

5. Guard against evil associations. The parent 
is the guardian of the child, and this fearfully 
increases parental responsibility. To allow children 
to associate with the low, vulgar, and vicious, is 
a breach of parental obligation, which is always 
followed by bad consequences. "Evil communi- 
cations corrupt good manners,' ' is a proverb that 
every parent should remember, and govern his 
conduct accordingly. Vice imparts to the moral 
atmosphere a deadly infection, which infuses itself 
into the susceptible nature of a child, and produces 
worse than cancerous sores upon it. 

6. Example. The force of example is next to 
omnipotent with childhood. Children almost 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



311 



instinctively follow the example of their parents. 
" Drunken fathers have drunken sons," has been 
reduced to a maxim in illustrating the power of 
example. The influence of parents is felt in every 
word they utter, in every act they perform. And 
when children see them prudent in speech, shun- 
ning all slanderous and profane words, mild in 
their tempers, free from petulance, envy, and jeal- 
ousy, exercising no uncharitableness, exhibiting no 
covetousness, practicing no deception, and guilty 
of no fraud: when they see their parents thus 
blameless in life, an influence in favor of virtue 
almost irresistible comes over them. There is a 
charm in a pure life more powerful than is found in 
the blandishments of wealth, the fascinations of 
eloquence, or the glory of warlike deeds. Let this 
sacred influence be exerted upon the buddings of 
childhood, and the flower will expand in beauty, 
and the richest fruits will reward the faith and 
energy of the good. 

7. Eeligion. Our duty to fear and love God 
should be impressed most deeply upon the youthful 
mind. Christianity is an ornament of grace and a 
crown of glory to the young. "Jesus said, Suffer 
little children to come unto me." "He took them 
up in his arms, and blessed them." Children cannot 
begin to love God too soon. Parents should teach 



312 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

their children that religion is not ascetic, that it 
mars no innocent pleasure, that it offends no refined 
taste, that it never behaves unseemly. The pre- 
cious truths of the Bible, the inimitable parables 
of the Great Teacher, the love of God to a lost 
world, the passion and death of Jesus, will so 
attract and impress the mind of the young, as to 
cause them to make the Bible their book, and its 
God their God. Children should be required to be 
present at family prayer, to be constant in their 
attendance upon church, to remember the Sabbath 
day to keep it holy, and ever to treat with respect 
the ordinances of God. 



SECTION IX. 

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND GOVERNMENT — UNITY — IMPARTIALITY — 
UNIFORMITY — EFFICIENCY — REASONABLENESS. 

The authority of the parents varies with the ages 
of the children. In infancy this authority is neces- 
sarily absolute. From infancy to manhood it gra- 
dually diminishes, until at the latter period it 
entirely ceases. Usually the state determines at 
what time the control of parents shall cease. It is 
a duty of parents to exercise this authority for the 
good of the children, with direct reference to the 
good of the state and the glory of God. 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



313 



1. Parental government should be a unit. The 
want of unity in family government is the destruc- 
tion of authority, and the ruin of domestic tran- 
quillity. When the parents are divided, when one 
is indulgent and the other rigid, when one exacts 
and the other indulges, when one punishes and the 
other pities, then parental dignity succumbs, and 
the bonds of family government are broken asunder. 
Sometimes there may be an honest difference of 
opinion between the husband and wife ; then this 
should be settled privately, and the child should 
never know that such difference existed. The 
children must feel that their parents are one. No 
complaint must be uttered to one concerning the 
other. They must feel that father approves what 
mother does, and that mother unites all her influ- 
ence to that of father in sustaining parental au- 
thority. 

2. Parental government should be impartial. 
"When children feel that more is exacted of one 
than of another, that one is made a servant, and 
another is set up as a gentleman, it produces envy 
and jealousy among them ; their duties become irk- 
some, they lose their love and respect for their 
parents, and the parental authority becomes a yoke 
too grievous to be borne. 

3. It should be uniform. A want of uniformity 

14 



314 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in the exercise of authority is always attended with 
evil consequences. It offers temptations to violate 
authority, so strong as to be almost irresistible. 
Flattery, coaxing, and caresses, followed by out- 
bursts of passion, by harsh words and harsher 
blows, and these, again, succeeded by over-indul- 
gence to every wayward disposition, must ever fail 
to secure either obedience or respect. 

4. It should be efficient. As we have before said, 
children should be made to obey. Obedience must 
be exacted, authority must be sustained. The rod 
must be used when insubordination is manifested. 
For this we have the authority of God. Children 
who have been brought to submission by the use 
of the rod, have acknowledged in after-years that 
benefit resulted from its use ; while those who 
have been allowed to go on in their own way, have 
indulged unavailing regrets that obedience had not 
been enforced by its use. Chastisement should 
never be inflicted in anger, but always in sorrow, 
with affection. 

5. It should be reasonable. God's government 
is preeminently a government of reason. He says 
to his children, " Come now, and let us reason 
together." Thus should parents reason with their 
children. Their experience, their superior know- 
ledge and accumulated wisdom, should be used for 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



315 



the benefit of their children. Parents should be glad 
to give to the young their advice. When the child- 
ren are about to leave the parental roof, and engage 
in whatever vocation they may have selected, 
then is wise counsel greatly needed. Who can 
be expected to give this counsel so well as the 
parents ? 

SECTION X. 

PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS: HOW VIOLATED BY IDLENESS — NEGLECT — - 

FLATTERY — CRUELTY — BAD EXAMPLES. 

From the principles we have laid down, some 
useful deductions may be made in reference to the 
violation of parental duty. 

1. Idleness. Those parents who neglect to pro- 
vide for their own households are worse than infi- 
dels. In this country it must be sheer laziness 
which will prevent a decent maintenance of a 
family, however large. Idle parents who suffer 
their children to go in rags, miserably fed, and with 
no home comforts, deserve the execration of the 
state, and the contempt of all good citizens. 

2. Neglect. When parents fail to procure good 
teachers, they are guilty concerning their children. 
When, for the sake of acquiring wealth, or for the 
sake of political preferment, they spend all their 



316 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

time away from their children, they are sowing 
to the wind, and may expect to reap the whirl- 
wind. "When the mother is at the ball or theatre, 
instead of in the nursery, she involves herself in 
serious guilt, and brings frightful curses upon her 
offspring. Fashionable, pleasure-loving parents are 
planting thorns which will pierce them in old age 
with the deepest anguish. 

3. Flattery. "When parents pamper pride and 
ambition, when they make their children believe 
that they are superior to others, and. thus unfit 
them for the positions which they are capable of 
filling, great guilt is incurred, and great evil is 
produced. "While children are to be taught self- 
reliance, they are equally to be taught humility. 

4. Cruelty. So strong is the natural love of 
parents for their offspring, that we seldom have to 
complain of cruelty. It violates the very constitu- 
tional principles of human and even of brute 
nature ; and a parent becomes a demon before he 
can bring himself to inflict cruelty upon his unof- 
fending, or even upon his erring child. 

5. Bad examples. When parents teach morality 
and fail to exemplify it, the consequences must be 
pernicious. The guilt incurred by setting a bad 
example before children is enormous. We cannot 
condemn in too strong language the utterance of 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



317 



profane or vulgar words, the expression of any 
loose opinions on morality, the exhibition of any 
infidel principles, of any licentious conduct, or the 
indulgence in any inordinate appetite or passion on 
the part of parents, and especially when such ex- 
ample may contaminate their offspring. 

SECTION XI. 

FILIAL DUTIES : OBEDIENCE — AFFECTION — REVERENCE — CARE IN SICK- 
NESS — BEAUTY OF FILIAL PIETY. 

The duties of parents and children are to a great 
extent reciprocal. If children have claims upon 
their parents, their parents have corresponding 
rights in reference to their children. These rights 
and obligations vary, of course, with the conditions 
and ages of their children. 

In order that the numerous duties connected 
with the filial relation may be discharged, God has 
wisely endowed children with filial affection. It is 
natural and universal. It may not be so strong 
as parental affection, but it is sufficiently strong for 
all the duties that devolve upon the child. Its 
implantation indicates the duties which the Divine 
Being requires of children. Its strength and con- 
tinuance during life, unless perverted by bad prin- 
ciples, indicate that filial duties do not cease until 
death dissolves the sacred relation. 



318 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

God has not left ns without clear indications of 
filial duty in his written word. And even a failure 
on the part of parents to do their duty does not 
exonerate the child. 

1. Obedience. " Children, obey your parents in 
the Lord; for this is right." Eph. vi. 1. " Cursed 
be he that setteth light by his father or his mother. 
And all the people shall say, Amen," Deut. xxvii. 
15. Such are the teachings of inspiration on the 
subject of filial obedience ; and they are sanctioned 
by the universal sentiment of mankind. These scrip- 
tures involve, 1st. A positive command to filial obe- 
dience. 2d. They contain & fearful curse in case of 
disobedience. 

This obedience to parents should be cheerful. A 
bright face, an active limb, a cheerful smile should 
accompany the act of obeying a parent's commands. 
It should be cordial. An outward act of obedience 
performed grudgingly loses all its moral beauty 
and effect. 

The question arises here, whether children are 
bound to obey parents when it would be a violation 
of the command of God for them to do so. We 
answer, it can never be right to do wrong. If a 
parent require the child to lie or steal, the command 
should not be obeyed. God's authority is far above 
that of parents, and no parental command can 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



319 



justify disobedience to God. This principle is clear. 
But suppose the child is forbidden by the parents to 
become a member of a certain Christian commu- 
nion. The child is not prohibited from any of the 
duties enjoined upon the Christian : he is allowed 
to read his Bible, to engage in his religious devo- 
tions, to remember the Sabbath, but is forbidden to 
unite with a particular denomination. In such cir- 
cumstances it is much more difficult to decide what 
is duty. The child must examine the whole ques- 
tion calmly and sincerely, must consider that his 
minority will soon terminate, must carefully con- 
sider the nature and extent of filial obligation ; and, 
above all, he must inquire whether his duties to God 
cannot be fulfilled otherwise than by becoming a 
member of the religious denomination to which his 
parents are opposed. If, after all this, he feels it to 
be his duty to God to attach himself to a particular 
branch of the Church, I cannot see but that he 
should do as his conscience dictates. In this case, 
however, the child is supposed to have attained con- 
siderable maturity of intellect, and to have acted 
without bias from any improper source. 

2. Affection. The child is bound to render to the 
parents a deep and constant affection. He should 
cherish filial love. The parents may have foibles, 
may even be stained with crime, but still the child 



V 

320 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

should render to them the homage of an abiding 
attachment, a deep and holy affection. This should 
know no abatement during life. Obedience must 
cease at a certain period, and even during the period 
when it is required it may be wrong to render it, 
but it can never be wrong to love our parents. We 
instinctively look with horror upon those who have 
forgotten to love their parents. They are without 
"natural affection," and have made themselves 
monsters in the estimation of the wise and 
good. 

3. Reverence. " Honor thy father and mother; 
which is the first commandment with promise; 
that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live 
long on the earth." This command, given upon 
Sinai, was thus solemnly reenacted by apostolic 
sanction. Parents may not have had the advan- 
tages which by honest industry they have given their 
children. They may be inferior, consequently, to 
their children in learning and polish ; still they de- 
serve honor. To cherish this respect, to preserve 
it incorrupt, is one of the highest duties of filial 
piety. Reverence to parents should be manifested 
by assiduous attention to the infirmities of age, by 
a sacred regard for their honor in all intercourse 
with men of the world, and by the application of 
such titles as will show that reverence to parents is 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



321 



the prevailing sentiment, and that their honor is 
dearer than the apple of an eye. 

4. Care in sickness and old age. It is a duty 
dictated by filial affection to take care of parents 
when the period arrives that they are unable to take 
care of themselves. Time has brought its changes : 
the parents can no longer command, can no longer 
counsel, can no longer support the child. The 
duties are now reversed. The child must watch 
the steps trembling with age, must guard those 
whose infirmities are bearing them to the tomb, 
must administer with the most earnest piety to their 
every want, must wait around their dying-bed, catch 
their last breath, give them an honorable Christian 
burial, and ever treat with sacred respect the 
memory of the departed. 

, How beautiful is filial piety ! God requires it ; 
nature claims it; and the universal sentiment of 
humanity approves it. Its words of tenderness, its 
patient watchfulness, its earnest seeking to relieve 
the infirmities of old age, excite our admiration. 
Filial piety adorns the sky of our humanity as a 
star of mild and radiant beauty, and sheds abroad a 
lustre almost divine. May its pure light guide the 
youth for whose benefit this book is written ; and 
may they all feel it their highest honor to love, 
obey, and reverence their parents. 
14* 



822 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION XII. 

FRATEHNAL DUTIES .* MUTUAL AFFECTION — REFERENCE OF DISPUTES TO 
PARENTS — SUBMISSION TO THE WILL OF PARENTS — -MUTUAL RE- 
SPECT — MUTUAL FORBEARANCE. 

God has wisely ordered that in the same family, 
around the same hearthstone, brothers and sisters 
should be reared. The duties of this relation are, 

1. Mutual affection. Children should love each 
other. They should be taught to love, and by offices 
of kindness, and by words of tenderness, they should 
seek to be loved. "When we see a family of parents 
and children, brothers and sisters, all loving and 
beloved, it suggests to us the day of millennial 
peace. But a family where all is dissension, where 
no love prevails, where suspicion, envy, and jealousy 
reign, where brother quarrels with brother, and 
sister indulges hatred to sister, reminds us of 
the deep depravity of our nature, and fills us with 
apprehensions of the future. Children of the same 
family, nurtured at the same maternal bosom, in- 
structed by the same parental lips, with the same 
blood flowing in their veins, should never forget to 
love each other. The same pulsation should heat 
in every bosom, the same light should irradiate 
every countenance, and the same spirit should 
breathe in every word and action. This affection 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



323 



should continue after they are dispersed from the 
home circle, where heart responded to heart for 
so many years. They may be separated by almost 
immeasurable distances and for long periods, but 
still their love is to know no abatement. By oc- 
casional reunions, and by those silent missives of 
affection, endearing letters, they should feed the 
flame of love. 

2. In cases of difficulties arising in the family 
circle, let the question be referred to the parents. 
The disinterestedness of the parents must not be 
doubted, and all parties must be willing to abide 
the decision. 

3. In the case of division of property, the chil- 
dren should be willing to submit to parental de- 
cision. Better have no patrimony, than to have 
it at the expense of family peace and brotherly 
affection. It is sad to see brothers at daggers'- 
points over the ashes of their parents. 

4. Mutual respect for each other's reputation. 
Be careful to say nothing that can wound the 
reputation of a brother or sister. Their reputa- 
tion is yours : in proportion as they suffer, so 
must you suffer. Let no word of cruelty ever 
escape your lips; let no suspicion ever be hinted 
that must, while it blasts others, recoil with a 
deadly influence upon you. 



324 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

5. Mutual forbearance. In every relation of life 
this virtue is needed. Man is inclined to selfish- 
ness ; and when difficulties assail him, or apparent 
injustice is done him, he has to call into action all 
the forbearance of which he is capable. This virtue 
is especially needed when there is a turbulent mem- 
ber in the family. An ill-tempered sister, a fretful 
brother, may be subdued by forbearance. A selfish 
boy may so have his selfishness put to the blush, as 
actually to become noble and generous. 

SECTION XIII. 

DUTIES OF TEACHERS AND PUPILS — TEACHERS SHOULD HAVE THOR- 
OUGH QUALIFICATION PUNCTUALITY — ENERGY — DISCIPLINE — CARE 

OF THE MORALS OF PUPILS — PUPILS SHOULD EXHIBIT OBEDIENCE 

ATTENTION — DOCILITY — COURTEOUSNESS. 

The duties of teachers and pupils are embraced 
principally under the heads of parental and filial 
duties ; for the teacher is universally admitted to 
be in loco parentis, (in the place of a parent.) But 
these duties are modified by the peculiarities of 
their relative positions. 

DUTIES OF TEACHERS. 

1. The teacher should seek a thorough qualifica- 
tion for his work. An ignorant man (or woman) is 
not fit to teach. Let him with laborious industry 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



325 



seek to obtain all the intellectual qualifications 
which may be necessary to impart instruction with 
success. He should never appear before his class 
without a thorough preparation on the lesson to be 
recited. He may have given instruction on the 
same subject hundreds of times, and yet he 
should not trust himself without a special pre- 
paration. 

2. Punctuality. The teacher should be at his 
post always in time. By example he should teach 
his scholars to be punctual. A want of punctuality 
on the part of the instructor will beget carelessness 
on the part of the pupils. They will begin to hope 
that he will not be at the school in time, and will 
take license to absent themselves, or to postpone 
preparation for reciting. If the teacher be in the 
habit of delaying, of causing his pupils to wait 
beyond tjie appointed hour, he will soon lose his 
influence, and his school will be scattered. 

3. Energy. No man can be successful as a 
teacher without energy. His business is not to sit 
and hear lessons. He must impart instruction, 
communicate knowledge, develop thought, educate 
the mind. Without energy of thought and action 
he cannot discharge his various duties and fulfil his 
noble mission. A lazy teacher is a disgrace to the 
profession. 



326 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. He should govern well. His discipline should 
be mild but firm. It should be impartial and con- 
sistent. If at any time he should be called upon 
by a stern sense of duty to use the rod, he should 
not hesitate, but he should ever use it as an afflicted 
parent, and not as a revengeful tyrant. He should 
feel it his first duty to govern himself, and then 
he will be apt to be successful in governing 
others. 

5. He should guard the morals of the young. 
He should feel his deep responsibility on this sub- 
ject, and should exert all his powers, by word and 
deed, to improve the heart, to correct the vices, to 
refine the manners, and to cultivate the virtues of 
the young. He should feel that he is educating for 
the state, for God, for eternity ; and no duty should 
be neglected which can make virtue attractive and 
vice hateful. It will be proper for him to present 
the attractions of the Bible, and to urge upon the 
young the solemn duty that rests upon them to 
read God's word. And in order that his teaching 
here be successful, he should exemplify the highest 
morality in his own conduct. Let him practice no 
deception upon his pupils, or attempt through them 
to practice deception upon their parents or the 
public. When he attempts to do this, his influence 
as a moral man is gone. 



FAMILY ETHICS. 



327 



DUTIES OF PUPILS. 

Pupils are too apt to look upon their teachers as 
enemies. Let their first duty be to regard them as 
friends. Pupils should treat their teachers with 
respect, and should ever entertain a sacred regard 
for their feelings. They will thus be prepared to 
render, 

1. Obedience to the commands of the teacher. 
No school can exist without government; and 
pupils should feel it a duty to sustain the teacher in 
all his efforts to secure good order. They should 
discountenance all acts of insubordination and 
rebellion. 

2. Pupils should endeavor to understand the 
instructions of their teacher. They should seek 
to be thorough scholars. They should go over 
nothing in a superficial manner. They should ever 
remember, that if any thing deserves to be learned, 
it deserves to be thoroughly learned. 

3. Pupils should be docile. Docility is abso- 
lutely essential to thorough learning. An impu- 
dent, egotistical, self-inflated scholar, is never a 
good scholar. He is an annoyance to the teacher, 
and a serious injury to the school. He thinks he 
knows more than the teacher, and is therefore fre- 
quently interrupting the recitation, calling in ques- 
tion the plainest truths, advancing the most absurd 



328 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

opinions, and maintaining them with a dogged 
stubbornness. 

4. Courteousness. Pupils should be courteous 
to the teacher, and polite to each other. Nothing 
is more out of place than boorishness among pupils. 
The law of kindness should control them. The 
school should be a family, in which the teacher 
should be a father, and the pupils brothers and 
sisters. £To envyings and jealousies should exist in 
the school. Here should be found the strongest 
attachments, unalloyed by selfishness, and unworn 
by time. Here are no conflicting interests, and 
here peace and harmony should prevail. 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 



329 



CHAPTER VI. 

DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 
SECTION I. 

1BOLITION OF SLAVERY — RESULTS — DIFFERENT RACES — NEGRO RACE, INFE- 
RIORITY OF — CAUCASIAN RACE, SUPERIORITY OF. 

The abolition of slavery renders the discussion 
of that subject unnecessary. 

Time alone can unfold the full results of a revo- 
lution which has not only set free four millions of 
human beings, but which has made of them citi- 
zens, and has placed in their hands the right of suf- 
frage. Negroes, who, when this work was first is- 
sued, were in slavery, are to-day invested with all 
the rights of citizenship, can serve on juries, and 
can hold any judicial, legislative, or executive office 
to which they may be chosen. Without a knowl- 
edge of letters, and utterly ignorant of the great 
principles of constitutional government, they may 
occupy any station of profit or of trust, from that 
of the Chief Magistrate of the nation to the hum- 
blest office within the gift of the people. 



330 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Our duties to these people are no longer the du- 
ties of masters to slaves. They are, however, the 
duties of superiors to inferiors. 

It is shown in the " Elements of Mental Philoso- 
phy" that the nigritian, or negro race, is inferior 
to all the other races of human beings. That this 
race should have been so suddenly invested with 
such power as is implied in the right to vote 
and hold any office, is one of the most astounding 
events of the present century. It is, however^ an 
event with which the moralist has to grapple, and 
it involves practical duties which we must calmly 
discuss and faithfully discharge. 

The young men and the young women into 
whose hands this treatise will fall, and for whose 
benefit it is designed, are supposed to belong to the 
Caucasian race — a race the superior in mind, in 
civilization, and in moral development, not only to 
the negro race, but to all other races of human 
beings. The discussion, then, of this really deli- 
cate and momentous subject will bring us to a 
knowledge of the duties of superiors to inferiors. 
The inferiority of those in reference to whom these 
duties arise, being an inferiority of race, increases 
the difficulty of our task. 

This inferiority is so marked, and has continued 
so long, that there is no more prospect of its being 



DUTIEo OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 331 



removed than of the Ethiopian's changing his skin. 
It is seen in the smaller size of the brain, in th^ 
diminution of the facial angle, and in the less deli- 
cate nervous organization of the body, and in all 
the manifestations of mind as well. The negro has 
raised no monument to his own genius. He has 
done literally nothing in discovery or invention. 
His star has never shone in the sky of literature, 
and in the world of mind he has been almost a 
blank. The great men of ancient times did not 
arise from, nor belong to, that race. The great 
men of modern times do not assimilate to the negro 
race. In the past, as a race, they have never shown 
themselves capable of high intellectual effort. If 
the races were equal when the work of progress 
began, they are not now equal, nor is it probable 
they ever will be equal again. The advantage 
already secured by the Caucasian race will be kept 
until the ages shall cease. 

SECTION II. 

FIRST DUTY : TO PREVENT RELAPSE INTO BARBARISM — DANGER OF THIS — 
DIFFICULTY OF PREVENTING — ANTAGONISM AROUSED — THE DUTY DOE3 
NOT INCLUDE SOCIAL EQUALITY — DANGER OF SOCIAL EQUALITY — INDI- 
CATIONS OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE — SHOULD NOT FIGHT AGAINST GOD 

RACES MUST BE KEPT DISTINCT — AMALGAMATION. 

The first great duty, then, devolving on the supe- 
rior race, is to prevent, as far as possible, the infe- 
rior from going back to barbarism. 



332 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

This is the universal tendency of the negro race. 
By contact with the white race the negro has 
attained all of civilization, acquired all of learning, 
and enjoyed all of religious privilege or culture, 
which have served to elevate him in the scale of 
being, and save him from the degradation in which 
he is found in his native Africa. Let slavery be 
denounced as it may be, and remain abolished as it 
is now, it presented to the world the negro in the 
Southern States of America in every way improved 
and advanced from his condition in Africa. Sep- 
arate him from the white man, and he at once sinks 
into all the ignorance and superstition of his ances- 
tors. Let this be prevented by all the means in 
the power of the superior race. 

At this time, the difficulty of accomplishing this 
work is very great. The asperities of war have 
scarcely passed away. An influence has been 
brought to bear upon the ignorant negro which 
has roused within him an antagonism to the native 
population of the Southern States. This antagon- 
ism has to be overcome. "We must bring tact, for- 
bearance, benevolence, and perseverance, in order 
to overcome it. It must be shown that the inter- 
ests of the two races existing in the same territory 
must be identical. Friendship must exist between 
the races, or the greatest calamities will inevitably 



DUTIES OP SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 333 

result. When the negro turns away from all the 
friends of his youth, when he refuses to take advice 
from those who are his real friends, when he deter- 
mines to follow his own counsels, or to unite his 
destinies with the low and depraved, his condition 
will be a thousand-fold worse than it has ever been 
on this continent. The more superstitious he be- 
comes, the less he will be fitted to discharge the 
duties of citizenship. The more rapid his descent 
into barbarism, the more certain his ruin, and the 
greater will be the calamity to the whole country. 
Self-interest, patriotism, and love of the human race, 
and, above all, our obligations to God, should cause 
the putting forth of every power by which to arrest 
the ruin of one race, and prevent a terrible calamity 
to the other. By dependence on the superior race, 
and consequently by the conservative influence 
which that race may exert upon him, the negro 
may be restrained from voudooism, preserved from 
idolatry and barbarism, and saved to the country as 
a useful element of society. 

The duty here presented does not include social 
equality. This is not demanded by the word of 
God, and seems to be directly opposed by the law 
of Nature. According to the Scriptures, a man has 
a right to choose his own associates, provided he 
takes care to avoid evil communications which cor- 



334 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rupt good manners. Social equality implies inter- 
marriage, and must bring with it all the horrible 
consequences of miscegenation. A mixed race is 
now struggling for existence in Mexico. One while 
it is a republic, and then an empire, but most 
of all in a state of anarchy. It has no stability. 
It evinces no progress. It exhibits no power of 
self-government. No patriot, no Christian, can 
desire to see this fair land in possession of such a 
race. The relation, then, of the two races has 
been determined by God himself. He has marked 
the two races by distinctions — physical, intellectual, 
and moral—so broad and deep, that any attempt to 
efface them would be fighting against God. I can 
conceive no greater calamity to the races, except 
their extinction. I can conceive no greater disre- 
gard of the indications of Divine Providence than 
would be manifested by an attempt to annihilate 
distinctions which have not resulted from the action 
of human governments, from the influence of edu- 
cation, from the progress of civilization, nor from 
any act of man at all, but from the direct power of 
God. Let there be no interference with Divine 
Providence. Let the races be distinct, as God made 
them. And as social equality must result in amal- 
gamation, let social equality be avoided. It is not 
merely a matter of taste, which, when refined, turns 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 335 

away with disgust from such alliances, nor is it a 
matter of present expediency, to be settled without 
reference to the future, but it is a matter of deepest 
moment to the progress of civilization, the stability 
of government, and the interests of the country, for 
all coming time. Man never interferes with God's 
work, without marring it, as he makes it in his own 
way, and for the accomplishment of his own great 
purposes. Man cannot violate a law of Nature 
without suffering the penalty. It has ever been so, 
and it ever will be so as long as God is immutable. 
It is not for man to change the order of God's uni- 
verse, nor to attempt to fight against God. On the 
other hand, let us bow meekly to the will of God, 
whether that will be manifested in his word or in 
his works, and we shall accomplish for ourselves 
and for others all that duty demands, and all that 
philanthropy requires. 

SECTION III. 

SECOND DUTY: EDUCATION — RESULTS OP IGNORANT LEGISLATION— EDUCA- 
TION THE ONLY REMEDY — NO MIXED SCHOOLS. 

I hold, in the second place, that it is the duty of 
the superior race to see, as far as possible, to the 
education of the inferior race. The more intelli- 
gent the negro becomes, the better for him and the 
better for the white man. 



336 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The tendency of ignorant legislation is to retard 
education. This has been one of the legitimate 
and mournful results of committing the great inter- 
ests of legislation to persons entirely unlettered. 
It is an evil with which we have to contend. It 
requires a profound philosophy to devise a remedy. 
My own opinion is, that the results of ignorant and 
corrupt legislation are already so marked that uni- 
versal public opinion must demand a change. In- 
tellect must at last control. Virtue will rise, even 
though depressed for ages. The remedy for the 
evils to which we have alluded is, to educate the 
inferior race up to a sense of the responsibilities of 
citizenship. They must have schools. Teachers 
must be employed. The work of instruction must 
be committed to competent hands. It has been a 
terrible calamity, that so sacred a right as that of 
suffrage has been placed in such incompetent hands. 
For this, the people that have suffered most have 
been the least responsible. Had this right been 
denied to all that were incompetent to read and 
write, it would have been a great stimulus to 
learning. Had no one been allowed to sit on a 
jury, and try and decide cases involving all that 
is clear to man on earth, then the evil would not 
have been so unmixed. No one can conceive all 
the injury that has resulted to education alone, 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 337 

much less to all the interests of the country, from 
throwing such responsibilities upon persons inca- 
pable of comprehending their nature, or of per- 
forming the duties connected with relations of the 
importance of which they were totally ignorant. 
In view of these facts, it becomes a matter of the 
highest importance to the preservation of all that 
remains of material substance, of intellectual cul- 
ture, of social refinement, or of civil or religious 
liberty, to see to the education of the inferior race. 
It will be for the political economist to devise the 
means of education, and to determine the plan. 
Nothing is more certain than that, unless these peo- 
ple are educated, ruin is inevitable, speedy, and per- 
manent. It is not only our duty to throw no impedi- 
ment in the way of their being educated, but to do 
all in our power to encourage education among 
them. 

This does not imply that the two races are to be 
educated in the same schools. As I believe God 
made the races distinct, and that man should not 
attempt to destroy the distinction which Infinite 
Wisdom has seen fit to make, so I believe that 
schools for the two races should be distinct. In- 
stead of elevating the inferior race, mixed schools 
would serve to degrade the superior. 
15 



338 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION IV. 

THIRD DUTY : THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION TO BE INCULCATED — PRESENT 
DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME — SUNDAY-SCHOOLS. 

The blessings of Christianity must he given and 
secured to the inferior in all the fullness in which 
they are enjoyed by the superior race. Their spir- 
itual and eternal interests must be eared for. They 
must continue to have preached to them the gospel 
of the grace of God. 

Great difficulties have always stood in the way 
of the Church. Truth has always had its conflicts. 
The gospel has always met with opposition. A 
race eager to hear the gospel from the lips of intel- 
ligent white men is now no longer willing to hear 
it from such lips. A docile race has become in- 
tractable. And now, what is to be done? "With 
increased difficulties there must be increased effort. 
We must have patience, forbearance, persistency. 
Duty must be above every other consideration. A 
relapse into idolatry is greatly to be feared. It 
must be prevented. Christianity is the only anti- 
dote. It is the leaven which is to leaven our entire 
humanity, of which this race is a part. £To preju- 
dice of caste or color, no violence of passion, no 
amount of opposition, should deter from the dis- 
charge of duty, or present the offer of salvation to 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 339 

a people who once received it so thankfully, and 
rejoiced in it so greatly. Vital piety is in peril, 
and eternal interests are at stake. 

The Sunday-school will be a great auxiliary to 
the day-school, and an invaluable assistance to the 
pulpit. It begins its work of evangelism at the 
right time. It impresses the heart with relig- 
ious truth, while it is tender and impressible. It 
should be employed with energy to mold character, 
and save from vice, ignorance, and ruin. The man 
or the woman that establishes the Sunday-school 
for the refinement of the negro race is doing a work 
for all time. It may require self-denial, and may 
tax all the powers of endurance as well as evoke 
all the energies, and demand the exercise of all the 
active and passive virtues; but, cost what it may, 
the work must be done, faithfully done, for the 
honor of God and the good of man. The man 
that can do this work, at this time, is little less than 
a hero. He as much deserves a crown as any mar- 
tyr that ever died for the faith. 



SECTION V. 

FOURTH DUTY! JUSTICE — NO INVASION OF EIGHTS — NO UNLAWFUL COM- 
BINATIONS — HORRORS OF A WAR OF RACES — DANGER OF COLLISIONS — 
POWER OF PUBLIC OPINION. 



Let justice be done this race. It has suffered 



340 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

often from the grossest injustice. No advantage 
must be taken in making or carrying out a con- 
tract. 

The right of every individual must be carefully 
respected. These people must not be oppressed. 
We must remember the past, and must not ignore 
the means that have been employed to provoke 
them to think evil, and to plot evil, against those 
who formerly occupied a different relation to them. 

No combination must be formed against them. 
No violence must be allowed. Justice demands 
that no fraud, no deception, be practiced, and no 
outrages committed against a people that are really 
not accountable for the false position into which 
they are sometimes thrown. They have rights, sa- 
cred rights, which must not be invaded. Let them 
enjoy their rights without intimidation and moles- 
tation. Let the good and generous exert all their 
influence to repress violence, however greatly such 
violence may be sometimes provoked. While it is 
the duty of every man to defend the right, it is the 
disgrace of any man to defraud the ignorant, intim- 
idate the cowardly, oppress the feeble, or injure the 
unoffending. 

A war of races would entail untold misery upon 
a land still mourning from the calamities of war. 
I know of to calamity that could befall this coun- 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 341 



try which could compare with that resulting from 
a war of races. Acts of gross injustice, repeated 
by either race toward the other, must end in a 
strife, which would be the annihilation of one 
race, and the source of incalculable misery to the 
other. 

When two races are compelled by circumstances 
to live together, the danger of collision is always 
imminent. This danger is increased when the 
races are as far apart as the Caucasian and the 
African. It may also be increased by a sudden 
change in the condition of one race, as from 
slavery to freedom. Such are the facts now exist- 
ing among us. In such a state of things it is not 
difficult to kindle a flame which cannot easily be 
extinguished. Bad men may be found, whose 
depravity may lead them to excite one race against 
the other, to create disturbances at every public 
gathering, and bring about collisions whenever pos- 
sible. Such men are little less than fiends, and 
deserve the execration of mankind. "The poison 
of asps is under their lips ; whose mouth is full of 
cursing and bitterness; their feet are swift to shed 
blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, 
and the way of peace have they not known ; there 
is no fear of God before their eyes." From such 
we must withdraw ourselves. A rigid adherence 



342 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to justice, which will allow the infraction of no 
rights, is absolutely essential to the preservation of 
peace, to the cultivation of good morals, to the 
growth and prosperity of the country, to the ele- 
vation of the inferior race, and to the safety of 
both. Wicked men must be restrained from 
kindling the worst passions of the human heart. 
Lawless combinations, formed by either race, must 
be repressed. 

Public opinion must be set against all violations 
of law and order. Acts of injustice must meet 
with universal condemnation ; justice must reign 
and peace be preserved. I admit the difficulty of 
the path which must be trodden, and am deeply 
impressed with the purity and elevation of moral 
character which must be cultivated, in order to the 
preservation of peace, law, and order. Such prin- 
ciples of truth and justice must be cultivated as 
no temptation can allure, no bribe can corrupt, and 
no power can extirpate. In navigating a perilous 
sea, we need a pilot of unusual skill, firmness, and 
presence of mind. So in managing the affairs of 
great communities, composed of every variety of 
character and of different races of men, we need 
every virtue that can command respect, win favor, 
or impart power, to produce great results. Among 
these virtues none shines with more luster, and 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 343 

none should be cultivated with more assiduity, than 
justice. 

SECTION VI. 

FIFTH DUTY! FORBEARANCE GREAT NEED OF IT — A LOFTY VIRTUE. 

To be patient In adversity is not so easy in 
practice as it is beautiful in theory. It requires 
more than courage; it demands fortitude to bear 
injuries with equanimity, and. insults with calm- 
ness. In the state of things. now existing, and des- 
tined to continue for some time to come, there is 
great need of forbearance. In the exercise of this 
virtue, it will greatly assist us if we reflect that 
many allowances are to be made for the conduct of 
the inferior race. It must be remembered that the 
negro has been a slave, or a barbarian, from time 
immemorial ; that he has but recently been invested 
with all the rights of American citizenship; that 
influences have been brought to bear upon him to 
make him believe that the superior race is inimical 
to him, and desires nothing so much as to place 
him again in slavery. In such circumstances, it is 
no marvel if he does many foolish and wicked 
things. But is it not the part of a magnanimous 
mind to exercise forbearance? For the sake of the 
past, which brings up many pleasing recollections 
of service rendered, and deep devotion exhibited, 



344 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and for the sake of the future, which must be dark 
or bright, stormy or calm, as we direct, let there be 
the greatest forbearance always exercised to the 
inferior race. 

It has been truly said; " Indeed, it is commonly 
not difficult for men to be active, or even bravely 
so; but when you come to the passive or reclin- 
ing side of life, here they fail. To bear evil and 
wrong; to forgive; to suffer no resentment for in- 
jury ; to be gentle when nature burns with a fierce 
heat, and pride clamors for redress; to restrain 
envy; to bear defeat with a firm and peaceful 
mind ; not to be vexed or fretted by cares, hopes, 
or petty injuries ; to abide in contentment and 
serenity of spirit when trouble and disappointment 
come — these are conquests, alas, how difficult to 
most of us!" 

Just here, and just at this time, a rare combina- 
tion of circumstances gives the opportunity, and 
creates a very great demand, for the exercise of 
endurance, for the cultivation of forbearance, and 
for the exhibition of all the passive virtues, whose 
luster does not dazzle like the sun, but whose efful- 
gence is like the mellow light of the evening star. 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 



345 



SECTION VII. 

SIXTH DUTY! LIBERALITY — GIVE EMPLOYMENT — MASTER AND SERVANT! 

1. NO UNJUST EXACTIONS^ 2. GOOD "WAGES j 3. SPIRITUAL WELFARE 

NO INJURY TO MORALS. 

The superior can well afford to be liberal to the 
inferior. 

From a sense of duty, employment should be 
given to those in inferior position. All things 
being equal, I should give the preference to the 
negro as a farmer or as a domestic. I have always 
doubted the correctness of that theory which pro- 
poses to bring amongst us a third race. This will 
only serve to increase our difficulties by increasing 
our complications. The rich lands of the South 
must not lie idle. Cotton is still in great demand. 
Other products of the soil are constantly needed. 
Let the landlord see that his fields do not lie idle. 
The negro is probably the very best cultivator of 
the soil. Let employment be given to him, and on 
the most liberal terms. 

The wisdom and patriotism of the owner of the 
soil will enable him to adjust himself to the recent 
change of relations, from that of master and slave 
to that of master and servant. 

As this latter relation will probably exist so long 
as society shall continue, the duties connected with 
.15* 



346 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

this relation may now be explained. I do not 
know that it is desired by any person that slavery 
should be reestablished. I know of no such desire, 
unless it may exist in the bosoms of old family ser- 
vants, who have most reluctantly been separated 
from the guardianship of those who attended faith- 
fully to all of their wants. Regrets have been 
sadly expressed by those who no longer could de- 
pend upon the watchful care of others to supply all 
their needs. There is certainly no general desire 
to accomplish another revolution. "We may then 
regard it as permanent, that the relation of mas- 
ter and slave will never more exist on this conti- 
nent, and that the relation of master and servant 
involves such duties as in the first edition of this 
work were comprehended under the former rela- 
tion. 

1. The master must not exact more from his ser- 
vant than was embraced either in the letter or 
spirit of the contract. This would create discon- 
tent, and would render the relations between the 
parties exceedingly unpleasant. Tasks that bear 
too heavily upon the laborer have seldom resulted 
in good to the capitalist, and have always done 
harm to society. Such exactions beget suspicion, 
arouse envy, extinguish sympathy, destroy mutual 
confidence, give cause for complaint, tempt to dis- 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 347 

honesty, and should therefore be carefully avoided. 
The imposition of merciless tasks even upon the 
lower animals is wrong, and, of course, the sin is 
increased in magnitude when the tasks are imposed 
upon human beings. 

2. The laborer is worthy of his hire. Let good 
wages be paid, according to contract. The laborer 
must live. He is entitled to enough to support 
him while he lives, and his wages must not be 
reduced below this standard. The conflict between 
the capitalist and the laborer has been long-con- 
tinued, and often violent. The capitalist desires 
labor at the lowest price, while the laborer desires 
the highest price. The law of supply and demand 
will usually exercise a controlling influence upon 
the wages of labor. When the supply of labor is 
abundant, wages will be low; but when there is a 
lack of laborers, the competition among capitalists 
will cause the wages to rise. These facts may not 
be known to the laborer, or there may be a combi- 
nation among capitalists to keep down the wages 
of labor, or some advantage may be sought by the 
employer, by which to obtain labor at less than its 
value. All this is wrong. Honesty requires us to 
do unto others as we would have them do unto 
us. Strict integrity forbids the employment of any 
means in order to avoid obedience to this law. It 



348 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

was regarded as a duty to the slave to give him for 
his labor a comfortable habitation, an abundance 
of good food, and suitable clothing, while he was in 
health, to see that he was properly attended during 
sickness, and to take care of him in old age. Sim- 
ple labor ought at least to have this reward, if no 
more. 

3. The master should afford sufficient opportunity 
to the servant to attend to his spiritual welfare. 
The privilege of attending church should not be 
denied. We have shown that the superior is al- 
ways responsible to some extent for the moral cul- 
ture of the inferior. Inferiors have precious souls, 
whose interests must not be neglected by those 
who must exert an influence over them for either 
weal or woe. Let masters see to it that this influ- 
ence is wielded for the good of the servant in this 
life and in the life to come. In attending to the 
spiritual welfare of the servant, the master must 
set no bad example, must not corrupt the heart, 
nor make vice appear less horrible than it really is. 
The crime of seduction is at all times horrible, but 
its turpitude is fearfully increased when it is com- 
mitted against an inferior and a dependent. The 
value of the soul is too great, and its eternal inter- 
ests are too precious, to be disregarded by any who 
may have it in their power to convert a sinner from 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 349 

the error of his way, and save a soul from death. 
"He that winneth souls is wise, and they that turn 
many to righteousness shall shine as the stars for- 
ever and ever." Let not, then, the spiritual wel- 
fare of the servant be neglected. 

SECTION VIII. 

DUTIES OF SERVANTS! FIDELITY — NO EYE - SERVICE — CHEERFULNESS — 
POLITENESS — OBEDIENCE. 

The duties of servants are easily understood, and 
may therefore be explained in few words. 

1. Servants should feel that their interests are 
for the time identified with those of their employer. 
"Whatever employed to do, they are bound to do as 
for themselves. Hence the work should be done 
with perfect fidelity, so as fully to promote the in- 
terests of the employer. 

2. Servants should be conscientious, and should 
do the work assigned them as well without the su- 
pervision of the master as with it. They must 
serve, but not with eye-service as men-pleasers. 
There should be no need of the eye of the master 
to prompt them to zeal and fidelity. 

3. The work should be done cheerfully. There 
should be no murmuring. Having promised to do 
the work, servants should perform it with an active 



350 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

step and a cheerful heart. A murmuring, com- 
plaining servant is an annoyance to every member 
of the family. For such servants it will be diffi- 
cult to secure a place, and still more difficult to 
retain it. 

4. The servant should be polite. Politeness is 
always attractive ; it is especially so in humble life. 
Like charity, it never behaves itself unseemly. It 
wins upon the feelings of the employer, and secures 
a better position for the servant. It never comes 
amiss, and is always appreciated by those whose 
good opinion is worth deserving. 

5. " Servants, obey in all things your masters ac- 
cording to the flesh." "Be obedient to them that 
are your masters according to the flesh, with fear 
and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto 
Christ; with good will doing service, as to the 
Lord, and not to man; knowing that whatsoever 
good thing any man doeth, the same shall he re- 
ceive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free." 
"Exhort servants to be obedient unto their own 
masters, and to please them well in all things; not 
answering again, not purloining, but showing all 
good fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of 
God our Saviour in all things." Such is the teach- 
ing of the Holy Scriptures on this subject. And al- 
though these duties were enjoined upon those whose 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 351 

servitude was involuntary, they are not the less bind- 
ing upon those who voluntarily contract to do ser- 
vice for another. The temporary character of the 
service does not lessen the obligation to fulfill the 
duties with a conscience void of offense toward 
God and man. 

CONCLUSION. 

Truly we have been led by a way we had not 
known* During the years of study which has 
conducted to conclusions that we believe to be 
true, we have had constantly in view the good of 
the young and rising generation. If obligation be 
ultimate, and if duty be the great business of 
moral beings, we cannot be far wrong in our view 
of virtue, and we must be right in all that pertains 
to practical morals. The satisfaction which we 
have felt, as we have seen moral obligation cleared 
of all obscurity, and shining like the path of the 
just, has been of the highest order. 

We have to urge all that may have traveled with 
us along this path to cultivate every virtue, to be 
strong in every noble principle, to neglect no op- 
portunity of doing good, and to consecrate them- 
selves to every good word and work. Never did 
the country more need than at this time men of un- 



352 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

compromising integrity, of unfaltering courage, of 
uncomplaining fortitude, and of sincere patriotism 
and piety. It needs them for the State and for the 
Church. It needs them to arrest vice, to purify 
politics, to give independence to the judiciary, to 
exalt private worth, and to fill places that have been 
disgraced by ignorance and crime. It needs them 
to save the government from the ruin that threat- 
ens, and to rescue liberty from its perils. It needs 
men of wisdom to counsel, and of nerve to do or 
die for truth and God. If the principles advocated 
in this little volume shall tend to the development 
of such men, then is our work not in vain. 

isTor have we been less anxious as to the purity 
and goodness of our women. Women are needed 
whose gentleness and truth, whose modesty and 
intelligence, whose refinement and piety, shall 
bring back to the land fraternity which has been 
sacrificed, purity which has been corrupted, and 
patriotism as unselfish as it shall be noble and true. 
To bring out such characters is worthy the best 
efforts of all that love their race. That such has 
been my aim in all these pages I am sure. I may 
therefore express the hope that many shall be 
guided to truth by studying these principles, and 
that by putting them in practice they may give the 
highest evidence of their value, I close them with 



DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 353 

a fervent prayer to God that the future of our 
country may lack neither noble men nor pure 
women, and that the present volume may con- 
tribute something to increase the number of both. 



THE END. 



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